Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 3 Vol. 22: No. 3 (Summer 2017)

Article 7

Summer 2017

2016 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases and
Public Laws of Note

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Civil
Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Criminal Law
Commons, Family Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Property Law and Real
Estate Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
(2017) "2016 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases and Public Laws of Note," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 22 : Iss. 3 ,
Article 7.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol22/iss3/7

This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

2016 Survey of Rhode Island Law
CASES
Administrative Procedure
Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Jamestown,
142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016)........................................................ 696
Arbitration
Lemerise v. Commerce Ins. Co.,
137 A.3d 696 (R.I. 2016)........................................................ 704
Civil Procedure
Albanese v. Town of Narragansett,
135 A.3d 1179 (R.I. 2016) ..................................................... 710
Manning v. Bellafiore,
139 A.3d 505 (R.I. 2016)........................................................ 717
Constitutional Law
State v. Gonzalez,
136 A.3d 1131 (R.I. 2016) ..................................................... 725
Contract Law
S. Cty. Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon,
116 A.3d 204 (R.I. 2015)........................................................ 738
Voccola v. Forte,
139 A.3d 404 (R.I. 2016)........................................................ 747
Criminal Law
State v. Breton,
138 A.3d 800 (R.I. 2016)........................................................ 754

693

694 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:693
State v. Burgess,
138 A.3d 195 (R.I. 2016)........................................................759
State v. Davis,
131 A.3d 679 (R.I. 2016)........................................................766
State v. Florez,
138 A.3d 789 (R.I. 2016)........................................................773
State v. Fry,
130 A.3d 812 (R.I. 2016)........................................................781
State v. Gaudreau,
139 A.3d 433 (R.I. 2016)........................................................793
Tempest v. State,
141 A.3d 677 (R.I. 2016)........................................................802
Family Law
Hogan v. McAndrew,
131 A.3d 717 (R.I. 2016)........................................................816
In re B.H.,
138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016)........................................................824
Government
Shine v. Moreau,
119 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2015)............................................................832
Labor & Employment Law
Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC,
134 A.3d 173 (R.I. 2016)........................................................842
Medical Malpractice
Ribeiro v. R.I. Eye Inst.,
138 A.3d 761 (R.I. 2016)........................................................848
Mortgage Law
Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho,
127 A.3d 897 (R.I. 2015)........................................................857
Premise Liability
Roy v. State,
139 A.3d 480 (R.I. 2016)........................................................863

2017]

SURVEY SECTION

695

Property Law
Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mardo,
140 A.3d 106 (R.I. 2016)........................................................869
Public Records
Providence Journal Co. v. R.I. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
136 A.3d 1168 (R.I. 2016)......................................................880
Tort Law
Hyde v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence,
139 A.3d 452 (R.I. 2016)........................................................888
LEGISLATION
2016 Public Laws of Note .......................................................... 895

Administrative Procedure. Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of
Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016). An appeal from a trial
court’s denial of reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal
Access to Justice for Small Business and Individuals Act (EAJA)
requires a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island. A municipal zoning board of review is an agency under the
EAJA, and a variance hearing before the board is an adjudicatory
proceeding under the same Act for purposes of seeking reasonable
litigation expenses.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In September 2010, Plaintiffs Henry and Mary Tarbox
(Plaintiffs) sought to convert their single-family home in
Jamestown into a duplex to allow Henry Tarbox’s mother to live
with them.1 Even though the town’s zoning ordinance allowed
this kind of use in the zone where their house was located, the
parcel of land that they owned did not have the required
dimensions to accommodate a duplex in compliance with the
zoning laws.2 In response, the Plaintiffs filed an application for a
dimensional variance with the zoning board of review of
Jamestown (Zoning Board).3 At the hearing for the variance
application, the Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, and Henry
Tarbox testified on his own behalf; the Zoning Board questioned
both Henry and his counsel extensively.4 No one came forward to
oppose the variance application, and the Zoning Board heard no
evidence in opposition to the variance application.5 Despite the
apparent lack of opposition, only three of the five Zoning Board
members voted to approve the application, resulting in the
1. Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191,193 (R.I.
2016). Henry and Mary were attempting to build an apartment attachment,
thus converting it into a duplex. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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variance’s denial.6
The Plaintiffs promptly filed a complaint and appealed the
Zoning Board’s denial to the Newport County Superior Court.7
The trial justice issued a written opinion, which overturned the
Zoning Board’s decision and granted the plaintiffs relief in the
form of a dimensional variance.8 After expending time and money
on the appeal to finally get what they wanted, the Plaintiffs
moved for reasonable litigation expenses under the EAJA.9
Reasoning that the Zoning Board was not an “agency” covered by
the Act and a hearing before the board was not an “adjudicatory
proceeding,” a second superior court justice denied the plaintiffs’
motion.10 The trial justice then entered final judgment, which
included the order to overturn the Zoning Board’s decision, as well
as the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for reasonable litigation
expenses.11 The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a notice of appeal to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court to challenge the denial of their
post-trial motion.12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Before the Court could get to the true issues under appeal,13
it first had to dispose of a tricky, procedural issue arising from the
Plaintiffs’ decision to file a notice of appeal rather than a writ of
6. Id. (citing R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 45-24-57(2)(iii) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.)) (“The concurring vote of four (4) of the five (5)
members of the zoning board of review sitting at a hearing is required to
decide in favor of an applicant on any matter within the discretion of the
board upon which it is required to pass under the ordinance, including
variances and special-use permits.”).
7. Id. at 194 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24-69 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.)) (allowing “an aggrieved party” to “appeal a
decision of the zoning board of review to the superior court for the county in
which the city or town is situated by filing a complaint.”).
8. Id.
9. Id. Plaintiffs also amended their complaint to reflect the additional
request. Id. n.4.
10.
Id.at 194; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-3 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
11.
Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 194.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. The Court stated that “[o]n appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial
justice misinterpreted the act in concluding that the board is not an ‘agency’
and that the hearing on plaintiffs’ variance application was not an
‘adjudicatory proceeding’ under the act.” Id.
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certiorari.14 The Court summarily disposed of the Zoning Board’s
argument that a writ of certiorari was required because the
appeal fell under the auspices of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)15 by noting that the APA “does not encompass zoning
appeals.”16 Despite this fact, the Court still held that a writ of
certiorari was required for other reasons.17 The Court explained
that this case first arose as a result of “an appeal from a decision
of a zoning board in accordance with section 45-24-69,” and the
Plaintiffs were only eligible to request reasonable attorney’s fees
under the EAJA after their victory on the merits of that appeal.18
Thus, the Court reasoned that because the claims were connected,
the proper procedure under well-established Rhode Island law was
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.19
In rejecting the Plaintiffs’ construction of the EAJA, the Court
explained that section 42-92-3 of the Act provides for two distinct
procedural avenues through which a victorious plaintiff may
appeal a decision for reasonable litigation expenses.20 Under the
Court’s understanding of the statute’s plain meaning, the first
avenue is under section 42-92-3(a), which allows “an adjudicatory
officer” to award reasonable litigation expenses to the party
challenging an agency determination if that agency did not have
“substantial justification” for its determination in an adjudicatory
proceeding.21 The Court read this provision in pari materia with
section 42-92-5, which states that “[a]ny party dissatisfied with
14.
Id.
15.
Id. “[T]he APA provides for review to this court by certiorari . . . .”
Id.
16.
Id. More specifically,
[t]he [APA] does not apply to review of administrative action by
municipal agencies. An aggrieved party pursuant to . . .§ 45–24–69
may appeal a decision of a Zoning Board of Review to the Superior
Court sitting in the county in which the city or town is
situated. Where municipal agency action is by statute reviewable in
the Superior Court, again the [APA] does not apply.
Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil Procedure § 80:1 at 639 (West 2015).
17.
Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 195.
18.
Id. “There is no indication that the act creates a cause of action
independent of the proceedings before the agency and the judicial review
thereof.” Id. at 198.
19.
Id. at 195; e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Westerly, 899
A.2d 517, 519 (R.I. 2006).
20.
See Tarbox, 142 A.3d. at 196.
21. Id. at 198.
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the fee determination by the adjudicatory officer may appeal to
the court having jurisdiction to review the merits of
the
22
underlying decision of the agency adversary adjudication.” The
thrust of the Plaintiffs’ argument was that the trial justice was an
adjudicatory officer, which allowed them to simply file a notice of
appeal.23 However, the Court found that the statute’s definition of
adjudicatory officer was entirely inconsistent with this
interpretation, and the proper procedure under this avenue is to
appeal a decision of the adjudicatory officer to the superior court
by filing a notice of appeal.24
The Court then determined that because a trial justice should
not be considered an adjudicatory officer, her determination of
litigation expenses under section 42-92-3(b) should connect with
section 45-24-69, as the underlying appeal came from a decision of
the Zoning Board, which has no adjudicatory officer.25 Thus, the
Court stated that because the Plaintiffs “were not even entitled to
seek reasonable litigation expenses until they received a favorable
decision from the Superior Court,” the Supreme Court’s review
encompassed both the underlying Zoning Board decision and the
trial justice’s denial of litigation expenses.26 Although the Court
held that all plaintiffs proceeding by this procedural avenue must
petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, the Court
treated the Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal as if it were a writ of
certiorari because this was an issue of first impression for the
Court.27
The Court then moved on to the merits of the case by
interpreting the EAJA.28 The Rhode Island Legislature made its
intent clear in the statute that the EAJA would be a deterrent
against abuses of power by state agencies that might seek to
22. Id. at 195–96.
23. Id. at 197.
24. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-2(1) (West, Westlaw through
2016 Legis. Sess.) (“the deciding official, without regard to whether the
official is designated as an administrative law judge, a hearing officer or
examiner, or otherwise, who presided at the adversary adjudication.”).
25. Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 198–99.
26. Id. at 199.
27.
Id. In doing so, the Court issued a stern warning to all those coming
after that a writ of certiorari is absolutely required in all future cases of this
kind. See id.
28.
Id.
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impose their will on citizens who have little to no chance to
challenge the agency’s decisions on their own.29 The Court noted
that in 1994 the legislature amended the definition of “agency”
under section 42-92-2(3) to include municipal entities “authorized
by law to make rules or to determine contested cases,” and held
that a municipal zoning board fell into this category.30 Although
the Zoning Board argued, among other things, that it should not
be considered an agency because it could not bring an action in
law or equity, the Court determined that, in general, the Zoning
Board—and all state municipal zoning boards—are authorized by
law to hear contested cases and make rules regarding zoning
procedure,31 even if they do not meet some of the other disjunctive
criteria for an agency.32
Lastly, the Court addressed whether the Zoning Board
hearing was an “adjudicatory proceeding” under the EAJA.33
Because the variance hearing involved “notice and an opportunity
to be heard,” the Court determined that it crossed the first
boundary, making it quasi-judicial in nature.34 The Court next
noted that the Plaintiffs were restricted from building a duplex on
their lot not as a result of the board’s decision, but because the
city’s zoning ordinance did not allow for this kind of use.35 The
Plaintiffs were then forced to seek a dimensional variance, which
the Court likened to a permit to depart from the usual zoning
requirements.36 Reasoning that the Zoning Board’s decision
29. Id. at 199–200.
30. Id. at 201.
31.
Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45–24–56(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.) (“The [zoning] board [of review] shall establish
written rules of procedure . . . .”).
32.
See Tarbox, 142, A.3d at 201. Other criteria for an agency includes
the ability “(2) ‘to bring any action at law or in equity, including, but not
limited to, injunctive and other relief, or’ (3) ‘to initiate criminal
proceedings.’” Id.
33.
Id. An adjudicatory proceeding is defined as “any proceeding
conducted by or on behalf of the state administratively or quasijudicially
which may result in . . . the denial, suspension, or revocation of a license or
permit or which may result in the compulsion or restriction of the activities of
a party.” R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-2(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016
Legis. Sess.).
34.
Tarbox, 142 A.3d at 202. (quoting Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd.,
15 A.3d. 1015, 1025 (R.I. 2011)).
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
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concerning the Plaintiffs’ application in the quasi-judicial variance
hearing resulted in the denial of such a permit, which in turn
restricted the Plaintiffs’ activities, the Court held that the zoning
variance hearing was an “adjudicatory proceeding” under the
act.37 In remanding the action to the to the superior court, the
Supreme Court required the trial justice to make findings on
whether the Zoning Board had “substantial justification” for the
denial of plaintiffs’ variance application, as none had been made.38
COMMENTARY

Although the issues that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
dealt with in this case were issues of first impression, it did not
seem to struggle to find analogies within the laws of Rhode
Island.39 Because the Zoning Board does not have an
“adjudicatory officer,” all appeals of variance applications must
necessarily come under the purview of section 45-24-69.40 The
responsibility of the trial justice then, is to determine whether or
not the agency’s decision was substantially justified, entitling the
plaintiff to reasonable litigation expenses under section 42-92-3(b)
of the EAJA.41 It is peculiar that the Rhode Island Legislature
chose to remain silent on the appeal process required for all other
agency determinations without an adjudicatory officer; however,
as the Court noted, the Legislature did provide a clear procedural
path for zoning appeals in section 45-24-69.42 Here, the Court
seemed to be acting in the interest of equity and justice, as the law
in this area was far from settled, and it would have been an
injustice to prevent a homeowner from obtaining reasonable
litigation expenses against the Zoning Board on account of a very
technical procedural violation.
The spirit of equity and justice is embodied within the EAJA
itself, as the Rhode Island Legislature so eloquently put it in the
statute, “[i]t is declared that both the state and its municipalities
and their respective various agencies possess a tremendous power
37. Id. at 202–03.
38. Id. at 203 (quoting Krikorian v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs., 606 A.2d
671, 676 (R.I. 1992)).
39. E.g., id. at 197–98 (citing Campbell, 15 A.3d. at 1025).
40. See id. at 199.
41. See id. at 198.
42. Id. at 199–200.
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in their ability to affect the individuals and businesses they
regulate or otherwise affect directly.”43 Because of this inequality
of power, the Legislature wished to guard against potential
arbitrary and capricious decisions of powerful state agencies on
the citizens of Rhode Island. While the EAJA certainly does have
a punitive aspect, it was passed—and subsequently amended—to
apply in a wide variety of cases where justice demanded that
citizens and small businesses who are of meager means should be
able to challenge agency decisions that arbitrarily limit their
rights.44
The Court certainly does not stretch the meanings of “agency”
or “adjudicatory proceeding” as defined in the act by applying the
plain meaning of the words, aided by the use of dictionaries and
secondary sources, which are usually among the first sources
drawn upon in judicial interpretation.45 That the Rhode Island
Supreme Court would use its role as the ultimate arbiter of justice
in the state to imbue the statute with such a broad meaning is no
surprise, especially in a case such as this, where there is no
evidence on record of why the Plaintiffs’ variance application
should be denied.46 In separating and clarifying the procedural
avenues to appeal under the EAJA, the Court ensured a statutory
scheme that will cover a wide range of agency actions all over the
state, which ensures that citizens are not left out in the open to
fall prey to the whims of an overzealous agency. The superior
courts may now be either reviewers or deciders of reasonable
litigation expenses under the EAJA, but no more can they deny
that the EAJA applies to decisions of municipal zoning boards.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court first held that a plaintiff
proceeding from the procedural avenue of a zoning appeal must
petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge a trial justice’s
determination of reasonable litigation expenses under section 4292-3(b) of the EAJA. Next, the Court determined that the clear
legislative intent of the EAJA, as amended in 1994, was to include
43.
Sess.).
44.
45.
46.

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-92-1(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
See Tarbox, 142 A.3d. at 200–01.
Id. at 201–02.
See id. at 193.
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municipal agencies such as the zoning board of review in the
definition of “agency” under the EAJA. Finally, the Court held
that a variance application hearing is an “adjudicatory
proceeding” under the act because it is a quasi-judicial hearing
which may result in the denial of a permit to vary land from the
usual town ordinance.
David M. Remillard

Arbitration. Lemerise v. Commerce Ins. Co., 137 A.3d 696 (R.I.
2016). Trial courts may not supplement review—either through
admission of testimony or other documentary evidence—when
considering an applicant’s motion to modify an arbitration award
pursuant to R.I. General Laws section 10-3-14. Reviewing courts
shall deny effect to arguments not raised during arbitration and
enter confirmation of an arbitration award unless modification is
justified under the narrow grounds of section 10-3-14.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

This case involved a dispute between Joseph Lemerise
(Plaintiff) and the Commerce Insurance Company (Defendant)
regarding the superior court’s decision to modify an arbitration
award to conform with the Plaintiff’s insurance policy limit.1 The
Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred by modifying the
arbitration award because the Court had no grounds to do so
pursuant to Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act.2 Meanwhile, the
Defendant sought affirmance of the superior court’s modification
and claimed that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by granting
an award in excess of the Plaintiff’s insurance policy limit.3
The parties stipulated largely to the underlying facts but
disagreed on the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries.4 In August of
2011, the Plaintiff was struck by an uninsured motorist while
crossing the street in Newport, Rhode Island.5 Following the
collision, the Plaintiff filed a claim for coverage under his
automobile insurance policy.6 The parties attempted to negotiate
1. Lemerise v. Commerce Ins. Co., 137 A.3d 696, 697 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id. (Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act is codified in G.L. 1956 chapter 3
of title 10).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The Plaintiff sustained injuries to his foot and ankle. Id.
6. Id. The insurance policy was registered with the Plaintiff’s mother,
although the Defendant did not dispute that the Plaintiff was entitled to
compensation under the policy. Id.
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appropriate compensation for the Plaintiff’s injuries to no avail.7
After filing suit in the Newport County Superior Court, the
Plaintiff eventually agreed to “participat[e] in Arbitration pursuant
to the terms of the Plaintiff’s [un]insured motorist policy.”8 The
arbitrator sought to determine the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries
and award sufficient compensation.9 After deliberation, the
arbitrator assessed the Plaintiff’s injuries at
$150,000 and added prejudgment interest of $47,550, which
brought the total award to $197,550.10
Following arbitration, the parties filed cross motions in the
superior court.11 The Plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitration
award, while the defendant sought modification.12 The superior
court supplemented its review with a copy of the Plaintiff’s
insurance policy, took testimony from the arbitrator, and
eventually granted the Defendant’s motion to modify the award to
conform with the insurance policy limit of $100,000.13 The Plaintiff
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in pursuit of a
reversal and confirmation of the initial arbitration award.14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its opinion by
discussing the appropriate standard of review upon an applicant’s
motion to confirm an arbitration award by both emphasizing public
policy in favor of deference to an arbitrator and the consequent
narrow scope for modification.15 In particular, the Court explained
that “[p]ublic policy favors the finality of arbitration awards, and
such awards enjoy a presumption of finality.”16 The Court further
expressed a policy against allowing
7. Id.
8. Id. at 705 (stipulating to a stay of the underlying litigation).
9. Id. at 698.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-3-11, 14 (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 2016 Reg. Sess.).
13. Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 698–99. The trial justice stated that he would
not “‘allow [plaintiff] to take advantage of some technicality to get more than
he bargained for in this case.’” Id. at 699.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 699–700 (citing § 10-3-14).
16. Id. at 699 (internal citations omitted).
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litigants to sidestep the binding effect of arbitration awards by
moving for modification in the trial court.17 As such, courts
reviewing a motion to confirm an arbitration award must grant
confirmation unless (among a few other narrow exceptions)18
modification of the award is justified pursuant to section 10-3- 14.19
Through precedent and a limiting construction of section 10-314, the Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the
arbitrator overreached his authority by assessing prejudgment
interest.20 To the contrary, the Court relied on its holding in
Sentry Insurance Co. v. Grenga21 where it concluded that
arbitrators “should” award prejudgment interest unless the
parties specifically contract otherwise.22 In line with Sentry, the
Court explained that the arbitrator’s award of prejudgment
interest to the Plaintiff did not justify modification.23 The Court
implied that arbitrators possess a wide range of discretion.24 As a
product of its deference, the Court narrowly interpreted the trial
court’s latitude to modify the award pursuant to section 10-3-14.25
The Court determined that the Defendant effectively waived
certain defenses to the arbitration award—including arguments
related to choice of law and insurance policy limits—by not raising
such defenses in the arbitration proceedings.26
The Court
extrapolated that waiver analysis by referencing its holding in
Wheeler v. Encompass Insurance Co.27 where it concluded that
17. Id. (quoting Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 687 A.2d 440,
441 (R.I. 1996)). “[P]arties who have contractually agreed to accept arbitration
as binding are not allowed to circumvent an award by coming to the courts and
arguing that the arbitrators misconstrued the contract or misapplied the law.”
Id.
18. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-3-12, 13 (West, Westlaw through Jan.
2016 Reg. Sess.) (detailing other grounds for modification not relevant here).
19. Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 700.
20. Id. at 700–02, 703–04.
21. 556 A.2d 998 (R.I. 1989).
22.
Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 701 (quoting Paola v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co., 461 A.2d 935, 937 (R.I. 1983) (“arbitrators should add
prejudgment interest to their awards unless the parties specifically provide
otherwise by agreement.” (emphasis added))).
23.
Id. at 704 (internal citations omitted).
24.
See id. at 702.
25. See id. at 703–04.
26. Id. at 704.
27. 66 A.3d 477, 483 (R.I. 2013).
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mistakes of law are not grounds for modification to an arbitration
award.28 Here, the Court decided that the Defendant’s failure to
submit a copy of the Plaintiff’s insurance agreement during the
arbitration proceedings constituted a waiver of a policy-limit
defense, and, even if the arbitrator erred as a matter of law, that
would not justify modification of the arbitration award.29 For
similar reasons, the Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that
Massachusetts law should have been applied.30 The Court solely
analyzed issues explicitly raised in arbitration and admonished the
superior court for expanding its review beyond those boundaries.31
The Court ultimately found for the Plaintiff by vacating the
superior court’s order and remanding the case to the superior court
with instructions to confirm the arbitrator’s award of
$197,550.32 The Court’s holding rested largely upon its position that
the arbitrator did not err by awarding prejudgment interest, and
that the Defendant waived its right to invoke the insurance policy
limit as a defense by failing to raise the defense during
arbitration.33
COMMENTARY

Dissenting, Justice Robinson disagreed with the Court’s
finding of a waiver of insurance policy-based defenses and proposed
a two-step approach to the confirmation of an arbitration award.34
First, an arbitrator should evaluate the plaintiff’s injuries and
determine a “fair and reasonable compensation.”35 Second, the
superior court should turn to the terms of the insurance policy and
reduce the plaintiff’s award to conform with
28. Id. at 698.
29. Id. at 704.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 702–03. The Supreme Court explained that the superior court
erred by conducting a de novo review of the arbitration award. Id. at 702.
Specifically, the Supreme Court took issue with the superior court justice’s
consideration of the insurance policy and the arbitrator’s testimony in its
review. Id.
32. Id. at 704–05.
33. Id. at 700–02, 703–04.
34.
Id. at 705 (Robinson, J., dissenting); see also Wheeler v. Encompass
Ins. Co., 66 A.3d 477, 484–89 (R.I. 2013) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (explaining
the two-step approach in greater detail).
35.
Lemerise, 137 A.3d at 705.
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the policy’s limitations.36 Justice Robinson seemingly diverged from
the Court in that he sought to simultaneously promote deference to
the arbitration award and enforce the insurance policy.37 Justice
Robinson proposed that, in this case, such an analysis would yield
an arbitration award equal to the Plaintiff’s insurance policy cap of
$100,000.38
The Defendant attempted to manipulate the arbitration
system, and the Court committed itself to punishing the Defendant
for doing so.39 The Defendant evidently undervalued the Plaintiff’s
injuries.40 As such, it wanted to divert the arbitrator’s attention
away from the insurance policy for fear that the large policy limit
would yield an overvaluation of the Plaintiff’s injuries.41 Upon
dissatisfaction with the award, the Defendant sought modification
of the arbitrator’s valuation by reference to the policy the Defendant
intentionally withheld from the arbitrator.42 The Court explained
that the Defendant’s approach was “fraught with danger[,]” and the
Defendant now must accept the consequences of liability in excess
of the policy limit.43
While the Court was apparently motivated to encourage
parties to enter future arbitration agreements, its decision might
produce the opposite result.44 Some people feel that arbitrators are
less partial, inferior adjudicators when compared to trial justices.
The legislature likely intended to quell those concerns by providing
trial courts with a method to modify arbitration awards in
accordance with section 10-3-14.45
The Court’s narrow
36.
Id.
37.
See id.
38.
Id.
39.
See id. at 704 (majority opinion) (referring to the Defendant’s decision
to withhold the Plaintiff’s insurance policy limit as “tactical in nature” and
explaining that it is “bound to suffer the consequences in the event that the
arbitrator disagrees with [the Defendant’s] valuation to such an extent that
the policy limit is exceeded by the award.”).
40.
Id.
41.
See id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
See id. at 699. The Court likely assumed that by creating a sense of
finality to arbitration awards, contracting parties would develop faith in the
arbitration system. See id.
45.
Because § 10-3-14 confers an additional power upon the judiciary to
check the arbitration system, one must read § 10-3-14 as affording protection
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construction of the enumerated grounds for modification under
section 10-3-14 has weakened the safeguards implemented by the
Consequently, the Court’s holding might
Legislature.46
discourage otherwise hesitant parties from entering future
arbitration agreements in light of the decreased scope for review.
The Court’s decision is also troubling because it fails to provide
adequate guidance to lower courts, regarding waiver of defenses not
raised in arbitration proceedings. At times, the Court seems to
suggest a broad rule that would deny effect to all arguments not
raised in arbitration, while, in other instances, it seems to narrowly
carve a rule prohibiting the introduction of issues intentional
withheld from an arbitrator.47 It remains unclear whether the
Court was persuaded by the Defendant’s mere failure to introduce
the insurance policy during the arbitration proceedings or the
Defendant’s bad-faith reservation. A broad reading of the Court’s
holding might produce injustice for parties denied the right to raise
issues not specifically expounded in arbitration, whereas a narrow
interpretation might hinder the Court’s stated goal of adding
finality to arbitration awards. Regardless of the lens of generality a
lower court adopts, it might select the wrong scope, thus yielding
an unintended result.
CONCLUSION

When considering a motion to modify an arbitration award
pursuant to section 10-3-14, trial courts may not expand review
beyond evidence presented during the arbitration proceedings.
Trial courts shall ignore arguments not raised during arbitration
and enter confirmation of an arbitration award absent a need to
make modifications in accordance with the narrow grounds
delineated in section 10-3-14.
Matthew Strauss

from mistaken arbitration awards.
46.
See id. at 700–02, 703–04. The Court’s narrow construction of section
10-3-14 must be viewed as a retraction of protection from errant arbitration
awards because such construction inevitably limits a litgant’s redress. See id.
47. See id. at 703–04.

Civil Procedure. Albanese v. Town of Narragansett, 135 A.3d
1179 (R.I. 2016). A Rhode Island Superior Court justice has broad
discretion in regulating discovery, and their decisions not to reopen
discovery and to deny a motion for continuance will only be
disturbed when they have abused their discretion. Additionally, an
attenuated spousal conflict of interest does not meet the personal
bias requirement for recusal. Lastly, summary judgment should
not be granted in cases where there is a genuine dispute of material
fact despite the fact that the record contains little evidence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Sometime during 2006, Joanne Albanese (Albanese) brought
suit against the Town of Narragansett, Rhode Island, the Town
Treasurer, the Town police department and two law enforcement
officers (collectively, Defendants), claiming assault and battery,
negligence, misconduct, and false arrest following a physical
altercation between herself and a maintenance worker employed by
her apartment complex.1 Albanese first claimed that the police
officers responding to the physical-assault call, Sergeant Favreau
and Lieutenant Sutton, used excessive force when retaining her at
the scene when they allegedly “drag[ged] her [out] of her car . . .
with her jacket over her head,” and second that the police officers
falsely arrested her.2 Albanese also claimed that the Defendants
acted with gross negligence by failing to act in a professional
manner in the ongoing landlord-tenant dispute over the mold issue
Albanese was experiencing.3 In her fourth claim, Albanese alleged
1. Albanese v. Town of Narragansett, 135 A.3d 1179, 1182, 1183 (R.I.
2016). Albanese was charged with one count of simple assault and/or battery
after attacking a maintenance worker employed by the apartment complex in
which she lived. State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215, 1217 (R.I. 2009). The
dispute arose after the maintenance department failed to address Albanese’s
mold issues, and Albanese allegedly body slammed the maintenance worker
while he was bringing trash to the dumpster. Id.
2. Albanese, 135 A.3d at 1183 (alterations in original).
3. Id.
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negligence per se, stating that the “[D]efendants had intimidated
and harassed her,” attempting to dissuade her from making any
further complaints about the mold issue, and that the Defendants
failed to address any of her reports of mold.4 Albanese also included
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and requested
punitive damages in her prayer for relief.5
Though the suit was originally filed in 2006, the suit lied
dormant for a number of years until 2013, when a Washington
County Superior Court justice imposed a discovery-close deadline
of July 17, 2013.6 A few months later, counsel for Albanese
withdrew representation, stating that there had been “a breakdown
in the attorney-client relationship,” and Albanese continued with
her claims pro se.7 The trial justice required the Defendants to
submit any dispositive motions by October 11, 2013, in preparation
for a December 10, 2013, trial date and gave Albanese until
November 8, 2013, to file any objections.8
On September 20, 2013, Albanese wrote a letter to the court,
stating that she was undergoing surgery and requested to postpone
the deadline to file an objection until after her surgery.9 One week
later, a status hearing was held, where Albanese stated that
surgery had not been scheduled yet.10 The trial justice denied the
request to postpone the deadline.11 On October 10, 2013, the
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.12 A status
hearing followed eight days later, where Albanese announced there
was still no scheduled date for surgery; the trial justice set another
status hearing for November 15, 2013, and extended the deadline
to file an objection to November 29.13
On November 15, 2013, Albanese notified the court that her
surgery was complete and requested another extension, stating
that she was “too ill to work on her objection” due to the recent

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1184.
Id.
Id.
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surgery.14 The trial justice granted a new deadline of December 13
and warned Albanese that any further requests for continuances
would be denied.15 On December 6, 2013, (one week before the
deadline) Albanese filed her written objection to the motion for
summary judgment and alerted the court that a memorandum and
supporting documentation would soon be submitted.16
Additionally, Albanese filed a document entitled “Emergency
Motion for an Extension of Time/Continuance in which to Complete
[Plaintiff’s] Answer to Summary Judgment and Continuance for
Hearing On Summary Judgment.”17 Albanese argued that she
needed more time because her previous attorney had never asked
for any kind of discovery.18 The trial justice refused to reopen
discovery but granted another extension, contrary to her previous
warning, and set a new deadline of January 17, 2014, for Albanese
to file an objection.19 Over the next month, Albanese filed
numerous motions requesting additional time, but at the hearing
on January 31, 2014, the trial justice denied Albanese’s motions
and proceeded with oral arguments on the issue of summary
judgment.20 Albanese was given the opportunity to provide oral
response, and after she did so, the trial justice granted Defendants’
summary judgment on all counts.21 At some point during this time,
Albanese had also moved for the trial justice to recuse herself from
the case, stating first that the trial justice failed to take her
seriously as a litigant acting pro se, and second that the trial justice
had a conflict of interest that would have warranted recusal.22
On appeal, Albanese claimed that the trial justice erred in
denying the motion to reopen discovery, denying motions for
continuance, denying the motion to recuse, and granting summary
judgment.23

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1186, 1187.
Id. at 1185.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court considered four issues, the
first of which was whether or not the trial justice erred in denying
Albanese’s motion to reopen discovery.24 The Court established
that a trial justice has broad discretion in regulating discovery for
the sake of judicial economy, and that the parties are bound to
comply with the timing of discovery set forth in the scheduling and
other orders once they have been set by the court.25 More than six
years had passed between the time that Albanese first brought the
suit and when the court imposed the discovery deadline, so she had
plenty of time to request materials during that period.26 Albanese’s
argument that her former attorney failed to seek important
documents for the case was unsuccessful because Albanese did not
move to reopen discovery until several months after her attorney
withdrew representation.27
For similar reasons, the Court determined that the trial justice
had broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a
continuance.28 The Court acknowledged that managing the trial
calendar is extremely difficult, and thus justices must be afforded
wide discretion in denying continuances, and the Court will
question such decisions only when there is a showing that the lower
court abused its discretion.29 Here, Albanese was granted an
extension on October 18, 2013, and she had twenty-five days to
work on the objection before her scheduled surgery, only three less
days than were initially allotted.30 Albanese also received two more
continuances after surgery even though her case was stagnant for
a number of years with no activity, and she further received several
continuances thereafter.31 By the final due date, Albanese had 100
days to respond to the summary judgment motion.32 Thus, given
the broad discretion the trial justice has in order to successfully
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Shelter Harbor Conservation Soc’y, Inc. v. Rogers, 21 A.3d
337, 343 (R.I. 2011)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1186.
29. Id. (citing Boucher v. Galvin, 571 A.2d 35, 37 (R.I. 1990)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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manage the trial calendar and the amount of time Albanese had to
submit the proper documents, the trial justice did not err in denying
any of Albanese’s motions for continuance.33
Third, the Court addressed whether or not the trial justice
erred in denying Albanese’s motion to recuse.34 Albanese argued
that the trial justice failed to take Albanese seriously as a pro se
litigant, encouraged the Defendants to move for summary
judgment, even though they had not yet filed a motion to do so, and
had a conflict of interest because the trial justice’s husband was a
law-enforcement officer who might have had contact with the
officers in the underlying case during his course of employment.35
The Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissed the first two
contentions stating that Albanese was a “recalcitrant litigant,” and
that the “trial justice went to great lengths to make exceptions for
Albanese’s behavior . . . and help[ed] [her] clarify her arguments
before the court,” despite the fact that she once needed to be
removed from the court room by a deputy sheriff.36 Further, the
Court found that Albanese failed to provide evidence showing that
the trial justice encouraged the Defendants to move for summary
judgment.37 Lastly, the Court held that the spousal conflict is an
“old rooted claim” and was mere conjecture, ultimately ruling that
the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to recuse.38
Finally, the Court considered whether or not the trial justice
erred in granting summary judgment, taking each count
separately.39 On the false arrest, gross negligence and misconduct,
and punitive damages claims, the Court concluded that the trial
justice did not err in granting summary judgment.40 However, on
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1187.
37.
Id. When the trial justice denied the motion to recuse, she stated on
the record that she had not ordered the Defendants to move for summary
judgment but instead had set a timeline for them in an effort to move the case
along. Id.
38.
Id. at 1188. The conflict of interest argument was not raised in time
to be considered in oral argument. Id. at 1187–88 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 1188.
40. Id. at 1189–91. The Court found that on the false arrest claim,
summary judgment was appropriate because the officer had probable cause to
arrest Albanese due to physical confrontation and failure to adhere to the
officer’s instructions. Id. at 1190. On the negligence and misconduct claims,
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the assault and battery claim, the Court found that summary
judgment was not appropriate.41 The Court reasoned that
summary judgment is not appropriate when there is a genuine
dispute of material fact, and that despite there being very little
evidence on the record, the Defendants’ story conflicted with
Albanese’s version of the events.42 Thus, a genuine dispute of
material fact existed, and the trial justice erred in granting
summary judgment on that count.43
COMMENTARY

It is evident that the Rhode Island Supreme Court heavily
considered the rationale behind affording trial justices a great deal
of discretion when determining whether or not the trial justice
erred in denying the motions to reopen discovery and grant a
continuance.44 Litigation is a time-intensive process in and of
itself, and delaying the process further by reopening discovery and
granting multiple extensions contributes to the development of a
clog in the judicial stream. Further, granting continuances for any
and all circumstances diminishes the importance of moving for a
continuance in emergency situations. The Court reasoned the same
way regarding recusal.45 Recusal requires a judge to make a
personal reflection and determine whether or not their conflict of
interest is strong enough to interfere with their ability to make an
unbiased judicial decision. Thus, this is inherently an area in which
a judge should be afforded more discretion. Beyond that, it is
important to allow such discretion in order to create a limit for
recusal. If grounds for recusal extend to such attenuated
circumstances as here, where the judge’s spouse might have had
some form of contact with the law enforcement officers in
Albanese’s case, recusal would occur in the majority of cases,
the Court found that there was no evidence on the record to support these
claims. Id. at 1191. On the punitive damages claim, the Court found that
punitive damages are only available “when a defendant’s conduct requires
deterrence and punishment,” which was not necessary here. Id. (quoting Pier
House Inn, Inc. v. 421 Corp., 812 A.2d 799, 803 (R.I. 2002)).
41. Id. at 1190.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1185.
45. Id. at 1187.
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especially in smaller communities.46
The Court also made a clear distinction that despite the
relatively scant evidence on the record, regarding the assault and
battery charges, summary judgment should not have been awarded
to the Defendants because there was still a dispute of fact between
the law enforcement officers’ testimony and Albanese’s testimony.47
A strong motivating factor for granting summary judgment has
been to weed out claims that do not actually contain a triable issue
in order to promote judicial economy and place a limit on already
costly and time-intensive litigation. Considering the Court was
erring on the side of judicial economy when deciding the other
issues in the case, reversing summary judgment when the evidence
appears facially weak makes an important statement. It
emphasizes that the amount of evidence is secondary to whether or
not there is a genuine dispute within the evidence that does exist.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice has
broad discretion in regulating discovery and denying motions for
continuance in order to help preserve judicial economy, and these
decisions will only be disturbed when the trial justice has abused
his or her discretion. Furthermore, the Court held that an
attenuated spousal conflict does not meet the threshold of personal
bias required for recusal, and summary judgment may be granted
if there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, despite an
overwhelming lack of evidence.
Camille M. Ingino

46.
47.

See id. at 1188.
Id. at 1190.

Civil Procedure. Manning v. Bellafiore, 139 A.3d 505 (R.I.
2016). The Rhode Island Supreme Court, under its inherent
power to fashion an appropriate remedy that serves the ends of
justice, has the authority to award attorneys’ fees against a party
that acts in bad faith. A party acts in bad faith by either failing to
directly answer questions during discovery or providing false
testimony at trial. The Court can infer from a trial justice’s
findings that a party’s conduct constituted bad faith.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On March 4, 1998, Michael Manning (Manning), after falling
unconscious at his home, was admitted to South County Hospital
(SCH).1 Doctor Peter J. Bellafiore, who was responsible for
Manning’s care, wanted Manning to undergo a magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) test in order to determine whether
Manning was suffering from a stroke.2 Over the course of four
days, Dr. Bellafiore was unsuccessful in having Manning undergo
an MRI test at least two times because Manning had a
claustrophobic reaction, and the sedatives Dr. Bellafiore
administered to Manning failed to mitigate Manning’s
claustrophobia.3 On March 7, 1998, Manning suffered a stroke
while at SCH and passed away two days later at Massachusetts
General Hospital.4
On January 6, 2000, Manning’s estate (Plaintiff) filed a
negligence and wrongful death suit against Dr. Bellafiore and two
others.5 On January 5, 2004, after an extensive discovery period,

1. Manning v. Bellafiore (Manning IV), 139 A.3d 505, 507–08 (R.I.
2016).
2. Id. at 508.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The claims against Dr. McNiece, Manning’s primary care
physician, and South County Hospital were subsequently dismissed. Id. at
507 n.1.
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the trial commenced.6 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr.
Bellafiore.7 Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial,
and moved for sanctions against Dr. Bellafiore and his attorneys,
White & Kelly, P.C. (White).8 Plaintiff contended that during
discovery, White failed to disclose conversations that Dr.
Bellafiore had with Manning on March 5 and March 6.9
On November 4, 2005, the trial justice granted Plaintiff’s
motion for a new trial against Dr. Bellafiore on the grounds that
the verdict was not supported by the evidence.10 Dr. Bellafiore
subsequently appealed the trial justice’s decision.11
On April 12, 2010, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed
the trial justice’s decision to grant a new trial because “the trial
justice conducted the appropriate analysis, did not overlook or
misconceive material evidence, and was not otherwise clearly
wrong.”12 As a result, Dr. Bellafiore settled with Plaintiff, but
expressly preserved the claims for sanctions against Dr. Bellafiore
and White.13
On September 10, 2012, the trial justice granted Plaintiff’s
motion to sanction both Dr. Bellafiore and White and awarded
Plaintiff $152,998.57.14 The trial justice sanctioned Dr. Bellafiore
and White under Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure,15 on the grounds that Dr. Bellafiore
6. Id. at 511.
7. Id. at 512.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10.
Manning v. Bellafiore (Manning I), No. W.C.2000-63, 2005 WL
2981660, at *24 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2005).
11. Manning IV, 139 A.3d 505, 512 (R.I. 2016).
12. Manning v. Bellafiore (Manning II), 991 A.2d 399, 410–11 (R.I.
2010).
13. Manning IV, 139 A.3d at 513.
14. Manning v. Bellafiore (Manning III), No. 2000-0063, 2012 WL
12796483, at *22 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2012).
15. Rule 11 states in relevant part that:
[E]very pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be personally signed by at least
one . . . attorney of record . . . . The signature of an attorney . . . or
party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper . . . and that the pleading,
motion, or other paper is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation . . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . may impose upon the
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made five assertions at trial that were “drastically different” from
his pretrial disclosures.16 Specifically, the trial justice found that
Dr. Bellafiore’s pretrial disclosures omitted the following: (1) the
term “conscious sedation”; (2) a discussion with Manning about
anesthesiology; (3) a drug called “[v]ersed”; (4) discussions with
Manning about sedatives; and (5) an apology Manning made to
Dr. Bellafiore.17 The trial justice concluded that sanctions were
appropriate against Dr. Bellafiore because “[e]ither [he] was
hiding the complete answers, or he opted to modify his version of
the truth far into the trial.”18 The trial justice found that
sanctions were appropriate against White because it failed to refer
to a “board letter,”19 which detailed Manning’s refusal to undergo
an MRI on March 5 with “maximum sedation,” when White
responded to Plaintiff’s interrogatories.20 Further, the trial
justice explained that although no evidence showed “[White] knew
that Dr. Bellafiore had such a detailed recollection of the specific
events of the key conversation[,]” White “was obligated but failed
to determine the issues with . . . Manning’s anesthesia and . . .
[his] concerns about the anesthesia.”21
However, the trial justice found that Dr. Bellafiore was
“primarily culpable” because “[h]e responded to his attorneys’
questions, drafted interrogatory answers, signed answers under
oath, responded to deposition questions under oath, . . . and
uncorked the surprise testimony deep into the marathon trial.”22
Accordingly, the trial justice held Dr. Bellafiore eighty percent
person who signed the pleading, motion, or other paper, a
represented party, or both, any appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s
fee.
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 11.
16. Manning IV, 139 A.3d at 513.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 513–14 (alterations in original).
19. Id. at 514. The trial justice found that Dr. Bellafiore submitted to
the Rhode Island Board of Medical Licensure a letter detailing conversations
with Manning, and that Dr. Bellafiore directed White to use the board letter
to answer Plaintiff’s interrogatories. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (alterations in original).
22. Id.
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responsible and White twenty percent responsible.23 Both Dr.
Bellafiore and White appealed the trial justice’s decision.24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the superior court’s order, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court sought to determine whether Rule 11 of the Rhode
Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure applies to
discovery violations, and whether the superior court abused its
discretion or was otherwise clearly wrong in imposing sanctions
on Dr. Bellafiore and White.25 Conducting a de novo review of the
rule’s language, the Court determined that Rule 11 was not
applicable to the alleged discovery violations against Dr.
Bellafiore.26 Nevertheless, the Court determined that it “may
award attorneys’ fees as an exercise of its inherent power to
fashion an appropriate remedy that would serve the ends of
justice.”27 The Court explained that in order for it to impose
sanctions, under its inherent power, the record must show that a
defendant acted in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.”28
First, the Court addressed the actions of Dr. Bellafiore.29
From the outset of the Court’s analysis, it explained that although
two of the trial justice’s five findings were actually part of
discovery,30 the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive
material evidence regarding whether sanctioning Dr. Bellafiore
was appropriate.31 Then, the Court focused on several statements
that Dr. Bellafiore made at trial with significant new details but
23. Id.
24. Id. at 515.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 515–16.
27. Id. at 516 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 911
A.2d 706, 711 n.5 (R.I. 2006)).
28. Id. (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991)).
The Court noted that under its inherent power, attorneys’ fees are also
appropriate when the award is “(1) pursuant to the common fund
exception . . . [or] (2) as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court
order . . . .” Id. (alteration in original).
29. Id. at 516–17.
30.
Id. at 517. The Court noted that Dr. Bellafiore’s testimony regarding
“[c]onversations with Manning about sedations on March 5 or March 6” and
“Manning[‘s] apolog[y]” were disclosed during discovery. Id.
31.
Id.
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were not disclosed in discovery.32 For example, the Court took
issue with the fact that at deposition, Dr. Bellafiore indicated that
“he did not consider anesthesia . . . as a desirable treatment for
Manning prior to [March 7] because [anesthesia] would pose too
much of a risk . . . .”33 However, at trial, Dr. Bellafiore testified
that he offered “conscious sedation” with the help of an
anesthesiologist on March 5 and March 6.34
Additionally, the Court found that Dr. Bellafiore’s
inconsistent statements in responding to interrogatories and
deposition responses and trial testimony35 supported the trial
justice’s conclusion that Dr. Bellafiore “[e]ither . . . hid[] the
complete answers, or he opted to modify his version of the truth
far into the trial.”36 As a result, the Court held that although the
trial justice did not explicitly assign the terms “bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”37 to Dr.
Bellafiore’s conduct, “a finding that Dr. Bellafiore acted in bad
faith can be inferred by the trial justice’s decision and that such
decision did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, and is
not otherwise clearly wrong.”38
Next, the Court addressed the actions of White.39 Although
the Court found that White had a duty to disclose requested facts,
White’s conduct did not amount to acting in bad faith.40 Thus, the
32. Id. at 518.
33. Id. (alterations in original).
34. Id.
35. Specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he record . . . is clear that, at a
minimum, Dr. Bellafiore failed to answer questions posed in plaintiff’s
interrogatories and at his deposition completely and that he added significant
new details in his testimony at trial.” Id.
36. Id. (alterations in original). The Court also found that an inference
of bad-faith could be drawn from “[t]he trial justice’s findings that Dr.
Bellafiore was ‘motivated by improper purposes and lacking in good faith[]’
[and that he] ‘knew his sworn answers were indirect, evasive, significantly
incomplete, and had little concern for the result.’” Id. at 519 (alterations in
original).
37. Id. at 518.
38. Id. at 519.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 519–20. The Court noted that the White’s actions were more
along the lines of negligence. Id. Furthermore, the Court explained that
“[had] there been a finding that [White] acted in bad faith because White . . .
knew that Dr. Bellafiore was providing false testimony, then [White] would
be in violation of Article V, Rule 3.3 of the [Rhode Island] Supreme Court
Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. at 520 n.11 (alterations in original); see
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Court vacated the judgment against White because the trial
justice’s decision neither showed a fact nor supported an inference
that White acted in bad faith “as necessary when relying on the
court’s inherent powers to impose a sanction.”41
Finally, the Court addressed the amount of the sanction
award.42 While noting that “a trial justice [has] wide latitude to
fashion an appropriate remedy for sanctionable conduct,”43 the
Court was troubled with the trial justice’s assessment of the
evidence in calculating the $152,998.57 award.44 The Court
explained that the Plaintiff did not have to incur the additional
costs of a second trial because the parties settled.45 In addition,
the Court found that the trial justice made an erroneous
assessment by including the attorneys’ fees for the hours spent on
the claims against the two other defendants that were
subsequently dismissed and the attorneys’ fees incurred by the
Plaintiff during the sanction proceeding.46 The Court reasoned
that, if it included Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees incurred during the
sanction hearing, “[i]n essence, the [C]ourt would be sanctioning
Dr. Bellafiore for defending against a motion to impose a sanction
on him, rather than for any sanctionable conduct.”47
Consequently, the Court vacated the $152,998.57 award and
directed the superior court to sanction Dr. Bellafiore in the
amount of $38,398.53.48
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that
it has the inherent power to award attorneys’ fees as an
appropriate remedy to serve the ends of justice and can refer to
the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure by

R.I. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . .
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”).
41. Id. at 520.
42. Id.
43. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pleasant Mgmt. LLC v. Carrasco,
918 A.2d 213, 217 (R.I. 2007)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 521.
46. Id. at 521–22.
47. Id. at 522.
48. Id.
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analogy as a guide to review a trial justice’s findings.49 Here, the
Court used the rationale of Rule 11, “to deter repetition of the
harm, and to remedy the harm caused,” to guide its decision.50 In
addition, the Court clarified that the trial justice must find, either
explicitly or implicitly, that the party acted in bad faith in order
for sanctions to be appropriate under a court’s inherent power.51
Moreover, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to balance
the purpose of imposing sanctions and the high standard of
awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to its inherent power. The
facts of this case support the Court’s adherence to balancing these
principles because Dr. Bellafiore either willfully refused to directly
answer questions during discovery or committed a fraud on the
superior court by giving false testimony.52
However, the dissent argues that the trial justice’s decision
contained several errors. Specifically, the dissent explains that
the trial justice mistakenly applied Rule 1153 and that two
assertions Dr. Bellafiore made at trial were disclosed in
discovery.54 While these were erroneous findings made by the
trial justice, Dr. Bellafiore’s conduct allows the majority to
underplay these errors and focus on his key inconsistencies. For
instance, although two of the assertions Dr. Bellafiore made at
trial were disclosed during discovery, Dr. Bellafiore still made
three key assertions at trial that either were significantly changed
or omitted in his responses during discovery.55 In addition, even
though the superior court applied the wrong rule when awarding
Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court undoubtedly has the
discretion to use its inherent power to award attorneys’ fees56 and
may use the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure by analogy to
49. Id. at 516.
50. Id. (quoting Huntley v. State, 109 A.3d 869, 873 (R.I. 2015)).
51. Id. at 519.
52. See id. at 518.
53. Id. at 523–24 (Robinson J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Robinson concurred with the majority on vacating the sanction
against White. Id. at 522.
54. Id. at 523. Justice Robinson also argued that the trial justice
erroneously found three inconsistent statements because, although Dr.
Bellafiore never used the word “[v]ersed,” Dr. Bellafiore implicitly mentioned
the word “[v]ersed” in deposition testimony. Id.
55. Id. at 517–18 (majority opinion).
56. Id. at 516 (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 911
A.2d 706, 711 n.5 (R.I. 2006)).
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guide its review.57
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that even though the
trial justice applied Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
sanctioning Dr. Bellafiore because an inference of bad faith could
be drawn from his conduct either during discovery or at trial.58 In
addition, the Court held that the sanctioning of White was an
abuse of discretion because there was neither a fact nor inference
that could be drawn to support a bad faith finding.59 Finally, the
Court reduced the original monetary sanction imposed to
$38,398.53 because the trial justice erroneously calculated the
amount of the award.60
Steven Davis

57.
2002)).
58.
59.
60.

Id. (citing Lett v. Providence Journal Co., 798 A.2d 355, 365 (R.I.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 521–22.

Constitutional Law. State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131 (R.I.
2016). The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether a
trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence when officers entered into his home and arrested him
without warrants, and whether that denial violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Court clarified factors to consider
when applying the analyses for warrant exceptions, the
attenuation doctrine, and the harmless error principle.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Shortly before midnight on January 21, 2012, Tony Gonzalez
allegedly shot and caused the death of a man at the home of
Gonzalez’s ex-girlfriend, Patricia Dalomba, in Warwick, Rhode
Island, in the presence of Dalomba and her current boyfriend;
both Dalomba and her current boyfriend were unharmed.1
Dalomba, the only eyewitness, called 911 to report the shooting
and identified Tony Gonzalez as the shooter several times as well
as provided his home address and physical description.2
Following the 911 call, Warwick police officers began to arrive
at the station shortly after midnight on January 22, 2012, where
they were immediately informed that Gonzalez was the shooter.3
In the early morning hours of January 22, 2012, officers attended
briefings, interviewed Dalombra, discussed strategy, and
determined Gonzalez’s location.4 At approximately 7:00 a.m., six
1. State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1135-36 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id. at 1142. Dalomba’s current boyfriend was taking shelter in the
closet and unable to see the shooter. Id. at 1140.
3. Id. at 1152 (majority opinion), 1159 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The
identification of Gonzalez as the shooter was based on Dalomba’s eyewitness
identification as well as testimony from Dalomba and her boyfriend,
regarding a series of hostile and threatening text messages and phone calls
exchanged among them and Gonzalez in the days leading up to the shooting.
Id. at 1136, 1139, 1142–43, 1157 (majority opinion).
4. Id. at 1139, 1140 (majority opinion), 1159–60 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
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Warwick police officers joined at least six Providence police
officers at a Providence substation before they “departed in a
‘caravan’” for Gonzalez’s residence, which he shared with his
mother Cira Gonzalez.5 Police officers were highly aware that
Gonzalez was likely armed as both Dalomba and Gonzalez’s
brother informed them that Gonzalez almost always carried a gun
and “typically [slept] with a handgun under his pillow,” which
could pose a threat to officers’ safety.6
At the Gonzalez residence, the police officers established a
perimeter around the house, and three or six officers approached
the front door.7 An officer carrying a tactical shield knocked on
the door while officers with guns “displayed” stood directly behind
him.8 Ms. Gonzalez opened the door and spoke to the lead officer
for ten to fifteen seconds.9 When asked for information on
Gonzalez’s location, Ms. Gonzalez, at most, gestured to the stairs
and/or glanced at the stairs10—no verbal answer was given—and
the police entered the Gonzalez residence.11 The Warwick and
Providence police officers arrested Gonzalez just after 7:00 a.m. on
January 22, 2012.12 While in the process of handcuffing Gonzalez,
but before reading him his Miranda rights, the arresting officer
repeatedly asked about the location of the gun, to which Gonzalez
replied, “[the gun’s] not here. It’s not in the bedroom. I don’t have
a gun.”13 Officers removed Gonzalez from the home, placed him in
the back of a marked police car, and departed for the station.14
At 8:10 a.m. while still in her home, Ms. Gonzalez read and
signed a written consent for the officers to search her home.15 At
approximately the same time, the police officers transporting
Gonzalez pulled into a parking lot, removed Gonzalez’s handcuffs,
and Gonzalez read and signed a written consent to search his
5. Id. at 1160 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 1137–38 (majority opinion) (alteration in original).
7. Id. at 1149, 1154.
8. Id. at 1149.
9. Id. at 1138, 1149.
10. Id. at 1139, 1149.
11. Id. at 1138, 1139, 1140–41, 1149.
12. Id. at 1152.
13. Id. at 1139. The gun used in the shooting was never located.
1143 n.6.
14. Id. at 1139.
15. Id. at 1150.

Id. at
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bedroom.16 The police officers subsequently searched Gonzalez’s
bedroom and seized evidence of gun paraphernalia and clothing
that matched Dalomba’s description of the shooter.17 The police
did not have an arrest warrant or a search warrant.18
On May 22, 2012, a Kent County grand jury indicted Gonzalez
on four charges: (1) first-degree murder, (2) assault with intent to
commit murder, (3) discharging a firearm while committing
murder, and (4) discharging a firearm while committing assault
with intent to commit murder.19
Gonzalez filed motions to suppress evidence found in his
bedroom as well as his comments regarding the gun made during
his arrest based on his “contention that his arrest was unlawful
because the police did not have a warrant to enter his home and
arrest him.”20 The trial justice (1) denied the motion to suppress
Gonzalez’s statements made during the arrest and before he was
advised of his Miranda rights, finding that the question asked by
the police officers as to the location of the gun was “prudent” given
the officers reasonably assumed Gonzalez was armed;21 (2) denied
the motion to suppress evidence on the grounds of lack of consent
to search, finding that both Gonzalez and his mother “freely and
voluntarily” gave written consent to search;22 (3) denied the
motion to suppress evidence on the grounds of lack of arrest or
search warrants, finding that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless search;23 and (4) denied the motion to suppress
evidence from the arrest and search based on lack of consent to
enter the house, finding that Ms. Gonzalez consented when she
opened the door, nonverbally indicated that Gonzalez was
upstairs, and allowed police officers to enter.24
In February 2013, following a nine-day trial, the jury found
16. Id. at 1155–56.
17. Id. at 1140. Evidence seized included: an open black gun case,
miscellaneous gun parts, a loaded magazine, and receipt from a gun store,
identifying Gonzalez as the purchaser of a nine millimeter handgun, a black
vest, a black scarf, a black jacket, and gray boots. Id.
18. Id. at 1136.
19. Id. at 1135.
20. Id. at 1135–36.
21. Id. at 1141.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1141–42.
24. Id. at 1142.
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Gonzalez guilty on all counts and sentenced him to two,
consecutive, life sentences.25 Gonzalez appealed this decision to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which granted his petition to
determine if the trial justice’s denial of the motions to suppress
were clearly erroneous and whether or not police violated
Gonzalez’s federal constitutional rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court deferred to the trial
justice’s factual findings, applied a “clearly erroneous standard,”27
and conducted an independent, de novo review of the evidence in
the record, in a light most favorable to the State, to determine if
Gonzalez’s Fourth Amendment constitutional rights were
violated.28 Therefore, the Court would reverse the trial justice’s
denial of the motion to suppress only if “‘(1) his or her findings
concerning the challenged statements reveal clear error, and (2)
[the Court’s] independent review of the conclusions drawn from
the historical facts establishes that the defendant’s federal
constitutional rights were denied.’”29
The Court reviewed Fourth Amendment principles including
federal and Rhode Island precedent on the issue of exceptions to
the warrant requirement for searches and seizures.30 The Fourth
Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in
their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”31 The “Fourth Amendment
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent [a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement], that threshold
25. Id. at 1145.
26.
Id. at 1135, 1145. Gonzalez also appealed the decision based on the
contention that two of the jurors in his case were biased and either should
have been dismissed or he should have been granted a mistrial, but the Court
declined to address that issue in light of its ruling on the motions to suppress.
Id. at 1159.
27.
Id. at 1145 (citing State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 50 (R.I. 2014), cert.
denied 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015); State v. Cosme, 57 A.3d 295, 299 (R.I. 2012);
State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 1044 (R.I. 1998)).
28.
Id. (citing State v. Harrison, 66 A.3d 432, 441 (R.I. 2013)).
29.
Id. (quoting State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I. 2004)).
30. Id. at 1146–47.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”32 This strong
protection of privacy in the home creates a presumption that
warrantless searches are unreasonable.33 Exceptions to the
warrant requirement include when the search is consented to, and
when exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into the
home.34
A. Consent
First, the Court addressed the purported consent of Ms.
Gonzalez for the police officers to enter her home, noting that the
burden is on the State to prove by a “‘fair preponderance of the
evidence’”35 that consent was “‘freely and voluntarily’”36 given
when assessed under the totality of the circumstances.37 Some of
the factors to be considered under the totality of the circumstances
include “‘the number of officers entering the home,’ ‘the
apprehension of a family member,’ ‘the time of day,’ and a ‘display
of weaponry.’”38 The Court held that the trial justice’s
determination that Ms. Gonzalez consented to police officers
entering the home and resultant denial of the motion to suppress
were erroneous, as she did not freely and voluntarily give
consent.39 The Court summarized the totality
of
the
circumstances of when Ms. Gonzalez opened the door to the police
officers: she faced at least three officers, several of whom had their
weapons drawn and one held a tactical shield; it was 7:00 a.m. on
a Sunday morning; and the officers demanded to know the
32. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1146 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980)).
33. Id. at 1146 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586). The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has applied the prohibition of warrantless entry to a person’s
home to purposes of both searches and arrests. State v. Linde, 876 A.2d
1115, 1124 (R.I. 2005) (citing Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
34. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1147 (citing Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d
1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)).
35. Id. (quoting State v. O’Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I. 1990)).
36. Id. (quoting State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 918 (R.I. 1980)).
37.
Id. at 1147–48 (quoting Palmigiano v. Mullen, 377 A.2d 242, 246
(R.I. 1977) (stating that “the question of whether consent was ‘in fact
voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’”).
38.
Id. at 1148–49 (quoting State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1374 (R.I.
1984)).
39. Id. at 1149.
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location of her son.40 The Court then concluded that these were
“hardly circumstances conducive to voluntary consent.”41 The
Court continued that while nonverbal consent can be freely and
voluntarily given, Ms. Gonzalez’s glancing and/or gesturing up the
stairs—which could also be explained as reflexive after the officer
first looked up the stairs when asking for the location of
Gonzalez—further supported the lack of free and voluntary
consent.42
Secondly, the Court applied the analysis to determine
whether Ms. Gonzalez’s written consent was freely
and
voluntarily given.43 The Court held that Ms. Gonzalez did not
freely and voluntarily give written consent and that the trial
justice’s denial of the motion to suppress was erroneous.44 The
Court noted a lack of evidence in the record upon which to a
determine that the “state met its burden of proving that Ms.
Gonzalez’s written consent was free and voluntary by a fair
preponderance of the evidence.”45 The Court emphasized that,
upon examination of all the facts, a mere hour-and-ten-minutes
passed between Ms. Gonzalez opening her door to armed police
officers and signing the written consent.46 In this amount of time,
police officers repeatedly asked Ms. Gonzalez where her son was
and she stood by as police officers sprinted up the stairs, arrested
her son, and removed him from their home47; furthermore, there
were still several officers in her home, and she expressed a range
of emotions from the time officers entered her home despite
appearing calm at the exact time she read and signed the written
consent agreement.48
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (comparing State v. O’Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I. 1990) (holding
that defendant’s mother’s valid consent to search home did not violate the
Fourth Amendment)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1149–50.
45. Id. at 1150 (citing O’Dell, 576 A.2d at 427).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Ms. Gonzalez appeared calm when she read and signed the
written consent, but she had previously cried at several points. In addition,
the detective who obtained her written consent testified that he prefaced her
reading of the consent agreement with a hypothetical scenario that the
officers would obtain a search warrant if she did not consent to the search
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B. Exigent Circumstances
Next, the Court addressed the State’s reliance on exigent
circumstances for not obtaining a warrant, noting that the burden
is on the State to overcome the presumption that all warrantless
home searches are unreasonable by viewing the facts as known to
the police at the time of the arrest.49 The Court is extremely
mindful that “‘[w]hen an officer undertakes to act as his own
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed an
action to get a warrant.’”50 Immediate and serious consequences
may be present where (1) there is a potential for evidence to be
destroyed inside the home before a warrant could be obtained; (2)
there is a risk that the suspect may escape; or (3) the suspect
poses a threat to the lives or safety of the public, the police
officers, or themselves.51
The Court held that exigent circumstances did not exist in
this case, and thus the warrantless arrest was invalid.52 The
Court detailed the difference between an “emergency situation”
and a “planned arrest,” stating that an emergency situation
requires prompt police action where it is not practicable to obtain
a warrant while, in contrast, a planned arrest does not stem from
an ongoing investigation in the field and it is practicable to obtain
a warrant.53 The Court found that the facts present in this case
were much more comparable to a planned arrest than an
emergency situation,54 and put strong emphasis on the seven
hours between approximately midnight when the police had
sufficient reason to suspect that Gonzalez was the shooter and
7:00 a.m. when the police arrested him in his home.55 During
these seven hours, police made no attempt to obtain a warrant.56
The Court did not find evidence to support that swift action was
and presented consent simply as a second option. Id.
49. Id. at 1150–51.
50. Id. at 1151 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751(1984)).
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 1154.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1153.
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necessary during this entire seven-hour period,57 and while law
enforcement argues that “[t]o sit down at a desk and type out a
warrant at that point in time . . . was a waste of resources,”58 “the
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.”59
Furthermore, law enforcement indicated that it felt evidence,
namely the gun, could be destroyed and that Gonzalez may be a
threat to officer safety or himself; however, the Court found that
assertion was based on generalized conjecture instead of specific
facts of the investigation.60 “[S]ubjective, generalized statements
of the police—about their concern for destruction of evidence and
the possibility that defendant could harm himself or others or
escape arrest—are neither sufficient nor fact based” and cannot
support a determination that exigent circumstances are present.61
C. Attenuation Doctrine
Finally, the Court determined whether Gonzalez’s written
consent to search his bedroom was valid even though the
underlying arrest was illegal.62 In general, the fruit-of-thepoisonous tree doctrine deems evidence derived from an illegal
search or arrest as inadmissible because the evidence was tainted
by the primary illegality;63 however, the attenuation doctrine
allows evidence obtained by illegal means to be admissible if the
connection between the arrest and the consent to search is
sufficiently remote so as to purge the evidence of the primary
taint.64 When assessing whether attenuation is sufficient to
render consent valid, the Court considers “[t]emporal proximity of
the arrest and the [consent to search], the presence of intervening
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1153, 1164 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
59. Id. at 1153 (majority opinion) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393 (1978)) (comparing United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir.
1980)).
60. Id. at 1164 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 1165.
62. Id. at 1155 (majority opinion).
63. Id. (citing State v. Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 919 (R.I. 1980)); Fruit-of-thepoisonous-tree Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
64. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1155 (citing State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120,
1134 (R.I. 2006); Attenuation Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).

2017]

SURVEY SECTION

733

circumstances . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct . . . .”65 The State bears the burden of
proving that the primary taint has been purged from the
evidence,66 and “‘consent [that] is obtained during the course of an
illegal detention is presumptively . . . invalid.’”67 Here, the Court
held that the facts presented by the State were not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the evidence is invalid as fruit-ofthe-poisonous-tree stemming from the illegal arrest.68 The Court
emphasized that only a short time passed between Gonzalez’s
illegal arrest in his home and his signing the written consent to
search his bedroom.69 In addition, Gonzalez was handcuffed until
just before he signed the written consent, was still in the back of a
police car with two police officers standing nearby,70 and was only
one-half mile from his home.71 Under the totality of these
circumstances, the Court could not discern any “intervening
circumstances that would lead to the determination that
[Gonzalez’s] consent was sufficiently attenuated from his illegal
arrest so as to be untainted by the preceding illegal police
activity,” and, therefore, the consent was not voluntary.72
D. State’s Argument of Harmless Error
While the Court held erroneous the denial of all four motions
to suppress, the State contended that even if the evidence was
illegally obtained, admitting it was harmless due to the “‘truly
overwhelming’ evidence of [Gonzalez’s] guilt.”73 The Court noted
that “the United States Supreme Court has applied the harmless
error principle to the admission of evidence obtained in violation
of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights[,]”74 but the State
65. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1155 (quoting Casas, 900 A.2d at 1134–35).
66. Id. (citing State v. Parra, 941 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I. 2007)).
67. Id. (quoting Parra, 941 A.2d at 804).
68. Id. The concurrence highlights that officer testimony indicates that
the handgun case was removed from the bedroom before Gonzalez was even
presented with the written consent statement, further underscoring the
appropriateness of it being suppressed. Id. at 1161 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 1155 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 1155–56.
71. Id. at 1162 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 1156 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
73. Id.; Error, harmless error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
74. Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970)).
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must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”75 When assessing
whether the error to allow evidence is harmless, the Court looks at
factors including, “the relative degree of importance of the witness
testimony to the prosecution’s case, . . . the presence or absence of
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, . . . and . . . the overall strength of the
prosecution’s case.”76
Here, the Court found that while there was substantial
evidence of Gonzalez’s guilt presented at trial, it was not so
overwhelming as to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
tainted evidence did not influence the verdict.77 The Court
emphasized that the evidence from Gonzalez’s bedroom,
particularly the clothing he was wearing the night of the shooting,
not only was direct evidence of his guilt but also served to directly
corroborate the testimony of Dalomba, the sole eyewitness.78 This
lent credibility to Dalomba, which is critical in light of the fact
that neither side considered her a palatable witness, and the State
remarked in its closing arguments that she was a “horrible
person;” therefore, the illegally obtained evidence potentially
impacted a juror’s decision whether or not to believe Dalomba.79
75. Id. at 1156–57 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)) (citing United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st
Cir. 2012); State v. Mercurio, 89 A.3d 813, 822 (R.I. 2014); State v. Smith,
446 A.2d 1035,1036 (R.I. 1982)).
76. Id. at 1157 (quoting State v. Bustamante, 756 A.2d 758, 766 (R.I.
2000). The Court noted that it will not apply the harmless error principle
where there is an “overwhelming amount” of evidence indicative of a
defendant’s guilt. Id. (quoting State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 590 (R.I. 2005).
77. Id. at 1157, 1158–59.
78.
Id. at 1158. The Court also found that the receipt for Gonzalez’s
purchase of a gun might have influenced a juror who was uncertain whether
Gonzalez could have afforded a gun. Id.
79.
Id. at 1157–58 (citing Mercurio, 89 A.3d at 822–23 (holding that
error was not harmless where it effected witness credibility and credibility
was “central to the case.”)). In this case, the prosecutor stated:
I told you all that at the beginning; you weren’t going to like
[Dalomba], she’s going to be rude, obnoxious, defiant, and
disrespectful. . . . But one thing she didn’t do was lie to you. . . .
[T]he accounts of what happened, that she gave on th[e] stand [are]
corroborated by the physical evidence that was obtained in this case.
Id. at 1157 (first alteration not in original). The defense counsel stated,
“[Dalomba’s] the least credible person in this room right now . . . [i]f her
mouth is moving, she’s lying.” Id. at 1157–58.
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COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court further clarified the
circumstances that will not support the determination that a
warrantless entry into a home, a warrantless search, or a
warrantless arrest was valid. It is well established that
warrantless searches are unreasonable unless one of the limited
exceptions to the warrant requirement is present, including a
defendant’s voluntary consent or exigent circumstances.80
Searches conducted outside of these bounds are a violation of the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right, and any evidence collected
is inadmissible in court unless the harmless error principle
applies.81
In holding that the motions to suppress at issue here were
erroneously denied, the Court considered several factors, but
heavily focused on elapsed time when deciding whether obtaining
a warrant is reasonable, assessing whether exigent circumstances
were present, and determining whether consent to a warrantless
search is freely and voluntarily given.82 Here, the Court clarified
that because law enforcement had seven hours before the arrest of
Gonzalez, there was ample time to at least pursue an arrest
warrant, and it could have been done in a manner that would not
have distracted from the investigation.83 Furthermore, the Court
determined that lack of time between an illegal arrest and
obtaining consent for a subsequent search can render consent
coerced and invalid, especially where there are no intervening
circumstances.84 The Court also declined to hold this admission of
illegally obtained evidence as a harmless error, even when the
80.
Id. at 1147 (citing State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I.
1984); Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)).
81.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 19, 22 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
82. Id. at 1149, 1152, 1155.
83. Id. at 1152.
84. Id. at 1156. The Court noted that officers needed only to obtain a
warrant for Gonzalez’s arrest for the subsequent search to be valid and the
evidence admissible; when presented with a valid arrest warrant, it would
have been reasonable to expect Gonzalez or Ms. Gonzalez to open the door to
the officers, and if they did not then the officers would have be justified in
entering under the circumstances present here. Id. at 1147 n.9 (citing Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980); State v. O’Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427
(R.I. 1990)).
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evidence against Gonzalez was overwhelming, where it could have
directly influenced jurors as they decided whether or not a key
eyewitness was credible.85
The application of these standards ensures that law
enforcement does not violate a suspect’s Fourth Amendment
rights even when law enforcement is nearly certain that they have
the proper suspect and that suspect is guilty of the crime of which
he will be accused. Police are often in rapidly unfolding and
dangerous situations where there is little to no time to consider
options, and they need the flexibility to make decisions. In those
cases, there are reasonable exceptions to the warrant requirement
available to law enforcement, justifying a search or arrest, or to
allow the judicial process to proceed when illegally obtained
evidence would not have impacted jurors’ decision. However, this
was not one of those situations, and the Court’s decision once
again underscores the importance of the right to privacy–
particularly privacy in one’s own home.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the Superior
Court’s denials of the defendant’s motions to suppress and
remanded the case for a new trial.86 The Court reaffirmed that
consent to warrantless searches must be freely and voluntarily
given when assessed under the totality of the circumstances;87
exigent circumstances must be based on real, immediate, and
serious consequences, as opposed to generalized conjecture; and
must be grounded in an emergency situation and not a planned
arrest.88 Evidence that stems from an illegal arrest is not
admissible if there are not intervening circumstances that would
effectually attenuate the evidence obtained from the illegal
arrest,89 and admission of illegally obtained evidence is not a
harmless error where it lends credibility to and corroborates the
statements of a primary witness.90

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1158–59.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1149–50.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1158.
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Contract Law. S. Cty. Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d
204 (R.I. 2015). Under the theory of quantum meruit, a
subcontractor may recover the value of the services rendered to
property owners, so long as the subcontractor proves each of the
three elements of the claim. A subcontractor may not recover fees
for its expert witness because such fees are not considered to be
recoverable or taxable costs as a matter of law.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 2010, Defendants Brian and Karen McMahon (Defendants)
purchased approximately eleven acres of forested property on
Block Island with the intention of building a 2,500-square-foot
house and a barn on the property.1 The Defendants selected S.
Heinz Construction & Design, Inc. (Heinz Construction) as the
general contractor for the project.2 Heinz Construction and the
Defendants agreed that Plaintiff, South County Post & Beam, Inc.
(Plaintiff), a subcontractor that specialized in “timber frame
design, fabrication, and installation,” would build the roof for the
house and also design and build the timber frame for the barn.3
In July 2010, Heinz Construction and Plaintiff signed work
orders, which described the scope of the work that Plaintiff was to
perform on the house and the barn.4 In the following months,
Plaintiff also performed work that was outside the scope of the
work orders, including the construction of a tower and a deck on
the roof of the house, but this additional work was never recorded
in a change order.5 In May 2011, a billing dispute arose between
the parties, and Plaintiff brought a civil action seeking damages
for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.6
In October 2013, a bench trial was held before Justice Kristen
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

S. Cty. Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 207 (R.I. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E. Rodgers of the superior court.7 At trial, Plaintiff presented
testimony from three witnesses: Kenneth Bouvier (Bouvier),
Dennis Scott Heinz (Heinz), and Robert L. Brungraber, Ph.D.
(Brungraber).8 Bouvier, Plaintiff’s founder and
president,
testified that in October 2010, Plaintiff sent an invoice to Heinz
Construction for the additional work performed on the roof of the
house.9 After receiving two payments from Heinz Construction,
Plaintiff was told that the Defendants would pay Plaintiff directly
for its work in the future; however, Bouvier recalled receiving only
one direct payment from the Defendants.10
Heinz, Heinz Construction’s “principal,” testified that he
routinely sought the Defendants’ review and approval of the work
and change orders that Heinz Construction executed with Plaintiff
throughout the construction process.11 Heinz further testified
that he was aware of only the two payments from Heinz
Construction to Plaintiff for the work Plaintiff had performed on
Defendants’ property, and that he had asked the Defendants to
directly pay Plaintiff on just one occasion.12 Following Heinz’s
testimony, Plaintiff presented the testimony of its expert witness,
Brungraber, a civil engineer in the field of heavy timber
structures.13 Brungraber testified that he had “reviewed various
engineering drawings by [P]laintiff as well as various work orders,
change orders, purchase orders, and invoices.”14 Upon review of
these items, Brungraber concluded that the amounts Plaintiff
charged for each part of its work were “‘very reasonable.’”15
7. Id. at 204, 208.
8. Id. at 208.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. From July-September 2010, “Heinz Construction and [P]laintiff
executed five change orders relating to the scope of the work for the barn.”
Id. at 207.
12. Id. at 208. “In the agreed statement of the facts, the parties stated
that [P]laintiff had received only two payments from Heinz Construction for
the work it had performed on [the] [D]efendants’ property: $20,000 paid on
July 29, 2010, and $24,012.50 paid on August 28, 2010.” Id.
13. Id. at 208, 209.
14. Id. at 209.
15. Id. Brungraber noted that the prices Plaintiff charged “while
sometimes at the low end of the reasonable price range for each component,
they were always within the range that he would have charged in the twenty
years that he worked for a company that engaged in work similar to
[P]laintiff’s work.” Id.

740 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:738
Defendant Brian McMahon (McMahon) testified on behalf of
the Defendants.16 McMahon testified that Heinz requested that
the Defendants directly pay Plaintiff $60,100 in September
2010.17 McMahon added that this was the only time that he had
directly paid Plaintiff, and that he believed that Heinz
Construction would be responsible for payments to Plaintiff from
that point onward.18 McMahon further testified that a few weeks
after the payment, he was “‘shocked’” when he received an
“‘accounting’” from Bouvier via email, which reflected over $30,000
owed to Plaintiff.19 On November 22, 2010, Bouvier sent
McMahon a direct request for final payment, provoking a billing
dispute between the parties regarding the outstanding balance.20
Following the bench trial, Justice Rodgers entered judgment
for the Defendants on the breach of contract claim, and entered
judgment for Plaintiff on the claim of unjust enrichment.21 The
trial justice found that Plaintiff had established the three
elements of an unjust enrichment claim: (1) that Plaintiff
conferred a benefit on Defendants valued at $41,549.45; (2) that
Defendants had appreciated the benefit of Plaintiff’s work; and (3)
that it would be unjust for Defendants to “‘retain the benefit
without paying the value thereof.’”22 On October 15, 2013, final
judgment was entered for Plaintiffs in the amount of $41,549.45
plus costs, and Defendants appealed.23 Subsequently, Plaintiff
filed an “Application for Taxation of Costs,” which the trial justice
granted and Defendants appealed.24 After consolidating the
Defendants’ appeals, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed
the superior court’s judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for unjust
enrichment but vacated and remanded the superior court’s order

16. Id. at 208.
17. Id. at 209.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. “Before trial, the parties filed an agreed statement of facts,
which included the parties’ agreement that [P]laintiff’s total unpaid invoices
equaled $41,549.45.” Id. at 208.
23. Id. at 209.
24. Id at 210. This application for costs filed by Plaintiff “included the
filing fee, the costs of four deposition transcripts, the service of one subpoena,
and the fee for expert witness Brungraber.” Id.
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to grant Plaintiff’s application for costs in its entirety.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the superior court’s judgment, the Supreme
Court initially sought to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled
to recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment.26 However,
before addressing the arguments of the parties on appeal, the
Court briefly compared unjust enrichment to quantum meruit.27
The Court declared that in Rhode Island, in order to recover for
unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, a claimant must prove: “(1)
that he or she conferred a benefit upon the party from whom relief
is sought; (2) that the recipient appreciated the benefit; and (3)
that the recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances
that it would be inequitable for [the recipient] to retain the benefit
without paying the value thereof.”28 The Court determined that
although Plaintiff brought an action for unjust enrichment,
Plaintiff “actually [sought] to recover the value of the services
rendered for which [the] [D]efendants have thus far declined to
pay, i.e., to recover in quantum meruit.”29 While Plaintiff styled
its cause of action as one for unjust enrichment, Plaintiff may
recover under the theory of quantum meruit by proving the same
three elements.30
Following this discussion, the Court addressed the
Defendants’ challenge to the trial justice’s judgment that Plaintiff
was entitled to recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment.31
The Defendants argued that the third element of Plaintiff’s unjust
enrichment claim was not proven, “arguing both that the trial
justice failed to make any findings of fact specific to this third
element, and that the [P]laintiff failed to prove [D]efendants’

25. Id. at 210, 216.
26.
Id. at 210. Unjust enrichment is defined as “[t]he retention of a
benefit conferred by another, who offered no compensation, in circumstances
where compensation is reasonably expected.” Id. (quoting Unjust Enrichment,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
27.
Id. at 211. Quantum meruit is defined as “[a] claim or right of action
for the reasonable value of services rendered.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
28.
Id. at 210–11 (internal citations omitted).
29. Id. at 211.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 212.
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enrichment was unjust.”32 However, the Court rejected
Defendants’ arguments and found that the trial justice rendered a
“comprehensive decision from the bench,” in which the trial justice
properly addressed each element of Plaintiff’s claim and supported
her conclusions with sufficient factual evidence.33 Specifically, the
Court stated that “the timing and the content of the emails
exchanged between the parties and McMahon’s testimony that he
was aware that [P]laintiff continued to perform work . . . even as
the parties were discussing account and billing questions,”
supported the trial justice’s findings.34 Accordingly, the Court
held that there was “competent evidence . . . in the record to
support the trial justice’s conclusion that ‘it would be unjust for
the [Defendants] to retain the benefit conferred by [Plaintiff]
without paying the value thereof.’”35
The Court then addressed the Defendants’ additional
challenges to the trial justice’s conclusion.36 First, the Defendants
argued that the trial justice erred in ruling that Plaintiff did not
have to prove that it lacked an adequate remedy at law before
finding that the Defendants were unjustly enriched.37 However,
the Court reaffirmed that unjust enrichment “‘can stand alone as
a cause action in its own right,’”38 and when such an action stands
alone, “the presence or absence of an adequate remedy at law is
simply one of the factors considered in the third element’s
balancing of the equities and is not determinative of whether
[P]laintiff can or will prevail as a matter of law.”39 Thus, the
Court rejected the Defendants’ argument and declared that the
elements of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit do not require
that the Plaintiff prove that he or she lacks an adequate remedy
at law.40 Secondly, the Defendants urged the court to consider the
possible public policy consequences of affirming the trial justice’s

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
2005)).
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 113 (R.I.
Id.
Id. at 214.
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decision.41 Defendants argued that allowing the subcontractor to
recover against the property owners here “would render every
property owner a de facto party to subcontracts executed by the
general.”42 The Court confirmed that it was aware of such policy
considerations, but reemphasized that the third element requires
a “fact-specific balancing process” to determine if a party is
unjustly enriched.43 Here, the Court noted that given the
undisputed facts of the case and the parties’ direct communication
throughout the construction process, this decision would not result
in the public policy concern raised by the Defendants.44
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $41,549.45.45
Finally, the Court addressed the Defendants’ second appeal
challenging the trial justice’s order that granted the Plaintiff’s
application for costs.46 Upon review of the superior court’s order,
the Court sought to determine whether the Plaintiff’s expert
witness fee was taxable as costs.47 The Defendants argued that
the trial justice erred when she ruled that Brungraber’s fee could
be taxed as a cost of the cause of action because “the expert’s fee
was precluded as a recoverable cost by G.L. 1956 § 9-17-22.”48
The Plaintiff contended that its application for costs was based on
“§§ 9-22-5 and 9-22-18 and that, pursuant to these statutes, the
trial justice simply exercised her discretion in allowing
Brungraber’s fee as a recoverable cost.”49 The Court previously
held that “‘[c]osts are normally considered the expenses of suing
another party, including filing fees and fees to serve process. Fees
to pay expert witnesses would not be included in this definition of
costs.’”50 Conducting a de novo review of the statutory language,
the Court ruled that pursuant to sections 9-22-5 and 9-22-18, the
trial justice erred by including Brungraber’s expert fee as a

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 215 (internal citation omitted).
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taxable cost.51 Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court
order granting the Plaintiff’s application for costs and remanded
the application to the trial justice with “an instruction to enter a
new order awarding the Plaintiff all costs for which it applied,
except Brungraber’s expert witness fee.”52
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly recognized the
importance of the third element of a claim for unjust enrichment.
However, as the Court noted, this element cannot be proven
merely by showing that a subcontractor has conferred a benefit
upon a property owner.53 Instead, a court “‘must look at the
equities of each case and decide whether it would be unjust for a
party to retain the benefit conferred upon it without paying the
value of such benefit.’”54 It is the primary role of the trial courts
to examine the facts and balance the equities between the parties
to determine what would be a just and unjust result.55 The Court
gives great deference to the trial court’s determination and so long
as there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings,
then the Court will not substitute its view of the evidence.56
Here, the Court found that there was a proper balancing of
the equities by the trial justice. However, the facts of this case
reveal that the scale tipped in favor of the subcontractor. Through
an examination of the facts, the trial court determined that it
would be an unjust result if the property owners retained the
benefit conferred to them without paying the subcontractor the
value of the work performed.57 By affirming the trial court’s
decision, the Court: (1) protected the Plaintiff from being taken
advantage of; (2) provided a remedy for Plaintiff’s damages by
awarding the Plaintiff the value of its work performed; and (3)
barred the Defendants from unjustly benefitting from Plaintiff’s
work. It is clear that through its conclusion, the Court seeks to
51. Id. at 216.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 212.
54. Id. (quoting R&B Elec. Co. v. Amco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1356
(R.I.1984)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 210.
57. Id. at 213.
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(hopefully) deter future property owners in Rhode Island, from
unjustly benefitting from a subcontractor’s work without properly
paying for the value of the services rendered to them.
The Court concluded that the Plaintiff was entitled to
recovery because it proved each of the three elements of its unjust
enrichment claim. However, the Court ultimately ruled that
Plaintiff should instead recover under the theory of quantum
meruit because Plaintiff sought the value of the services it
rendered to Defendants. While the theories of unjust enrichment
and quantum meruit differ slightly, they each require Plaintiff to
prove the same three elements as the Plaintiff proved in this case.
Using the “fact-specific balancing process” it is possible that the
Court could have reached a different outcome.58 Alternatively,
the Court might have concluded that the facts of the case tipped
the scale in favor of the property owners. Specifically, the Court
noted that “the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and Heinz
Construction is a factor that weigh[ed] against Plaintiff recovering
the value of its work from Defendants.”59 Here, it seemed that the
“only reason [P]laintiff [did] not attempt to collect the outstanding
balance for its work on [D]efendants’ property under its contract
with Heinz Construction [was] the undisputed fact that [P]laintiff
want[ed] to maintain a good business relationship with Heinz
Construction.”60 Due to the contractual relationship, the Court
could have rejected Plaintiff’s claim, thereby leaving Plaintiff to
seek the remaining balance from the general contractor.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a subcontractor is
entitled to recover the value of the work performed under the
theory of quantum meruit only if the subcontractor proves each of
the three elements of the claim. The Court determined that the
third, and most important element, must be proven using a factspecific balancing of the equities to determine if it would be unjust
for a party to retain the benefit conferred upon it without paying

58.
59.
60.

Id. at 214.
Id. at 212.
Id.
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the value of such benefit.
Brandon Ruggieri

Contract Law. Voccola v. Forte, 139 A.3d 404 (R.I. 2016). A
transfer of properties from a transferor to a transferee for the
release of mortgages on the properties is null and void without
adequate consideration if the transferee was already obligated to
release the mortgages under a prior settlement agreement.
Without a finding that donative intent was present, an argument
that a transfer constitutes a gift must fail.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 2005, Edward E. Voccola1 sued his son, Stephen Voccola
(Stephen), and his daughter, Barbara Voccola (Barbara), in
Providence County Superior Court, seeking to revoke a purported
gift of stock in a corporation.2 In March 2007, a Settlement
Agreement was executed by Mr. Voccola and four of his children—
Barbara, Stephen, Paul Voccola (Paul), and Patricia Forte
(Patricia).3 The relevant part of the agreement stated: “[Patricia,
Stephen, Paul, and Barbara] agree forthwith upon the signing of
this agreement to discharge and/or release all mortgages and
promissory notes which reference [Mr. Voccola], Jere Realty, Inc.,
Lakeview Realty, Inc., [CCI, WSI, and/or CVR].”4 On or about
June 4, 2007, “three documents were signed purporting to be
Waivers of Notice of Minutes of a Special Joint Meetings [sic] of
1. The two consolidated actions on appeal in this case were commenced
by Edward E. Voccola, who passed away on June 25, 2010, during the
pendency of the case. Marvin Homonoff was the temporary custodian of the
estate, but was later substituted by Barbara Voccola and Edward R. Voccola
in their representative capacities. Voccola v. Forte, 139 A.3d 404 n.1 (R.I.
2016).
2. Id. at 407. The stock in question was from Redbrook Investments,
Inc. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (alterations in original). “Mr. Voccola was the sole shareholder of
three Rhode Island corporations—Capital City Investments, Inc. (CCI), City
View Realty, Inc. (CVR), and West Side Investments, Inc. (WSI). Id. Patricia
was the President of all three corporations during the pendency of this case.
Id.
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the Stockholders and Board of Directors of [CCI, CVR, and WSI]
respectively.”5 The waivers in question were allegedly sought to
evidence that a meeting and vote took place on May 29, 2007, and
were all purportedly signed by Mr. Voccola.6 In anticipation of the
waivers to be signed, Patricia, as President of CCI, CVR, and WSI,
signed warranty deeds conveying the real estate of those
corporations to Red Fox Realty, LLC (Red Fox).7 The “signed”
waivers indicated that the transfer of properties from Mr.
Voccola’s companies to Red Fox was in exchange for Patricia
assuming from Mr. Voccola two mortgages on the properties.8
In response to these conveyances, Mr. Voccola brought suit
against Patricia and Red Fox (collectively, Defendants) in
Superior Court, alleging that his signature on the WSI waiver was
falsified and that Patricia wrongfully transferred his properties.9
Mr. Voccola also asserted that the transfer of the warranty deeds
at issue in the case were void because they lacked adequate
consideration.10 In July 2012, during a seven-day bench trial, the
court heard from all five of Mr. Voccola’s children, two
handwriting experts, and two additional witnesses who testified
that they observed Mr. Voccola sign the property over to
Patricia.11 The trial justice found that the Settlement Agreement
from the previous case was the “product of mutuality of assent and
was supported by adequate consideration,” holding that “[t]he
mortgages should have been discharged effective as of the date of
the Settlement Agreement” and that “any subsequent conveyance
of property to [Patricia], which was performed in exchange for
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Patricia was the owner of Red Fox Realty, Inc. Id. However, the
Court noted that the Agreed Statement of Facts in the case indicated that
“Red Fox was not officially organized as a corporation until June 1, 2007.” Id.
n.3.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10.
Id. at 407–08. In response, the Defendants filed a counterclaim for
damages of $82,000 for a mortgage Patricia took out to assist Mr. Voccola in
paying for criminal fines he faced in a matter unrelated to this suit. Id. at
408.
11.
Id. at 408–11. The Agreed Statement of Facts provided that
testimony of “discussions by and between conversations between [Mr.
Voccola] and any of his children . . . shall not be deemed to be hearsay but
shall be accepted into evidence . . . .” Id. at 408 (first alteration in original).
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[Patricia’s] release of mortgages on those properties, was done
without consideration.”12
The trial justice indicated that she gave little weight to
Patricia’s evidence regarding the Settlement Agreement and
found that the two eye witnesses were “biased” due to the
relationship they had with Patricia.13 The trial justice accepted
some of Stephen’s testimony about Mr. Voccola’s intent to recover
the properties; however, she gave little weight to the other
siblings’ testimony due to the “divisive nature” of their
relationship.14 In regard to the handwriting specialists, the trial
justice accepted the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and found that
the Defendants’ expert was not credible.15 After analyzing the
information before her, the trial justice determined that the
signatures were not Mr. Voccola’s and held that the deeds, which
transferred Mr. Voccola’s properties, were void.16 The trial justice
also concluded that Patricia breached her fiduciary duties to CCI,
CVR, and WSI for self-dealing and rejected Patricia’s argument
that the conveyance of property was a gift because there was no
evidence of donative intent.17 The Defendants then filed a timely
notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

At the outset, the Rhode Island Supreme Court made clear
that the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury are
given “great weight,”18 and a significant amount of deference is
given to the “[trial justice’s credibility] determinations . . . .”19
The Court first sought to determine the validity of the waivers
12.
Id. at 411 (alteration in original).
13.
Id.
14. Id. at 412.
15.
Id. The trial justice indicated that the Defendants’ expert testimony
was not credible because “he reached a conclusion on the validity of the
signature before he prepared his report.” Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. In regard to the Patricia’s counterclaim, the trial justice found
her testimony credible and that she was able to establish the damages she
prayed for. Id. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on the
decision of the counterclaim, which was later denied. Id.
18.
Id. at 412–13 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wellington Condo.
Ass’n v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass’n, 68 A.3d 594, 599 (R.I. 2013)).
19.
Id. at 413 (alteration in original) (quoting Banville v. Brennan, 84
A.3d 424, 430 (R.I. 2014)).
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and the validity of the transfer of property from Mr. Voccola’s
businesses to Red Fox.20 In doing so, the Court recognized that
the Defendants spent significant time arguing the signatures’
authenticity in their appellate argument but concluded that it was
unnecessary to decide the genuineness of the signatures on appeal
because Patricia’s agreement to release the mortgages for the
conveyance of the properties was done without consideration.21
In describing the fundamental principles of contract law, the
Court explained that to determine whether sufficient
consideration exists, it “employ[s] the bargained-for exchange
test,”22 and that “[a] promise to carry out a preexisting contractual
obligation owed to the promisee, or the performance of such a
contractual duty, generally is not sufficient consideration . . . .”23
Looking to the 2007 Settlement Agreement, the Court found that
it was clear that Patricia was obligated to release the mortgages
she held on the properties.24 The Court determined that because
the Settlement Agreement was signed prior to the waivers,
Patricia was already required to release the mortgages.25 Thus,
the Court found Patricia’s subsequent transfer of property for
releasing the mortgages lacked consideration because she was
already legally obligated to release the mortgages under the
Settlement Agreement.26 The Court rejected Patricia’s argument
that because she was not a party in the 2005 lawsuit, she was “not
bound” by the Settlement Agreement.27 The Court explained that
although Patricia was not a party in the 2005 suit, she did in fact
sign the Settlement Agreement and had an “interest in the
resolution of the 2005 suit” because of her shareholder status in a
company with a dispute that was resolved in the Settlement
Agreement.28 The Court concluded that the
Settlement
Agreement was a “valid and enforceable” contract and that the
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 414 (quoting DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274, 1279 (R.I.
2007)).
23.
Id. (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 153 at 533 (2011)).
24. Id. (citing Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I. 2004)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 414–15 (citing DeLuca v. City of Cranston, 22 A.3d 382, 384
(R.I. 2011)).
27. Id. at 415.
28. Id.
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three warranty deeds were null and void because they lacked
adequate consideration.29
Next, the Court considered the claim that Mr. Voccola’s
transfer of properties was a gift to Patricia.30 Patricia argued that
the trial justice improperly looked to Mr. Voccola’s actions after
the signing of the waivers instead of his present intent at the time
of the alleged gift and that adequate consideration was not given
to Mr. Voccola’s statements prior to the signings.31 The Court
explained that donative intent is essential to the existence of a gift
and that it is proper to look at subsequent acts if it were unclear
what the donor’s intention was at the time of the alleged gift.32
The Court reasoned that the “gift” at issue did not resemble the
typical gift that a parent gives a child; rather, the act resembled a
business conveyance of properties from “three corporations to one
corporation.”33 The Court reiterated that it gives great deference
to the trial justice’s determinations and concluded it was unclear
what Mr. Voccola’s donative intent was at the time he allegedly
signed the waivers.34 By looking at Mr. Voccola’s subsequent acts,
the Court determined that a gift was not intended.35
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court faced the challenge of
settling a long-standing family dispute between Mr. Voccola and
his five children.36 In doing so, the Court was tasked with
determining whether Mr. Voccola’s corporations were rightfully
transferred to the Defendants.37 The Court had to examine the
issue of whether the waivers and transfer of the properties were
valid.38 It was interesting that the Court spent significant time in
its opinion recapping the testimony given by each witness at trial,
29. Id. (citing DeLuca, 22 A.3d at 384).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 416 (citing Ferer v. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 732 N.W.2d 667,
674 (Neb. 2007)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 417 (citing Ferer, 732 N.W.2d at 674).
35. Id. The Court then accepted the trial justice’s findings for Patricia’s
counterclaim for $82,000. Id. at 419.
36. Id. at 407.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 413.
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but ultimately relied little on that testimony for its holding. The
Court simply looked to see if Patricia was bound by the previous
Settlement Agreement to determine whether there was adequate
consideration for the subsequent transfer of properties.39 Finding
that Patricia was bound under the earlier Settlement Agreement
to release Mr. Voccola from the mortgages on those properties, the
Court persuasively resolved the issue by applying a basic principle
of contract law: “when a party performs an obligation owed under
a preexisting contract, the law ordinarily will regard a demand by
that party for additional benefits as void for lack of
consideration.”40 Thus, the Court’s in depth overview of the
testimony from trial seemed futile.
Moreover, the Court recapitulated the trial court’s decision by
examining some of its important findings.41 In doing so, the Court
stated that the “trial justice . . . found that Patricia, as President
of CCI, CVR, and WSI, breached her fiduciary duties by engaging
in self-dealing when she transferred the properties at issue to her
own company for no consideration.”42 The Court, however, left the
discussion of fiduciary duty at that. Being that the case involved
the transfer of properties between corporations, it was
conspicuous that the Court did not elaborate more on the trial
justice’s finding that Patricia breached her fiduciary duty. The
issue of the genuineness of the signatures and the lack of
consideration seemed to be directly related to Patricia’s role as
President of those companies. Arguably, the Court could have
elaborated more on this finding to clarify whether a breach of a
fiduciary duty occurred.
Lastly, the Court explored the Defendants’ claim that the
transfer of properties was a gift from Mr. Voccola.43 In resolving
this issue, the Court focused on donative intent and the delivery
requirement.44 The Court recognized that Mr. Voccola’s valid
signatures on the waivers would have helped support
an
argument for donative intent; however, the Court accepted the
trial justice’s findings that the testimony was not credible and
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 414.
Id. (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 153 at 535 (2011)).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416.
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held that no donative intent was found.45 Although it can be
argued that the Court could have further examined the signature
issue in regard to donative intent before coming to its conclusion,
the Court reiterated its precedent in giving significant deference
to the trial justice’s findings.46 To further demonstrate that
deference, the Court accepted the trial justice’s findings on
Patricia’s $82,000 counterclaim.47 The Court, in looking at both
the findings and the evidence, consistently relied on the trial
justice’s determinations and found no error.48
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a trial justice’s
decision finding that the transfer of the three properties from the
Plaintiff to the Defendants for the release of mortgages on the
properties was executed without adequate consideration because
one of the Defendants was already obligated to release the
mortgages under a prior Settlement Agreement. The Court also
found that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s
determination that the transfer of the properties was not a gift
because no clear donative intent was present. Lastly, the Court
accepted the trial justice’s findings that the Defendant’s
counterclaim for damages was proper.
Tyler Bischoff

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 417.
See id. at 417–18.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 419.

Criminal Law. State v. Breton, 138 A.3d 800 (R.I. 2016). On a
motion for a new trial, a trial court justice must analyze the
evidence in front of him to determine if he would reach a different
conclusion than the jury, and in doing so, the trial justice has the
discretion to find that a witness is credible, even though a witness’s
testimony may be inconsistent at times.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On October 25, 2011, a masked assailant stabbed Dilicia Lora
(Lora) as she was leaving her apartment to go to work.1 Lora
suffered several lacerations, leaving her face permanently scarred.2
Lora identified her attacker as the Defendant, Jose Breton (Breton),
after pulling his mask up to his nose and recognizing the bottom
half of his face.3 When she arrived at the hospital, Lora told her
doctors about Breton’s past abusive and threatening behavior
toward her, and that she did not report this abuse to police out of
fear of retaliation from Breton.4
The day after the attack, Lora explained to police that she
identified Breton as the attacker because she was able to recognize
a portion of the attacker’s face and the particular ski mask worn by
the attacker, which belonged to Breton, in addition to the fact that
Breton was the only person who had threatened Lora prior to the
attack.5 At that meeting, Lora also told police about the
tumultuous, two-year relationship she shared with Breton.6
1. State v. Breton, 138 A.3d 800, 802 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id. Lora told her family that “Pappi” had attacked her immediately
after the attack; Breton also went by the name “Pappi Valdez.” Id. at 801, 802.
4. Id. at 802.
5. Id. Lora told police that Breton had told her that if she did not stay
with him, Breton would “kill [her]”, “take [her] eyes out,” or “leave [her]
paralyzed.” Id. (alterations in original).
6. Id. at 801–02. At one point in the relationship, Lora left Rhode Island
to stay with her mother in the Dominican Republic to get away from Breton.
Id. at 801. When Breton traveled to the Dominican Republic as an attempt to
win back her favor by offering to partake in counseling, Lora refused, and
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In May 2010, police responded to a domestic incident between
Breton, Lora, and Lora’s daughter, Jani Tolentino (Tolentino),
where Breton hit and pushed Tolentino after an argument.7 When
police responded to this incident, Lora told police that she did not
know Breton’s real name and that they had only known each other
for a few months, when in fact, the two had been dating for two
years.8 At trial, Lora indicated that she was not truthful with the
police on this particular occasion because she was afraid of Breton.9
The State charged Breton with one count of assault with a
dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault on Lora.10
Breton was also charged with one count of simple assault on
Tolentino, stemming from the May 2010 incident.11
At trial, Breton offered two alibi witnesses who suggested that
he was in New York City from 3:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. on the day of
the attack.12 Breton’s mother, Ana Cruz, testified that she picked
Breton up on the night of October 24, 2011, and dropped him off in
Manhattan with another family member, Femije Tairi (Tairi), on
her way to a family funeral in Virginia.13 Tairi testified that she
met Breton in Manhattan around 3:30 a.m. on October 25, 2011,
and traveled with him to her apartment in Brooklyn after Breton’s
mother left to continue driving to the funeral.14 Tairi said that she
talked with Breton for about two hours, until 6:00 a.m., when
another family member visited the apartment to grieve.15 Tairi
testified that Breton stayed at her residence in Brooklyn until
around 10:00 p.m. on October 25, 2011, when Cruz picked Breton
up on the drive home from the funeral and returned him to Rhode
Island.16
The jury convicted Breton on the two counts of assault against
Breton traveled back to Rhode Island. Id. Lora eventually moved back to
Rhode Island in 2011, and though she worked with the mother of Breton’s
child, Lora attempted to avoid him. Id. at 801–02.
7. Id. at 801.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 802–03.
13. Id. at 802.
14. Id. at 802–03.
15. Id. at 803.
16. Id.
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Lora but reached a verdict of acquittal for the third count of assault
against Tolentino.17 Breton then moved for a new trial, challenging
that the verdict was “against the weight of the evidence” because
Lora’s testimony, specifically her statement that she could identify
her attacker in a short period of time in a dimly lit stairway, was
not credible.18 Breton also argued that the State was unable to
demonstrate doubt of his alibi after the testimony of both of his alibi
witnesses.19
After considering the testimony, the trial justice found both
Lora and Tolentino to be credible witnesses, though there were
some questions about Lora’s ability to identify Breton during the
attack.20 On the other hand, the trial justice had some doubts about
the testimony of the alibi witnesses, leading him to question their
credibility.21 After weighing the credibility of all of the witnesses
and the relevant evidence, the trial justice determined that he could
not come to a different conclusion than the jury, and therefore
denied Breton’s motion for a new trial.22 On appeal, Breton argued
that the trial justice “misconstrued” evidence when he found Lora
to be more credible than either of Breton’s alibi witnesses.23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that
it would overturn the trial justice’s decision to deny Defendant’s
motion for a new trial only if the decision was clearly erroneous or
“the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material and relevant
evidence . . . .”24 The Court took into account the role of the trial
justice in determining if a new trial is appropriate, which was to act
as a “superjuror” and “(1) consider the evidence in light of the jury
charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or
she would have reached a result different from that reached by the
17. Id. at 801.
18. Id. at 803.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 804.
21. Id. Specifically, the trial justice questioned the timing of a family
gathering in New York at 6:00 a.m., and its relationship to the timing of the
alleged attack. Id.
22. Id. at 801, 805.
23. Id. at 801.
24. Id. at 803–04 (quoting Battle v. State, 125 A.3d 130, 132 (R.I. 2015)).
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jury.”25
The Court focused its analysis on the trial justice’s examination
of the witnesses’ credibility.26 Specifically, the Court considered
the fact that the trial justice took into account several issues with
Lora’s identification of her attacker, including the poor lighting,
short period of time, Lora’s inability to identify the weapon in the
attack, Lora’s prior reluctance to identify the victim in the May
2010 incident, and the elapsed time since the October 2011
incident.27 Additionally, the Court considered the trial justice’s
assessment of Breton’s alibi witnesses.28
After reviewing the analysis of the evidence by the trial justice,
the Court determined that the trial justice “satisfied his
obligations” in his role as a “superjuror” when he denied Breton’s
motion for a new trial because he examined all of the evidence,
made credibility determinations, and decided that he would not
have come to a conclusion contrary to the jury’s conclusion.29
Additionally, the Court concluded that even though there may have
been some inconsistency in Lora and Tolentino’s testimony, the
trial justice acted within his discretion to find these witnesses
credible.30
COMMENTARY

In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
principle that when considering a motion for a new trial, a trial
justice should examine all of the evidence, make credibility
determinations about the witnesses, and grant a motion for a new
trial only if after making these considerations, the trial justice
would have come to a different conclusion than the jury about the
verdict.31 Though there were some questions in this case about the
credibility of the State’s main witness, Lora, the trial justice was
within his discretion to determine her testimony to be credible.32
Though the Court will overturn a decision on a motion for a
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 803 (quoting State v. Offley, 131 A.3d 663, 674 (R.I. 2016)).
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803, 805.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 805.
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new trial if the trial justice misconstrued relevant evidence, the
Court indicates that the trial justice’s analysis of the credibility of
witnesses is discretionary, and therefore a defendant faces a high
bar to overturn the decision.33 It is important that the Court gives
the trial justice this broad range of discretion to make credibility
determinations in criminal cases, and specifically motions for a new
trial, because the trial justice has the opportunity to observe the
witnesses live at trial. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the
trial justice considered the witnesses’ attitudes, body language, and
demeanor in his credibility determination.34 If the Court were to
follow a different standard of review, such as a de novo instead of
“clearly erroneous,” it would undermine the importance of the trial
justice’s observation of a live witness to assess body language as
well as oral testimony. The trial justice is in a much better position
that the appellate court to determine credibility, which, in this case,
was essential to proving the State’s case. Therefore, the Court will
defer to the trial courts with these determinations unless there is
clear error by the trial justice.35
CONCLUSION

A trial justice has the discretion to make credibility
determinations and may find a witness credible even though
testimony may present some inconsistencies. The Court, on review
of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, will give broad
discretion to these credibility determinations by the trial justice.
Kelsey A. Hayward

33.
34.
35.

Id. at 803–04.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 803.

Criminal Law. State v. Burgess, 138 A.3d 195 (R.I. 2016). A firsttime informant’s tip that does not include a statement against
interest, which serves as the basis for the informant’s knowledge
of criminal activity or predictive detail, is not sufficient to
establish probable cause to arrest a suspect. If the informant’s tip
does not establish probable cause on its own, police must conduct
an independent investigation to corroborate the tip to establish
probable cause before making an arrest.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On October 26, 2011, during a routine traffic stop, Officer
Brian Macera realized the passenger in the vehicle had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest.1 To avoid arrest, the
passenger told Macera that a “clean-shaven, African American
male with short-cropped hair and a thin build was distributing
crack cocaine in the vicinity of Providence and Cranston.”2 The
passenger-now-informant also told the officer the man, nicknamed
“CJ,” drove a blue Mercury with Rhode Island license plates and
that he would be at the Royal Buffet restaurant in Cranston
around 4:00 p.m.3
After receiving this information and contacting the Rhode
Island State Police High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task
Force (task force), Macera and several members of the task force
formed a police perimeter around the shopping plaza in which the
Royal Buffet was located; the informant was also present to
1. State v. Burgess, 138 A.3d 195, 196 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id. at 197. The Court was troubled by the fact that police neither
arrested the informant pursuant to the outstanding warrant for this arrest,
nor charged him with any crime. Id. at 198 n.6.
3. Id. at 197. The evidence is unclear whether the informant told
Macera that CJ was at the Royal Buffet or that CJ would arrive at the
restaurant soon. During the suppression hearing, Macera testified that the
informant told him CJ was presently at the restaurant; however, at trial,
Macera testified that the informant called CJ around 3:00 p.m. and then told
Macera CJ would be at the Royal Buffet close to 4:00 p.m. Id. n.3.
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provide visual confirmation of the suspect.4 Neither Macera nor
any member of the task force attempted to find a blue Mercury in
the parking lot, claiming there were too many vehicles in the lot.5
The Defendant, who matched the informant’s physical description,
walked out of the restaurant, and the informant identified him as
CJ.6 Macera and the team “surrounded” the Defendant, had him
put his hands on a vehicle, and conducted a pat-down search.7
During the pat-down search, Macera felt an unidentifiable bulge
in the Defendant’s front pocket, removed the object, and
discovered sixty-two dollars in cash.8 After Macera read the
Defendant his Miranda rights and explained that the Defendant
was suspected of selling drugs, the Defendant initially denied
possessing any drugs.9 After Macera observed that the Defendant
appeared nervous and smelled of burnt marijuana, the Defendant
admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day, and Macera told
the Defendant a K-9 unit was on its way.10 In response, the
Defendant said, “[i]t’s in my pocket.”11 Macera then searched the
Defendant and found two bags of crack cocaine in the waistband of
Defendant’s jacket.12 After Macera discovered the crack cocaine,
the Defendant identified his vehicle as a blue Chevrolet Impala
with Rhode Island license plates.13
Charged with one count of possession of cocaine, the
Defendant moved to suppress the two bags of crack cocaine as well
as all statements made to Macera, arguing his arrest was invalid
because Macera lacked probable cause at the time of arrest and
the search of his jacket violated both the state and federal
constitutions.14 The trial justice denied the Defendant’s motion to
suppress, finding police had probable cause to arrest the
Defendant because Macera testified that the Defendant smelled of

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197–98.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2017]

SURVEY SECTION

761

marijuana, appeared nervous, and stated, “[i]ts in my pocket.”15
The trial justice also relied on police “surveillance” of the Royal
Buffet before the police apprehended the Defendant and the
match between Defendant’s physical appearance and the
informant’s description of CJ.16 At trial, a jury convicted the
Defendant of the charged crime; thereafter, the Defendant
appealed the trial justice’s denial of the motion to suppress.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon reviewing the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court deferred to the trial justice’s
findings of fact and reviewed the issue of probable cause de novo.18
The State conceded the Defendant was under arrest from the
moment the police surrounded him outside the restaurant.19 The
Court emphasized that “[a] valid arrest must be supported by
probable cause at its inception[,]” and information obtained after
an initial arrest cannot be used to show probable cause.20 The
Court looked to the evidence the trial justice relied upon to find
probable cause and found the only pre-arrest evidence that could
support probable cause was the informant’s tip, the “surveillance”
of the shopping plaza, the Defendant leaving the Royal Buffet, and
the similarity between the Defendant’s appearance and the
informant’s description.21 The Court held these facts alone did
not support probable cause for the Defendant’s arrest.22
First, the Court stated probable cause exists when the
officer’s knowledge of the circumstances is based on reasonably
trustworthy information and is sufficient for a reasonably cautious
person to believe the suspect has committed an offense.23 The
Court examined the reliability and potential bias of the tip based
on the totality of the circumstances.24 Here, the Court found the
informant’s tip to be unreliable because the police were not
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Chum, 54 A.3d 455, 460 (R.I. 2012)).
Id. at 199.
Id. (citing State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 480 (R.I. 2003)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Chum, 54 A.3d at 462).
Id. at 200 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
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familiar with the informant, and the informant’s tip did not
include any statements against his interest or serve as the basis
for his or her knowledge of the crime.25 Although the existence of
these factors increases the likelihood the informant is being
truthful, the Court stated that these factors are not conclusive on
the issue of reliability.26 The State argued that the informant had
an interest in being truthful because he was in police custody at
the time he or she gave the tip.27 However, the Court rejected this
argument because the informant did not make any statements
admitting involvement in a crime.28 Additionally, the Court found
the informant unreliable because he did not tell police the basis
for his knowledge, which could have included facts such as him
purchasing cocaine from the Defendant or his involvement in drug
dealing with the Defendant.29 Lastly, the Court found the
informant’s accurate description of the Defendant’s physical
appearance, vehicle, and location under cut the tip’s reliability
because it did not describe the illegal activity.30 The State argued
the tip contained predictive information that the Defendant would
be at the Royal Buffet around 4:00 p.m.;31 however, the Court
found that, even if this were true, knowledge about the
Defendant’s physical appearance and future location had no
bearing on the informant’s claim that the Defendant was in
possession of crack cocaine.32
25. Id. at 200, 201 (citing State v. Read, 416 A.2d 684, 689 (R.I. 1980)).
The Court distinguished this informant from an informant who provided
reliable information to police for six months. Id. at 200–01 (citing Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309, 312–13, 313 (1959)).
26. Id. at 200 (citing Draper, 358 U.S. at 309, 312–13, 313).
27. Id. at 201.
28.
Id. The Court distinguished this informant’s statement from an
informant’s statement that admitted to police that the informant bought
marijuana from a certain address. Id. (citing Read, 416 A.2d at 689).
29.
Id. at 201–02 (citations omitted) (comparing this informant’s tip to
informants’ statements in six other cases where the basis of those informants’
knowledge was his or her involvement in the crime). The basis of knowledge
can be derived from legal as well as illegal interaction with the suspect, but
the Court highlights that the informant’s statement against penal interest is
closely tied to his basis of knowledge and provides case examples where the
basis of knowledge stemmed from illegal involvement with the suspect. Id. at
201.
30. Id. at 202.
31. Id. at 203.
32.
Id. (comparing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309-10 (1959),
United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 697 (4th Cir. 1991), and State v.
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Next, the Court analyzed whether, even if the informant’s tip
was unreliable on its own, independent police investigation
corroborated the tip to establish probable cause.33 The Court
determined the police did not sufficiently corroborate the
informant’s tip to establish probable cause because the
investigation only consisted of creating a perimeter around the
shopping plaza and confirming the Defendant matched the
informant’s description.34 The police failed to corroborate the
informant’s description of the Defendant’s vehicle either by
searching the parking lot, claiming that the parking lot was too
large, or by conducting a records check.35 Based on these findings,
the Court found police efforts insufficient to corroborate the
informant’s tip to establish probable cause.36
Finally, the Court concluded that the Defendant’s arrest
lacked probable cause because the circumstances were not
sufficient to cause a reasonable person with Macera’s knowledge
at the time of arrest to believe Defendant committed a crime.37
Therefore, the Court held the Defendant’s arrest was invalid, and
the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion to
suppress his statements to the police.38
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court set out a test to determine
when an individual’s right to be protected from unlawful arrest
and subsequent seizure of evidence can be outweighed by law
enforcement’s interest in using information gathered from
informants to find and arrest suspected criminals.39 While an
informant’s tip can be helpful to police, the Court emphasized the
importance of examining the totality of the circumstances to
determine if the information is reliable and the basis for the
informant’s knowledge, as well as police efforts to corroborate the
Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 330 (R.I. 2003)).
33.
Id. (citations omitted).
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 204–05 (examining Draper, 358 U.S. 309-13, United States v.
Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 2001), and Miller, 925 F.2d 699–700).
38. Id. at 205.
39. Id. at 200.
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informant’s tip, before making an arrest.40 To maintain the
fluidity of probable cause, the Court considered all relevant factors
in determining the reliability of the informant’s tip, stating no
factor to be conclusive on its own.41
The Court expressed concern with allowing a first-time
informant’s physical description of another person in conjunction
with a statement that the person is involved in unlawful activity,
unconfirmed by independent police investigation, to establish
probable cause.42 If the facts here were enough to establish
probable cause, a person with minimal, easily obtained knowledge
about another person could theoretically send police to arrest
nearly anyone against whom they had a personal vendetta. The
doctrine of probable cause aims to prevent this exact type of arrest
by requiring a police officer’s knowledge of the circumstances,
prior to arrest, to be based on “reasonably trustworthy
information” and “sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution” to believe the suspect committed a crime.43
On the other hand, the Court also has an interest in allowing
police officers to use an informant’s tip to arrest suspected
criminals so long as the tip is reasonably reliable. The Court
discussed circumstances in which the informant’s tip could be
sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause, such as if the
police are familiar with the informant, if the informant makes a
statement against his or her interest or gives the basis for his or
her knowledge, and if the description of the suspect is highly
detailed.44 In this case, the Court found the informant’s tip lacked
all of these factors, concluding that the police lacked probable
cause at the time of the Defendant’s arrest.45
The Court’s holding does not deny officers the ability to use a
potentially unreliable tip, but provides police officers the
opportunity to test the reliability of an informant’s tip through

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 204 (finding no other case where probable cause found in
similar circumstances).
43. Id. at 199 (quoting State v. Chum, 54 A.3d 455, 462 (R.I. 2012)).
44. Id. at 200–03.
45.
Id. at 200–03 (majority opinion), 205 (Robinson, J., concurring)
(finding the key factor to be that the informant did not advise police of the
basis of his or her assertion).
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their own investigation before making an arrest.46 In this case,
the Court acknowledged that the State would have had a stronger
argument that the informant’s information was reliable had the
officers taken further steps to verify the reliability of the
informant’s tip, such as, at a minimum, checking the parking lot
for a vehicle matching the informant’s description.47 The Court’s
holding encourages police officers to do their due diligence before
relying on an unreliable tip.
In sum, the Court’s analysis and holding emphasized the
importance of examining the reliability of an informant’s tip under
the totality of the circumstances to establish probable cause prior
to arresting a suspect.48
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held an informant’s tip is
not sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause if the
informant is a first-time informer, gives no basis for his or her
knowledge, makes no statements against interest, and gives
insufficient detail of the Defendant’s appearance and activities.
However, an informant’s tip can be corroborated with independent
police investigation to test the accuracy of the informant’s
information.
Samantha Armstrong

46.
Id. at 200, 203 (majority opinion).
47.
Id. at 203. The Court appears generally unhappy with the police’s
behavior because the police also failed to execute the warrant for the
informant’s arrest in exchange for the tip. Id. at 198 n.6.
48. Id. at 205.

Criminal Law. State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679 (R.I. 2016). An
objection made in a conference with a trial justice may adequately
preserve the record for appeal, even if no objection is made
contemporaneously during the trial. An opening statement is not
so prejudicial as to require a limiting instruction where the trial
justice took steps to inform the jury during the trial that
statements from counsel are not evidence. Giving a jury
instruction regarding eyewitness testimony is within the trial
justice’s discretion and is only reviewable for abuse. Objections
made during motions in limine must be renewed
contemporaneously during the trial in order to be properly
preserved for appeal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Dominique Gay was murdered while walking with two of his
friends, Dean Robinson and Wilson Andujar, on March 20, 2009.1
Gay had a child with Crystal Dutra, and after the end of their
relationship, Dutra began a relationship with Miguel Davis
(Defendant).2 Gay began to harass the Defendant in various ways
between 2007 and 2009, including challenging him to fights.3
On the day of the murder, Andujar testified that he was
walking, with Robinson on his right and Gay on his left, to
Robinson’s house after eating at a restaurant.4 As the three
walked towards an alley, Andujar heard the sound of gravel
coming from his left.5 Andujar looked and saw the Defendant
pointing a gun at the group.6 Andujar heard the first shot and
attempted to run away, but he slipped and then heard a second

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679, 682 (R.I. 2016).
Id. at 682–83.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
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shot.7
Andujar testified that he saw the Defendant wielding a black
handgun and wearing a hoodie with the hood pulled over part of
his head and a bandana that covered his face “from the tip of his
nose passed his chin.”8 Andujar had known the Defendant “for a
couple of weeks” three years prior to the shooting when they were
in school together.9 Andujar further testified that he did not
immediately recognize the Defendant, but that it had later
“clicked in [his] head who [he] just saw.”10 When questioned at
the police station, Andujar told police he did not know who the
shooter was, but he later testified he feared retaliation if he
disclosed this knowledge.11 Three years after the shooting, and
after seeing a news video online of the Defendant being arraigned
for Gay’s murder, Andujar identified the Defendant as Gay’s
shooter to the police.12
In the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor informed the
jurors that they would be hearing from Robinson, and that he
would testify that: 1) he saw the Defendant and knew it was him
from the moment he saw him, and 2) he informed Dutra that the
Defendant was the shooter.13 Robinson was also expected to tell
the jury that in November 2012, he ran into the Defendant who
told him to stop talking to the police.14 The same day that
Robinson was supposed to testify, his attorney informed the court
that Robinson would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.15 The
Defendant did not move for a mistrial when this occurred.16
During the trial, the State called Kevin Santiago to testify
regarding the Defendant’s access to guns based on what the
Defendant had confided in him.17 Santiago testified that while
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 685.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 687–88.
14. Id. at 688.
15. Id. Robinson’s attorney advised him to invoke his rights, perhaps
because Robinson was with Andujar and Gay that morning for the purpose of
finding a way to smoke marijuana, and they even purchased a cigar for that
purpose before going to the restaurant. Id. at 684.
16. Id. at 688.
17. Id. at 686.
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the grandfather of the Defendant’s girlfriend (Lisa) was out of
town, Lisa and the Defendant had used his home for their
“liaisons.”18 While his girlfriend was in the bathroom, the
Defendant discovered a few guns, including a 9 mm handgun.19
Santiago also testified that the Defendant confessed to him that
he had murdered Gay.20 The State offered testimony from Lisa’s
aunt that she had checked on the home while the grandfather was
away and found no handgun under the mattress where it was
kept.21
At the end of the State’s case, the Defendant moved for a
limiting instruction to be given to the jury that would require the
jury to disregard anything the State said regarding Robinson in
its opening statement, or in the alternative, that the Defendant be
allowed to mention Robinson’s absence from the State’s case in his
closing.22 “Because Robinson was unavailable as a matter of law,”
the trial justice denied both of these motions.23 After jury
instructions were given, both parties were called for a conference
to express any concerns regarding the instructions given.24 The
Defendant did not renew his objection at this conference.25
The Defendant filed an appeal alleging reversible error by the
trial justice for not giving the jury a limiting instruction with
regard to the State’s opening statement or instructions regarding
eyewitness testimony. The Defendant also argued his motion for a
new trial should have been granted.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

As an initial matter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought
to determine if the Defendant made an adequate objection to the
State’s opening argument.26 The Court held that the Defendant
adequately preserved the record when the Defendant requested
the limiting instructions during a charging conference the day
18. Id.
19. Id. Forensic evidence showed that the Defendant had been shot with
two 9 mm bullets. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 687.
22. Id. at 690.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 691.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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before the jury was instructed, reasoning that to deny this would
be “elevating form over substance.”27 Because the Defendant
failed only to renew the objection after the trial justice had
instructed the jury, the Court held that the record was adequately
preserved.28
The jury instructions “need only [to] adequately cover[] the
law.”29 “[A]n erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it can be
shown that the jury ‘could have been misled’ to the resultant
prejudice of the complaining party.”30 Because the State made its
opening statement in good faith, believing that Robinson would
testify, the Court only addressed whether the opening statement
was “so prejudicial that the trial justice was required to give
specific limiting instructions.”31 The Court held that the limiting
instruction was not needed because the trial justice repeatedly
reminded the jury that anything the attorneys said was not to be
considered evidence.32
The Defendant also wanted the jury to be read a list of factors
to consider when evaluating eyewitness testimony because of how
unreliable the Defendant believed Andujar’s testimony was.33
The Court noted that it had previously held that judges are not
permitted to comment on evidence unless done so in an impartial
way; however, it had approved jury instructions regarding the
reliability of eyewitnesses in past cases.34 Because of this, the
Court held that whether to give a jury instruction regarding the
reliability of eyewitness testimony remains within the discretion
of the trial justice and will only be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.35 Here, that discretion was not abused because the
Defendant did not present evidence of the problematic nature of
eyewitness testimony until appeal, and despite the problems with
this particular witness’s testimony,36 the witness knew the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 689 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Long, 61
A.3d 439, 445 (R.I. 2013)).
30. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Long, 61 A.3d at 445).
31. Id. at 692–93.
32. Id. at 693.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 694.
35. Id. at 696.
36. The Court listed a variety of reasons why this witness’s testimony
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Defendant before the night of the murder.37 Despite not requiring
trial justices to give specific jury instructions regarding
eyewitness testimony, the Court noted that the “better practice”
would be for courts to give “more comprehensive instructions
when eyewitness testimony is an issue.”38
Concerning the admittance of evidence regarding the
Defendant’s access to guns, the Defendant filed pretrial motions to
exclude this evidence because Lisa’s grandfather was no longer
alive to testify as to what kind of guns he owned, and the weapon
used in the murder was never found.39 The trial justice admitted
this evidence because access to guns is admissible evidence, even
if it is not the exact gun that was used in the crime.40 Because the
Defendant did not contemporaneously object during the trial, and
because the trial justice did not give a final ruling on the evidence,
the Court held that the Defendant did not properly preserve the
record for review.41 Similarly, the Defendant did not properly
preserve the admittance of a photograph of Gay with his family
because the Defendant did not contemporaneously object when the
photograph was admitted into evidence, but rather only objected
in his motion in limine.42
Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not err by
denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial because the
Defendant met his burden to “(1) consider the evidence in light of
the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine
was “problematic,” including:
the assailant was in disguise, held a gun, the only eyewitness
testified that he ran as soon as he saw the weapon and heard it
discharge, the eyewitness did not identify this [D]efendant for more
than three years, and the first identification was made just days
after the only eyewitness saw a video of [D]efendant being arraigned
for this crime.
Id. at 696–97.
37. Id. at 693, 697.
38. Id. at 697. For examples of what a “more comprehensive instruction”
would be, the Court notes two cases: State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87, 92–93 (R.I.
2015) and State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1290–91 (R.I. 2011).
39. Davis, 131 A.3d at 697.
40. Id. The trial justice relied on State v. Rios, 996 A.2d 635, 639 (R.I.
2010).
41. Id. at 701, 702.
42. Id. at 703.
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whether he or she would have reached a result different from that
reached by the jury.”43 The trial justice denied the motion based
on the jury finding that Santiago’s testimony regarding the
Defendant’s confession was believable.44 The trial justice also
found the witness credible and noted that the Defendant would
not be able to avoid conviction based on this testimony.45
Furthermore, Santiago’s testimony was corroborated by forensic
evidence and Dutra’s testimony, which supplied the motive.46
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Supreme Court seems to set forth two contrary
standards regarding preserving evidence for appeal. On the one
hand, the Court rejected favoring “form over substance” when it
rejected the idea of requiring a contemporaneous objection in
order to preserve the record after counsel had made his objection
known during a conference. On the other hand, the Court would
not review the Defendant’s motions that were made in limine
without contemporaneous objection. In essence, the Court chose
to elevate form over substance—a position it explicitly rejected
earlier in its own decision. From the Court’s decision, it is not
clear when lack of a renewed contemporaneous objection may be
overcome. However, it does open the door for counsel to argue
that giving weight to “form over substance” would have more of a
detrimental effect than simply hearing the issue, in spite of the
issue not being properly preserved.
Concerning giving instructions on eyewitness testimony, the
Court merges its prior holdings in order to develop the rule that it
is within the trial justice’s discretion to give a jury instruction on
eyewitness testimony; however, the Court does not provide any
guidance on when declining to give such an instruction may be
deemed an abuse of discretion under review. This is particularly
important in the case at bar where the eyewitness testimony was
especially problematic, but the instruction was not given. It raises
the question of when the giving of an instruction, or lack thereof,
would ever be deemed an abuse of discretion. Unfortunately,
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 704, 705.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id.
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there is no clear answer.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an objection made
in a conference with a trial justice may adequately preserve the
record for appeal, even if no objection is made contemporaneously
during the trial; however, objections made in motions in limine
must be renewed contemporaneously during the trial in order to
be properly preserved. An opening statement is not so prejudicial
as to require a limiting instruction where the trial justice took
steps to inform the jury during the trial that statements from
counsel are not evidence. Giving a jury instruction regarding
eyewitness testimony is within the trial justice’s discretion and is
reviewable only for abuse.
Katelyn E. Kalmbach

Criminal Law. State v. Florez, 138 A.3d 789 (R.I. 2016). A
Rhode Island Superior Court justice has the authority to allow the
State to impeach a witness with his prior statement and not to
admit parts of the complainant’s father’s witness statement into
evidence. Furthermore, a defendant who fails to challenge jury
instructions and a verdict sheet at appeal will not fall within the
raise-or-waive rule, and an untimely motion for a new trial should
not be considered by a trial justice.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On August 1, 2010, Ricardo Florez (Florez) engaged in sexual
contact with a boy under the age of fourteen,1 Joshua.2 The
assault occurred in a McDonalds restaurant in Pawtucket when
Joshua, Joshua’s nephew, and Joshua’s father, Glenn, were on
their way to a Red Sox Game.3 Florez approached Joshua when
Joshua was alone at a table in McDonalds and started a “onesided” conversation with him; Joshua was afraid of being rude by
not responding.4 Once Glenn returned, Joshua stated that he was
going to the bathroom.5 While Joshua was in the bathroom
washing his hands, Florez came out of the stall with his pants
down, walked over to Joshua, and grabbed Joshua’s penis over his
clothes.6 Florez then let Joshua walk out, and Joshua told Glenn
what happened.7 Glenn called the police, but Florez had fled by
the time the police arrived.8
On August 5, 2010, Joshua and Glenn went to the police

1. State v. Florez, 138 A.3d 789, 792 (R.I. 2016).
2. The superior court used pseudonyms to protect the complainant and
his father. Id. at 792 n.3.
3. Id. at 792.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 793.
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department to identify Florez and provide a statement.9 At this
point, Joshua told the police that a second touching had occurred,
when “[Florez] grabbed [his] hand and made [Joshua] touch his
exposed penis.”10 Glenn also made a statement, which mainly
contained what Joshua told him had happened.11
On March 31, 2014, the superior court found Florez guilty of
one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault and
later sentenced Florez to twenty years imprisonment, eight years
to serve and the remaining as probation.12 Florez appealed this
decision on multiple issues; Florez asserted that the trial justice
erred in denying his motion for a new trial, both the trial justice’s
jury charge and verdict sheet were flawed, the trial justice erred
when the State was allowed to improperly refresh Joshua’s
recollection, and that the trial justice erred by not allowing certain
parts of Glenn’s witness statement into evidence.13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the trial court’s denial of Florez’s motion for a
new trial, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first turned to a
procedural problem with the motion.14 Under Rule 33 of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for a new
trial “shall be made within ten (10) days after the verdict or
finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix
during the ten day period.”15 The jury returned a guilty verdict in
Florez’s case on May 31, 2014; however, Florez did not file his
motion until the date of the hearing,16 April 14, 2014, four days
late.17 The Court considered the fact that during the hearing, the
trial justice issued a warning to Florez that he “would suggest
that [Florez] file it today,” because the State mistakenly
9. Id. at 792–93.
10. Id. at 793.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 791–792.
13. Id. at 792.
14. Id. at 794.
15. Id.; see also SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 33 (2002).
16. After the jury returned its verdict on March 31, 2014, finding Florez
guilty, Florez’s counsel scheduled a hearing in anticipation for filing a motion
for a new trial. Florez, 138 A.3d at 794 n.5. The hearing was originally
scheduled for April 7, 2014 but it did not occur until April 14, 2014. Id.
17. Id. at 794.
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represented to Florez that the deadline was April 14, 2014.18
Although the justice issued the warning and Florez was
misinformed, the Court reiterated its previous holding that “[t]he
time limit set forth in Rule 33, is jurisdictional and cannot be
waived.”19 Further, to decide if the warning would allow for
Florez to file at that time, the Court looked again at Rule 33,
which “specifically provides that any further time for filing a
motion for a new trial must be fixed by the trial justice within the
ten-day period.”20 Therefore, the motion was untimely because it
was filed past the date provide in Rule 33, and the trial justice
could not fix a new date after that date had passed.21
The Court briefly considered the merits of Florez’s motion for
a new trial and found that it was “devoid of any merit.”22 Florez
argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new
trial because of specific “shortcomings” of Joshua’s testimony that
were acknowledged by the trial justice and because the footage
from the surveillance tape showed Florez leaving the bathroom
before Joshua, contradicting Joshua’s testimony.23 However,
Florez’s argument did not pass the Court’s standard of review for
a motion for a new trial, which “‘accord[s] great weight to a trial
justice’s ruling on [such a motion] if he or she has articulated
sufficient reasoning in support of the ruling.’”24 The Court
acknowledged that a trial justice “commits clear error when he or
she completely overlooks testimony which is materially
contradictory to the testimony on which the justice based his or
her determination . . . .”25 However, the Court found that clear
error did not occur in Florez’s case because the trial justice
recognized that Joshua’s testimony was neither “perfect nor
crystal clear” but still found his testimony to be credible and
trustworthy considering Joshua’s difficulties as a child
18. Id.
19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Champion, 873 A.2d 92,
94 (R.I. 2005)).
20. Id. (emphasis in original).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 793 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Kizekai, 19 A.3d
583, 589 (R.I. 2011)).
25. Id. at 795 (quoting King v. Huntress, Inc., 94 A.3d 467, 495 (R.I.
2014)).
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understanding what happened to him.26
Next, the Court addressed Florez’s claim that the jury
instructions and verdict sheet, which returned a non-unanimous
guilty verdict, went against the ruling in State v. Saluter when the
trial justice failed to specifically state to the jury that it was
required to unanimously find that Florez committed one, either, or
both of the sexual contacts.27 Florez contended that the trial
justice made the verdict sheet unclear because there was a
possibility that the jury found that Florez touched Joshua’s penis
over his pants, or Florez forced Joshua to touch Florez’s penis, or
both, or the jury was split over both.28 The Court commented that
Florez attempted to make a duplicity complaint,29 but the Court
has “consistently” held that the correct way to attack a duplicitous
complaint is to file a motion to dismiss, which Florez failed to do.30
Florez sought to establish his duplicity claim through asserting
error in the jury instructions and verdict form; however, the
Court concluded that his attempt failed because it was subject to
the Court’s “raise or waive rule.”31 The Court concluded that
Florez did not make an objection during trial either to the jury
verdict or instructions, and further, that Florez agreed when the
trial justice explained how he planned to deal with the potential
Saluter problem.32
The Court further contended that the
exceptions to the raise-or-waive rule would not apply to Florez
because the exceptions do not apply unless “basic constitutional
rights are concerned.”33 When examining the three-part test to
the exception, the Court found that even if the asserted error was
more than a harmless error, it was not a novel issue that “counsel
could not reasonably have known during the trial.”34
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1254–55 (R.I. 1998)).
28. Id.
29. Duplicity “refers to the joining of two or more offenses, however
numerous, in a single count of an indictment.” Id. (quoting Saluter, 715 A.2d
at 1253).
30. Id. at 795–96 (citing SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), (3)).
31. Id. “[A] litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on
appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Bido,
941 A.2d 822, 829 (R.I. 2008)).
32.
Id.
33.
Id. at 796 (quoting Bido, 941 A.2d at 829).
34.
Id. (quoting Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 878 (R.I.
2001)).
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Moreover, when reviewing the trial justice’s evidentiary
rulings, the Court stated that it would not overrule the trial
justice’s decisions on evidentiary rulings unless that decision was
an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to Florez.35 During the
trial, when Joshua was asked if he had ever touched Florez or if
there was any other touching besides Florez touching Joshua’s
penis over his pants, Joshua answered “[n]o.”36 Florez argued
that the trial justice erred when he allowed the State to use
Joshua’s witness statement to “refresh [Joshua’s] recollection” of
the second touching.37 However, due to the trial justice’s ruling
on Florez’s objection, the Court contended that Joshua’s statement
was allowed under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Rhode Island Rules of
evidence as opposed to refreshing Joshua’s recollection.38 When
the defense council objected to using Joshua’s witness statement,
the trial justice overruled, stating that “[i]f he says no then he
could impeach him with his own statement assuming that . . .
statement is inconsistent or if he says I’m not sure I don’t
remember why can’t he refresh his recollection with his own
statement about something that he just cant recall on the
stand.”39 The Court found that this clearly allowed for the trial
court to permit Joshua’s prior witness statement because the
State used these two inconsistent statements to impeach Joshua
as a witness, which was permissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).40
Further, it was within the trial justice’s discretion to impeach
Joshua with his prior statement, making Florez’s argument fail.41
Finally, Florez argued that the trial justice erred when
Glenn’s witness statement about Joshua’s interview with the
police, “I then found out that the male tried to touch [Joshua’s]
penis and the male tried to have [Joshua] touch his penis,” was
improperly prevented from being used at trial.42 Florez argued
that the fact that Glenn used the word “tried” would have cast
35. Id. at 793 (citing State v. Pitts, 990 A.2d 185, 189 (R.I. 2010)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 797 (alteration in original).
38. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) allows a prior inconsistent statement to be
admitted into evidence if the two statements are “sufficiently” inconsistent.
Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 798.
42. Id. (alterations in original) (emphases omitted).
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doubt upon his guilt and that it was a contradictory statement to
Glenn’s testimony in trial.43 Florez challenged that he was
wrongly prevented from using Glenn’s witness statement during
the cross-examination of Glenn and during Officer Slack’s
testimony.44 First, the Court found that Florez was not prevented
from using Glenn’s witness statement during cross-examination,
but the trial justice merely “corrected defense counsel’s form of the
question.”45 The Court further found that Florez decided not to
question Glenn about this statement and instead saved the
question for Officer Slack.46
In regards to the questioning of Officer Slack about Glenn’s
witness statement, after the State objected to its use during
Officer Slack’s testimony, defense counsel argued that “I’m not
even offering it for the truth of the matter asserted[;] merely these
words appear in this document.”47 The objection was sustained,
and defense counsel reiterated his argument.48 The Court could
not find a basis for Florez’s argument under any rule of law.49
The Court suggested that Florez was possibly trying to advance an
argument under 801(d)(1)(A), as a prior inconsistent statement,
but the Court made clear that Florez did not make such an
argument, and therefore that argument was waived.50 Thus, the
Court found that the trial justice did not err in prohibiting Glenn’s
witness statement from being used during trial.51
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court gave great deference to the
lower court and strong emphasis to the importance of adhering to
statutory constraints when reviewing the issues asserted by
Florez. The bulk of the issues were easily struck down by the
procedural problems they encompassed. The motion for a new

43. Id. Glenn stated at trial that he did not learn much from Joshua’s
interview with the police. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 799.
46. Id.
47. Id. (alteration in original).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828–29 (R.I. 2008)).
51. Id. at 800.
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trial was “untimely” and “beyond [the Court’s] review.”52 Florez
waived his claim of duplicity by failing to file a motion to dismiss
and failing to comply with the raise-or-waive rule by not objecting
to the jury instructions and the verdict form during trial.53
Further, Florez was not prevented from using Glen’s prior
statement when questioning him during trial, his counsel was
simply asked to rephrase the question; when Florez was prevented
from using Glen’s witness testimony when questioning Officer
Slack it was because defense counsel did not raise an actual
exception to hearsay under the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.54
Most of the issues raised by Florez on appeal were barred because
they had not been properly dealt with during trial, and the Court
took a strict stance with these deficiencies.
Further, the Court’s holding emphasized the great deference
that is given to the lower courts’ decisions. It is important to
maintain the finality of trial court decisions, but it is equally
important that justice be properly administered and prejudicial or
material mistakes not be made at trial. The Court sought to
achieve an appropriate balance of finality and justice by being
strict with the procedural issues but still addressing the merits of
the claim even though it was not required to do so.
While in this case the Court may have seemed very firm and
even harsh when upholding the trial justice’s decision, because of
procedural standards and deference, it was partially attributable
to the facts in this case. The facts of this case raised a perfect
trifecta of factors that lead the Court to affirm the lower court’s
decision. The issues consisted of procedural defects, meritless
arguments, and trial court deference (partially due to the sensitive
and complicated matter of child molestation). All of these factors
created a situational stance of firmness by the Court. It does not
appear that the Court will always approach these issues with the
firmness that it did in this case, as the Court divulged into further
analysis in order to determine if the claims had merit or if
exceptions would apply to the claims. The Court correctly
balanced both sides, but it was the facts of the case and actions, or
lack there of, taken at trial that lead to affirming the trial court’s
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 794.
Id. at 796–97.
Id. at 799.
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decision.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a motion for a
new trial that is filed fourteen days after a verdict is untimely,
and therefore the trial justice should not have considered it. The
Court also held that Florez’s challenge that the jury instructions
and verdict sheet were duplicitous did not fall within the
exception of the raise-or-waive rule and that it was within the
trial justice’s discretion to impeach a witness with his prior
statement.
Katherine Bishop

Criminal Law. State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812 (R.I. 2016). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that a reference to an off-the-record
objection is insufficient to properly preserve the issue for appellate
review. Second, an instruction explaining that second-degree
murder must be committed willfully, prohibits the jury from
concluding it could be committed accidently. Third, it is not an
abuse of discretion for the court to allow posing yes-or-no questions
to a witness struggling to recall his or her memory. Fourth, a
witness can discuss his or her testimony with the party calling that
witness while under a general sequestration order unless under a
specific instruction not to speak to an attorney. Finally, a video
depicting a disturbing crime scene is not unfairly prejudicial as long
as it is probative, even if there is a less prejudicial video available.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Camden Fry was born to Kimberly and Timothy (Tim) Fry, on
May 6, 2001.1 Camden had behavioral issues when she was very
young that continued when she started school.2 On one occasion,
while Tim was away on business Kimberly told Tim that Camden
had a “really bad crying episode” and that Camden had “punch[ed]
[Kimberly] and hit[] her and that [Kimberly] had to sit on her” to
restrain her.3
Almost two years later, before Camden finished second grade,
the Frys made a number of changes in an effort to alleviate
Camden’s behavioral issues.4 The family began treatment with a
therapist, Wendy Phillips (Phillips), and Camden was diagnosed
with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and
1. State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 816 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id. Her parents noticed that she often fussed when finishing one
activity and then transitioning to another. Once Camden started school, she
had a hard time academically, and continued to struggle when transitioning
between activities. Id. Her behavior became an issue, especially for Kimberly.
See id.
3. Id. (fourth alteration in original).
4. Id. at 816–17.
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prescribed medication.5
However, Camden’s behavior had taken a toll on Kimberly.6 In
a session with their family therapist, Kimberly indicated she was
suffering from mental health issues including “depression,
insomnia, anxiety, and panic attacks.”7 Kimberly began to feel like
Camden’s tirades “lasted longer for her than for Tim,” forcing
Kimberly to block the sound with her hands if the tantrum lasted
longer than twenty minutes.8 During a therapy session on July 28,
2009, Kimberly told Phillips “she blamed Camden for her
depression” and revealed that she felt inadequate and “hopeless.”9
Phillips recommended that Kimberly see an individual therapist,
but Kimberly never did.10
Less than two weeks later, on August 10, 2009, Tim reported
that Kimberly told him she “wished that Camden wasn’t around
because it was so much easier when it was just the two of [them].”11
At 5:50 that evening, Tim left Kimberly and Camden—who were
sitting next to each other on the couch, watching television—to play
hockey.12 Later that night, Kimberly called Tim and told him that
Camden had a “two-hour crying fit,” but that Camden had gone to
bed.13 Tim stated that Kimberly “sounded a little groggy,” but that
this was not unusual because she took Clonazepam or Benadryl to
help her sleep at night.14
When Tim arrived home, he found Kimberly falling asleep on
the couch and Camden in her bed under the covers.15 The next
morning, Tim walked into Camden’s bedroom to wake her.16 When
he approached the bed, he noticed she was in the same position as
the night before and her eyes were opened.17 Tim pulled back the
covers, removed her stuffed animal, and turned her onto her back;
5. Id. at 817. The medication seemed to help with Camden’s behavioral
issues, but tended to wear off in the evening. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 818.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Camden’s body was “ice cold and stiff,” and Tim knew she was
dead.18 Tim cried out for Kimberly, who “crawled into the room on
her hands and knees,” still groggy from the night before.19
Tim called 911, and while being interviewed at their home,
Kimberly told a responding officer that Camden gave her a hard
time taking a bath.20 Kimberly reported that Camden fell on the
floor, and had to be pulled into her bedroom,21 but after that, they
“watched television and read books . . . until . . . she put her to
bed.”22 However, Kimberly’s “condition began to deteriorate,” and
it occurred to Tim that “she must have taken some kind of
medication.”23 Upon the discovery of several empty bottles of
prescription medication, an ambulance was called for Kimberly.24
The next day, Tim was visiting Kimberly at the hospital when
she told him that “she had a battle with Camden [and] that Camden
had been kicking and punching her and biting her.”25 Kimberly
told Tim that she sat on top of Camden and “put her hand over
Camden’s nose and mouth to make her stop screaming,” and
Kimberly told Tim, “I’m so sorry, I’m so sorry.”26 Kimberly’s ICU
nurse also reported hearing Kimberly say “I’m her mother. I was
supposed to protect her but I couldn’t protect her from me.”27
At the trial, the defense submitted proposed jury instructions
that included an instruction on accident and voluntary
manslaughter due to diminished capacity.28 In camera, the trial
justice rejected the defense’s request for a diminished capacity
instruction, but the conversation was not recorded and there was
no record of an objection to the instruction ruling by the defense.29
After the jury was charged, the defense counsel objected that
accident was “just briefly” discussed but did not object to the lack of
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter due to diminished
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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capacity.30
While the jury was deliberating, they asked the trial court,
“[d]oes there have to be mental competency for there to be intent?”31
After conferring with prosecution and defense, the trial court
responded, “[a] defendant’s competency to stand trial is a legal
determination made before trial and is not an issue before you. Do
not confuse ‘mental competency’ with the defendant’s state of mind
or intent. Please refer to the jury instruction on DEFENDANT’S
INTENT.”32 After this was submitted to the jury, the defense
admitted he had not objected to the lack of a diminished capacity
instruction when the jury was charged but requested that it be
given at that time.33 Before this could be considered further, the
jury reached a verdict; it found Kimberly guilty of second-degree
murder.34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The defense raised several issues on appeal. First, the defense
argued that the jury instructions were deficient because there was
no instruction given on voluntary manslaughter due to diminished
capacity, and the trial justice’s accident instruction was
inadequate.35 Second, the State was allowed to incorrectly impeach
a witness’s credibility and impermissibly used leading questions
during the testimony of a witness.36 Third, the State’s witness
violated a sequestration order, and the remedial measures allowed
by the trial court were insufficient.37 Fourth, the defense argued
that a video, which was over seven minutes long, was admitted even
though it was unfairly prejudicial to the defense.38
A. Diminished Capacity
The defense argued that there was sufficient evidence to
support a verdict for voluntary manslaughter due to diminished
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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capacity and that the trial justice’s refusal was in error.39 Rule 30
of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure “requires only
that objections be made before the jury retires to deliberate.”40
Further, “an objection must be made on the record and in a manner
that permits th[e] [Supreme] Court to conduct appropriate
appellate review.”41 Here, the defense uses sections of the
transcript that indicate he requested a diminished capacity
instruction in an off-the-record conference.42 Yet, at best, the Court
found that the record was ambiguous to whether the defense
objected to a refusal or simply requested the trial justice include a
diminished capacity instruction in the jury charge.43 Thus, the
Court ruled that the defense’s objection in an off-the-record
conference was insufficient to properly preserve an issue for
review.44
B. Accident
Next, the defense contended that there was sufficient evidence
presented at trial to allow an instruction on accident, and its
omission was an error by the trial justice.45 Dr. Elizabeth Laposata
testified at trial for the defense, regarding Camden’s death.46 Dr.
Laposata testified that Camden’s injures could have been caused by
an attempted restraint; that once Camden lost consciousness, chest
compressions alone could have deprived her of oxygen; and
sometimes restraints are maintained after a loss of consciousness
39. Id. at 821. The State responded with two arguments. First, that the
defense failed to object before the jury retired to deliberate. Id. Second, that
there was insufficient evidence to support Kimberly’s diminished capacity at
the time of the murder, so a diminished capacity instruction was not justified.
Id.
40. Id. (emphasis in original).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 822 (citing State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 951 (R.I. 2000)).
Defense counsel also argued that an opportunity to object to the jury charge
was renewed when the jury asked a question about the mental competency and
intent of Kimberly during deliberation. Id. However, the Court rejected this
argument as well, stating that while the trial justice has an obligation to clarify
juror confusion with supplemental instructions, juror confusion does not allow
“the addition of another instruction entirely.” Id. (citing State v. Gomes 590
A.2d 391, 394 (R.I. 1991)).
45. Id. at 822–23.
46. Id. at 823.
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to ensure the restraint has been effective.47 Based on this
information, the defense asked for an instruction on accident, but
the trial justice refused that specific instruction and instead
provided an alternate instruction on accident in two separate
areas.48
The Court found that these instructions properly explained to
the jury that they could not find Kimberly guilty of second-degree
murder if the death was an accident.49 Specifically, the Court
approved of the instructions that “second degree murder must be
committed willfully and that, if the death were accidental, then it
could not be willful.”50 Further, the Court concluded that because
little evidence existed upon which a jury conclude that Camden’s
death was an accident, “a more elaborate instruction was [not]
necessary.”51
C. Improper Impeachment
The next issue on appeal was the nine instances the defense
claims the prosecutor was allowed to “dictate the testimony” of the
family therapist, Phillips.52 However, the defense only objected to
two of the nine instances of error, so the Court dismissed the appeal
for seven of the nine unobjected-to-instances.53 Of the two
remaining objections, the Court ruled these were not objections
based on improper impeachment of Phillips’s credibility.54
In the first objection, the defense said, “I think it is
inappropriate that the witness read from the transcript. I think
she should be allowed to simply testify to her memory.”55 The Court
decided this objection was closer to an improper refreshment of the
witness’s recollection than improper impeachment.56
The second objection occurred after the State told Phillips to
review her notes to which the defense said, “Judge, again, I’m
simply going to have to object. I have no objection to this going in
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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full.”57 However, the Court interpreted this as using the rule of
completeness as grounds for the objection.58 The Court ruled the
objections failed to call forth the justice’s attention “with sufficient
particularity”59 to the issue at appeal, so the issues were “deemed
waived and not preserved for our review.”60
D. Leading Questions
Forty-five questions were listed by the defense as leading
during the direct examination of Phillips, but the defense only
objected to one such question at trial.61 Thus, the Court ruled the
other forty-four objections were not preserved for appellate
review.62 The only remaining objection arose when Phillips was
referencing her therapy notes and the prosecutor asked, “[w]hy
don’t you continue with the next seven typed lines. Do you ever
reference Tim and a difficulty with Tim; yes or no?”63 The defense
objected, stating that this was a leading question; the State
responded by asking the trial justice to consider the witness as
hostile.64 The trial justice overruled the objection, giving the State
some flexibility to phrase yes-or-no questions but did not explicitly
rule on whether or not he found the witness hostile.65 Phillips
testified to a lack of memory in some instances and needed
correction from the prosecutor when her testimony strayed from her
therapy notes on occasion.66 So, the Court ruled it could not find
that the trial justice abused his discretion in allowing flexibility to
pose yes-or-no questions.67

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 826. On appeal, defense counsel asserted that the cumulative
effect of the leading questions made them prejudicial. Id. n.7. But, the Court
stated that the defense’s argument was substantially undermined because the
defense failed to object to the leading questions. Id. n.7. The Court’s view was
the interest of judicial economy and promoting fairer and more efficient trial
proceedings by giving opposing counsel a chance to respond. Id. n.7.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 826.
65. Id. at 826–27.
66. Id. at 827.
67. Id.
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E. Violation of the Sequestration Order
The defense also contended that the trial justice’s refusal to
pass the case, after the prosecutor discussed testimony with Dr.
William Cox, was in error, and that the remedial measures offered
by the trial justice were deficient.68
The parties jointly requested and were granted a general
sequestration order prohibiting witnesses from hearing each other’s
testimony after opening statements.69 At the conclusion of Dr.
Cox’s testimony, the trial justice told Dr. Cox, “[p]lease don’t discuss
the case with anyone else. All witnesses for this trial are
sequestered.”70 During a lunch break, the prosecutor spoke with
Dr. Cox about two issues: the first was to correct Dr. Cox’s memory
of viewing photographs of the murder scene, and the second was
about potential cross-examination of Dr. Cox’s failure to dissect the
hyoid bone.71 While the trial justice did not consider the
prosecutor’s actions improper, he allowed the defense to question
Dr. Cox and suggest that he “may have violated the [c]ourt’s
order.”72 The defense was also allowed to ask a question that would
imply that Dr. Cox altered his testimony after consulting the
prosecutor.73
The Court found the discussion between the State’s attorney
and Dr. Cox did not violate the sequestration order.74 In coming to
this conclusion, the Court stated that when a witness testifies over
the course of several days, the witness and the party calling the
witness frequently discuss testimony.75 The Court also found that
a specific instruction not to discuss testimony with the prosecutor
“would only be granted in extraordinary circumstances,” so the trial
justice’s order could not have meant to encompass more than typical
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The trial justice conceded that he could have been clearer when
instructing Dr. Cox of his sequestration order and could have specifically
informed him not to speak to the State’s attorney. Id.
72. Id. (alteration in original).
73. Id. However, the trial justice did not allow defense counsel to ask
whether the discussion violated the Court’s order because “he did not want the
question to insinuate that there had been a violation of the sequestration order
when he did not determine there had been one in the first instance . . . .” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 829.
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trial practices.76 Accordingly, the Court held that the trial justice’s
remedial measure eliminated any potential prejudice from the
communication with the prosecutor.77
F. Admission of the Video
Finally, the defense argued that a seven-minute video, showing
the police walking through the Fry’s home and depicting Camden’s
body, was unfairly prejudicial to the jury.78 The defense argued
that the video was “minimally probative because the layout of the
home was not contested,” the video did not show anything that was
not shown in other exhibits, and it “inflamed [the jury’s] passions
against [Kimberly].”79
The video showed the bathroom, the bedroom, and a three-anda-half-minute focus on Camden’s body in her bed.80 The Court
ruled that the video should be included as evidence for several
reasons.81 First, the video added additional probative value
because it showed different perspectives than other photographs.82
Second, it showed the pathway of the struggle between Kimberly
and Camden from the bathroom to the bedroom, “where the final
struggle allegedly occurred”.83 Third, the video showed the stuffed
animal close to Camden’s body, which corroborated Tim’s story.84
Finally, the Court acknowledged that an image of a deceased eightyear-old is “disturbing,” but “crime scene [portrayals] of murder
victims . . . are unquestionably relevant” to the State’s burden to
prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.85 Despite
the existence of a longer, less-prejudicial video, the Court ruled that
the State has no obligation “to prove its case in the least prejudicial
way possible,” and it was up to the State to decide what video to
use.86 Because there was some probative value to the depiction of
Camden’s body and her home and because the evidence was not
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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offered, “solely to inflame the passions of the jury,” it was not an
abuse of discretion to admit the video.87
COMMENTARY

The admission of the seven-minute video was, understandably,
a contentious issue for the Court on appeal.88 Not only is the
subject matter one that inherently stirs emotions, but the
admission or rejection of the evidence is contingent on a sliding
scale that weighs concepts like “probative value” and “unfair
prejudice.”89 While the dissent’s description of the video describes
a chilling walkthrough of the Fry’s home and Camden’s body,90
there is enormous leeway given to admitting evidence that might
be unfairly prejudicial.91 The majority states that excluding
evidence “must be exercised sparingly,”92 that “only evidence that
is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial . . . must be
excluded,”93 and the video must be offered “solely to inflame the
passions of the jury[.]”94 Given such a high bar to exclude evidence,
the Court properly affirmed the admission of the video, even though
there was a long focus on Camden’s body. Although reasonable
minds could argue that this errs too far on the side of admitting
questionable evidence, it is consistent with a liberal policy of
allowing marginally pertinent information.
The affirmation of the accident instruction is also a source of
disagreement.95 The Court seems to weigh heavily the minimal
evidence presented by the defense to establish accident.96 Further,
the Court indicates a correlation in the emphasis of an instruction
based on how much evidence supported that conclusion at trial.97
However, saying what an act is not, does not always adequately
convey what the act is. A reasonable jury could have been confused
87. Id.
88. See id. at 832 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 830 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 832–33 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 830 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Hak, 963 A.2d 921,
928 (R.I. 2009); State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 412–13 (R.I. 2008); State v. Carter,
744 A.2d 839, 847 (R.I. 2000)).
92. Id. (quoting Hak, 963 A.2d at 928).
93. Id. (quoting Patel, 949 A.2d at 412–13).
94. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Carter, 744 A.2d at 847).
95. See id. at 833 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 824 (majority opinion).
97. See id.
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by that instruction or miss the implication. Based on the question
submitted by the jury during deliberations, there was clearly some
confusion about Kimberly’s mentality.98 Perhaps, as the dissent
argues, a more specific instruction about accident would have
assisted the jury.99
Finally, the decision regarding the violation of the
sequestration order seems like a liberal interpretation of the order.
The witness was told by the trial justice, “[p]lease don’t discuss the
case with anyone else. All witnesses for this trial are
sequestered.”100 It is understandable that a witness would wish to
discuss their testimony with the party that called the witness, but
the order from the Superior Court was unequivocal.101 The case
should not have been discussed with anyone else. The Court’s
justification that this practice is commonplace does not excuse the
prosecutor’s action; it only weakens the Superior Court’s order. Of
course, people are entitled to a fair trial—not a perfect trial—but
caution is merited when trial justices are put in the unenviable
position of fashioning remedial measures for parties on the spot.
Further, it puts the appellate court in the position of weighing how
potentially unfair one decision was, and now must decide whether
the countering, unfair decision was appropriately unfair. This is an
area ripe for varying degrees of justice.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a reference to an
off-the-record objection is insufficient to preserve that issue for
appeal.102 The Court also held that explaining that willful intent
is required to commit an act shows that it cannot be committed by
accident.103 The Court established that when a witness has issues
recalling information, some leeway in the form of yes-or-no
questions is not an abuse of discretion.104 The Court also held that
it is not a violation of a general sequestration order for a witness to
speak with the party calling him or her, unless specifically told not
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 819.
Id. at 835 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
Id. at 827 (majority opinion).
See id.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 827.
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to by the trial justice.105 The Court concluded that a disturbing
video is not unfairly prejudicial as long as it has some probative
value, even if there is another video available that is less
disturbing.106
Andrew Lentz

105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 831.

Criminal Law. State v. Gaudreau, 139 A.3d 433 (R.I. 2016).
When deciding whether to introduce into evidence a police
interrogation containing no inculpatory statements that is
recorded on videotape, a Rhode Island trial justice must weigh the
low probative value of the recorded comments from the officers
against the prejudicial impact to the defendant. If the evidence is
erroneously admitted, it is harmless error unless there is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error contributed to the
verdict. On a motion for a new trial, the trial justice must
determine that the evidence is sufficient to conclude guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

During a blizzard on March 2, 2009, Physique Gym in
Pawtucket was consumed in flames in the early morning hours.1
Upon arrival, the Pawtucket Fire Department reported that the
fire was “code red, fully involved.”2 The next day, after the fire
was contained, “a scarf and fanny pack wrapped inside a charred
‘puffy type’ winter coat and a set of keys to the premises that was
‘still in the lock’” were found “[o]utside the building, near an
entryway . . . .”3 That same day, a certified, accelerant-detection,
canine handler assisted the investigation, whose canine alerted to
four areas that contained traces of “flammable liquids . . . .”4
Upon excavation, two areas contained “burned paper towels and
the melted remains of what appeared to be a thirty-gallon
Rubbermaid-type barrel” with a strong gasoline-like odor, “one cap
from a gas can, and rubber mats covering the floor.”5 Two other
areas were found to have “irregular and ‘very significant burn
1. State v. Gaudreau, 139 A.3d 433, 436 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id. Code red means that it was “an actual confirmed fire” and “more
progressed than you would normally expect . . . .” Id.
3. Id. at 439.
4. Id. The “flammable liquids . . . [were] carbon-based, gasolines,
kerosenes, [and] diesel fuels.” Id.
5. Id.
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pattern[s]’ . . . consistent with ‘flammable liquid being poured out
of a container and then ignited.’”6 The fire inspector “later
testified that it was his opinion that, to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, there were four separate areas of origin for the
fire and the cause was an intentional act of fire setting.”7
Three witnesses were questioned about the fire.8 The
property owner, George Gardinar, said that “he leased the
property to [Gary] Gaudreau for use as a gym and that [Mr.
Gardinar] had allowed his insurance policy on the building to
lapse a few years earlier.9 Paul Richard, a snow-plow driver,
reported that “he had seen Gaudreau at the Physique Gym . . .
with his car backed up to an open door . . . with the trunk open, at
approximately 1:45 a.m.” and “that he was familiar with
Gaudreau and with his car because he was a member of Physique
Gym.”10 “About [fifteen] minutes later, Mr. Richard recalled
seeing Gaudreau in his car at the intersection of Newport and
Columbus Avenues; indeed, he recalled flashing his lights for
Gaudreau to go through the intersection.”11 “Karen Kane-Taylor,
who worked for [Gaudreau] at the gym . . . identified the puffy
jacket and scarf that were found at the scene as belonging to
[Gaudreau]” and later testified that “in the weeks leading up to
the fire, it seemed to her that products that were sold at the gym,
such as protein bars, drinks, water, and magazines, were not
being replenished.”12
The gym’s proprietor of twenty-three years, Gaudreau, called
to report a breaking and entering at his home at 3:50 a.m. on
March 2, 2009, a mere ten minutes after the Pawtucket Fire
Department arrived to the scene of the fire at the Physique
Gym.13 The officer who reported to Gaudreau’s home noted “only
one set of tire marks on the snow-covered driveway,” footprints in
the snow “leading from the garage to the back porch,” “a broken
Plexiglas window, with glass on the ground, both outside and
inside the door” near the back door of the home, and that the hood
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 438–39.
Id. at 437, 438, 441.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 436, 441.
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of Gaudreau’s car was cold.14 Gaudreau reported to the officer
that “he had left his house at approximately 1:30 a.m. and drove
around for a couple of hours because he was unable to sleep” and
that “he returned home at approximately 3:40 a.m. or 3:50 a.m.
and called the police about the break-in.”15 The only thing that
was missing from the home was a fanny pack that contained,
among other things, Gaudreau’s keys to the gym.16 Gaudreau
surmised that “whoever had broken in came through the rear
window, became spooked by the alarm, and grabbed the fanny
pack before leaving through the same window.”17
The lead detective called Gaudreau later that morning around
7:00 a.m. and asked that Gaudreau report to the police station to
talk about the fire and the breaking and entering.18 Gaudreau
provided essentially the same story to the detective, and the
detective released him.19 Following Mr. Richard’s statement,
which was given to the detective after Gaudreau’s first visit to the
police station, that he had seen Gaudreau when he was out
plowing the snow, the detective called Gaudreau back in around
noon.20 This second interview, during which Gaudreau waived his
Miranda rights, was videotaped, and Gaudreau’s story explaining
his
whereabouts
and
actions
remained
consistent,
notwithstanding the fact that the detective accused that “the jig
[was] up,” Gaudreau “set the building on fire, that there was a
witness who knew him, . . . Gaudreau was lying” and was making
“false statements to the police, that he made up the ‘cockamamie’
story about his house being broken into, and that they were sure
they would find his fanny pack at the gym.”21 The detectives told
“Gaudreau that he would be charged with first-degree arson, a
capital offense,” and asked if Gaudreau had anything to say, to
which Gaudreau replied that he did not; Gaudreau was placed
under arrest.22
14. Id. at 436–37.
15. Id. at 437.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 437, 438.
19. Id. at 438.
20. Id.
21. Id. At the time of this interrogation, the fire investigation had yet to
turn up the charred remains of the jacket and fanny pack. Id. at 439.
22. Id. at 439.
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“After Gaudreau was arrested, the detectives brought him to
the cellblock to process him and to seize his clothing, so that they
could be tested for accelerants” and found that Gaudreau had
“large sores on his lower legs and slight injuries to his hands,”
which Gaudreau said was a rash.23 Medical personnel informed
the detectives after treating Gaudreau for these injuries that the
sores were second-degree burns, and Gaudreau later testified that
“he had burned his legs at home in the early morning hours of
March 1, 2009, the night before the gym fire, when an oil lamp he
was filling spilled and caught fire” and explained that he initially
lied because he was concerned that if he said that he burned
himself, the police would think that he set fire to his gym.24 The
only physical evidence linking Gaudreau to the gym-fire scene was
“[b]urned matter and charred debris in tissues in a bathroom
wastebasket . . . seized from Gaudreau’s home.”25
Gaudreau’s first trial26 began on July 2, 2009 for charges of
first-degree arson27 and Gaudreau “sought, in limine, to suppress
the videotaped interrogation on the grounds that comments by the
detectives on the tape were irrelevant and highly prejudicial and
constituted
inadmissible
testimony
concerning
witness
credibility.”28 After an argument that lasted two days, “[t]he trial
justice denied defendant’s motion to suppress, but ordered that
two lines at the end of the tape—about the veracity of the
snowplow driver—be redacted,” and cautionary instructions were
given to the jury before the video was played.29 Gaudreau’s
second trial began in September 2013, and “[t]he parties agreed
that the evidentiary rulings from the first trial would constitute
the law of the case and that the exhibits marked as full in the first
trial would be admitted as full exhibits in the second trial”;
23. Id.
24. Id. at 439, 441.
25. Id. at 439.
26. The “trial ended in a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a
verdict.” Id. at 441.
27. Gaudreau was charged with two counts: first-degree arson and
knowingly making a false statement of a crime in violation of R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-32-2. Id. at 440. However, “[t]he trial justice severed the two
counts for trial and proceeded on the arson charge to ensure that defendant
was not prejudiced by the state’s allegations that he made a false claim to the
police when he reported the breaking and entering at his home.” Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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however, the defendant “did not reassert his request for a
cautionary instruction.”30 “[T]he jury returned a guilty verdict for
first-degree arson,” and the defendant moved for a new trial,
which was denied.31
Gaudreau timely appealed, raising two issues:
First, that the first trial justice abused his discretion
when he refused to exclude or redact the video-taped
interrogation . . . because the detectives’ statements
expressing disbelief in his story were both irrelevant and
inadmissible comments on defendant’s credibility . . . [and
that] any possible relevance was substantially
outweighed by its enormously prejudicial impact because
the jury repeatedly heard the detectives call defendant a
liar; second, that “the trial justice erred in denying
[Gaudreau’s] motion for a new trial because there was no
evidence linking him to the fire and, in particular, no
evidence of an accelerant on his clothing, in his house, or
in his car.”32
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Supreme Court
sought to determine whether the videotape evidence was
improperly admitted and if it was, whether this was an abuse of
discretion constituting reversible error.33 The issue regarding
how to analyze evidence of a videotape where the defendant does
not challenge the statements that he made, but rather that the
detectives’ comments were irrelevant and highly prejudicial was a
novel issue to the Supreme Court.34 Several organizations in
Rhode Island have either adopted or recommended that police
departments implement rules requiring that all police
interrogations be audio or video recorded, and the Supreme Court
was “faced with new issues that are associated with those
recordings.”35 The Supreme Court outlined a comprehensive
30. Id. at 441.
31. Id. at 442.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 443.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 443–44 (citing Task Force to Investigate & Develop Policies &
Procedures for Electronically Recording Custodial Interrogations, Final
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overview of various jurisdictions and how each handles evidence of
this nature.36 The opinions ranged from those that consider a
detective’s statements on credibility to be absolutely prohibited,37
to those jurisdictions that do not allow it, but consider that it is
not reversible error if there is a wealth of other evidence against
the defendant,38 and finally to those that consider that the “police
officer’s statements have probative value for providing context
even where the defendant, as here, made no inculpatory
statements and had not changed his story.”39
The Court opined that the appropriate approach for this type
of evidence is to conduct “a balancing test and carefully weigh[]
the low probative value of the recorded comments from the officers
against the prejudicial impact to defendant.”40 In so doing, the
Court determined that because
the majority of the video and transcript . . . [were]
dominated by the comments of the two detectives, with
defendant occasionally responding in the negative [and
b]ecause of the paucity of relevant or useful responses to
be gleaned from defendant’s consistent explanation of
events and assertion of innocence, those officers’
comments cannot be said to have had any contextual
value.41
Further, the Court held that the comments were prejudicial to
Gaudreau and “[t]he fact that the jury viewed a videotape of the
very detective sitting on the witness stand telling defendant that
Report (Feb. 1, 2012, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/RI-Task-Force-Report_Recording.pdf)).
36. Id. at 444–47.
37. Id. at 444–45 (citing State v. Elnicki, 105 P.3d 1222, 1229 (Kan.
2005)).
38. Id. at 446 (citing State v. Demery, 30 P.3d 1278, 1285 (Wash. 2001)).
39. Id. (citing Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001–03 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“no violation to fundamental due process, even though California law would
have required that the tapes be redacted, because not every trial error
constitutes a failure to observe fundamental fairness and because trial judge
gave two specific instructions that cured prejudice”); State v. Willis, 75 A.3d
1068, 1078 (N.H. 2013) (“finding that probative value was not outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice because the officer’s comments were in the
form of questions rather than accusations, and provided context for the
defendant’s responses”)).
40. Id. at 449.
41. Id. (footnote omitted).
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he was a liar compounded the danger that the jury might have
been prejudiced against defendant” and that it was “far more
prejudicial to him than anything said by his interrogators.”42
However, in light of the “tapestry of factual evidence and bearing
in mind the conduct, tone, and length of this particular
interrogation,” the Court concluded “that the passions of the jury
would [not] have been ‘so inflame[d] . . . as to prevent their calm
and dispassionate examination of the evidence.’”43 However, the
Court cautioned “that there is a real concern that these types of
interrogations have the potential to lead to
substantial
44
prejudice . . . and trial justices should be alert to the danger of
potential abuse, such as the introduction of manufactured
evidence that would not be admitted at trial.”45
On Gaudreau’s appeal of the dismissal of his motion for a new
trial, the Court stated that “[a]s long as the trial justice has . . .
articulated adequate reasons for denying the motion, his or her
decision will be given great weight and left undisturbed unless the
trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or
otherwise was clearly wrong.”46 In making her decision to deny
Gaudreau’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice found that
though the police investigation was not perfect, the officers were
credible and that Gaudreau’s “version of events leading up to the
time when [the officer] arrived at [his] home ‘lacked believability’
and made no sense.”47 Moreover, the eyewitness testimony of Mr.
Richard, the snowplow driver, was credible, as were the
testimonies from Mr. Gardinar, the lessor of the gym,48 and Karen
Kane-Taylor.49 The trial justice also “found that the burns
discovered on [Gaudreau’s] legs ‘and [his] ludicrous explanation of
42. Id.
43. Id. at 449, 450 (quoting State v. Gomes, 764 A.2d 125, 136 (R.I.
2001)).
44. Id. at 450 (citing Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 28 (Ky.
2005)).
45. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 730 A.2d 513, 521 n.5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999)).
46. Id. at 451 (quoting State v. Phannavong, 21 A.3d 321, 325 (R.I.
2011)).
47. Id.
48. Furthermore, the Court held that Mr. Gardinar “had no motive to
burn his property because he had allowed the insurance on the building to
lapse.” Id.
49. Id. at 452.
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how he sustained them may have been some of the strongest items
of evidence against [him].’”50 The Court held that “the trial justice
more than met her obligations [when she] . . . consider[ed] the
evidence in light of the jury charge, independently assess[ed] the
credibility of the witnesses, . . . determine[d] that she agreed with
the jury’s ultimate verdict,” and affirmed that decision by denying
Gaudreau’s motion to dismiss.51
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that
videotaped interrogations admitted against a defendant have
potential to lead to substantial prejudice;52 however, it remains
somewhat unclear if the Court made a bright line decision on a
test for future, similar evidentiary issues. Because the Court held
that the trial justice should have conducted a balancing test to
weigh the probative value against the prejudicial impact, it seems
that there is a possible scenario where videotaped interrogations
containing no inculpatory evidence is admissible. The Court did
place weight on the fact that Gaudreau’s explanations and
assertions remained consistent in the face of the interrogation.
Therefore, perhaps if another defendant’s story changed
throughout the course of the interrogation, this could be grounds
under the Court’s decision that such videotaped interrogations are
admissible.
Additionally, the Court held that the trial justice did not
commit reversible error by admitting this videotaped interrogation
in light of the overwhelming evidence against Gaudreau.53
However, it is arguable that the other evidence is not
overwhelming. If Gaudreau’s story is taken as true, it explains
his whereabouts and actions, and the only remaining evidence
linking Gaudreau to the fire is the fact that he operates the gym.
There is no physical evidence that definitively linked Gaudreau to
the fire. According to the Court in its confirmation of the trial
justice’s decision, the unreliableness and far-fetched aspects of
Gaudreau’s story were too intertwined with the overwhelming
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 448, 449, 450.
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aspects of the other evidence that tipped the scale in favor of the
fact that the impermissible evidence did not overbear the minds of
the jurors.54 However, it is also arguable that the videotaped
recording may have helped Gaudreau because it showed that he
remained consistent in his explanations, even in the face of
continuous and pointed accusations and questions.
The Court, in upholding the trial justice’s denial
of
Gaudreau’s motion for a new trial, reaffirmed that a new trial will
only be granted if evidence was overlooked or clearly wrong.55
The trial justice listed at least seven reasons56 why she agreed
that the jury reached the correct verdict. Because this was the
second, full jury trial for Gaudreau, and all the evidentiary issues
had been settled during the first trial, it is reasonable that the
verdict should not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that when deciding
whether to introduce into evidence a police interrogation
containing no inculpatory statements that is recorded on
videotape, a trial justice must weigh the low probative value of the
recorded comments from the officers against the prejudicial
impact to the defendant. If the evidence is erroneously admitted,
it is harmless error unless there is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error contributed to the verdict. The Court
determined this based on an exhaustive review of jurisdictions’
practices and reasoning alongside those with which it agreed.
Molly R. Hamlin

54.
55.
56.

Id. at 449.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451–52.

Criminal Law. Tempest v. State, 141 A.3d 677 (R.I. 2016). A
twenty-two-year-old murder conviction is vacated based on
evidence that the State withheld witness statements from the
defense, constituting a Brady violation. The State’s decision to
withhold the evidence was deliberate, which under Rhode Island
law, guaranteed the defendant a new trial regardless of the
materiality of the suppressed evidence. Although the lower court
granted the new trial based on two Brady violations and a due
process violation, the Court only addressed one Brady claim,
concluding that affirming one ground was dispositive of the case.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On April 22, 1992, a jury convicted Raymond “Beaver”
Tempest, Jr. (Tempest) for the February 19, 1982 murder of
Doreen Picard (Picard), and he was subsequently sentenced to
eighty-five years in prison.1 Picard and Susan Laferte (Laferte)
were both found brutally beaten in the basement of their home,
located at 409 Providence Street, Woonsocket, Rhode Island.2
Tragically, twenty-two-year-old Picard succumbed to her injuries
and was pronounced dead within an hour of being found.3
Although Laferte ultimately survived the attack, she was unable
to recall any details of that day, and no one has ever been charged
for her assault.4
Laferte and her husband owned the triplex apartment
building in which the attack took place.5 Laferte and her husband
lived on the first floor with their two young children, and Picard
lived on the third floor with her boyfriend.6 Douglas Heath
1. Tempest v. State (Tempest III), 141 A.3d 677, 679, 681 (R.I. 2016).
See State v. Tempest (Tempest I), 651 A.2d 1198 (R.I. 1995) for the
affirmation of Tempest’s conviction.
2. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 680.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 680 n.3.
5. Tempest I, 651 A.2d at 1203.
6. Id.
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(“Heath”) and his wife lived on the second floor, along with
Heath’s fifteen-year-old stepdaughter, Lisa LaDue (LaDue).7 On
the day of the murder, LaDue returned home at approximately
3:20 p.m. and noticed a “big maroon car” in the driveway near the
cellar bulkhead.8 After entering the apartment through the
backdoor, LaDue encountered Laferte’s three-year-old daughter,
Nicole, who was crying and said that her mother was “downstairs
sick.”9 LaDue thought Nicole was merely seeking attention, so
she went upstairs to wait for Heath to come home.10
Approximately ten minutes later, Heath returned home and also
met a crying Nicole, who indicated that her mother was in the
basement “lying down.”11 When Heath entered the basement, he
found the unrecognizable bodies of Picard and Laferte, one in a
sitting position between the washer and dryer, and one face down
in a “puddle of blood.”12 Horrified, Heath called out for LaDue to
make sure she was safe, and then called the police.13 LaDue later
testified that the maroon car was no longer present when the
victims were found and that an ambulance had parked in its
place.14
Evidence presented in Tempest’s trial revealed that he knew
Laferte prior to the attack and may have been having an
extramarital relationship with her.15 Prior to the attack, Laferte
and Tempest had arranged to mate their dogs, agreeing that
Tempest would have his pick of the litter, and Laferte would keep
the remaining puppies.16 Tempest promised his puppy to his
friend, John Allard (Allard).17 On the day of the attack, Tempest
and Allard went to Laferte’s apartment to retrieve the puppy and
left “without incident” at approximately 1:45 p.m.18 Tempest’s
7. Id.
8. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 679.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 680.
12. Id.
13. Tempest I, 651 A.2d 1198, 1203 (R.I. 1995).
14. Id.
15. Id. Laferte acknowledged that she was involved in an affair at the
time of her attack, but due to her memory loss, was unable to verify that the
affair was with Tempest. Id. at 1203 n.1.
16. Id. at 1204.
17. Id.
18. Id. Laferte’s sister, Carol Rivet, was present during the puppy
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former sister-in-law, Sherri Richards, who lived with Allard and
watched Tempest’s children on the day of the murder, testified
that Tempest returned to her house between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m.,
left shortly thereafter to meet his brother-in-law, Robert Monteiro
(“Monteiro”), and subsequently returned to Richards’s apartment
between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m. with Monteiro.19
Donna Carrier (Carrier) was one of four witnesses who
testified that Tempest confessed to killing Picard.20 Carrier
testified that Tempest was upset with Laferte because she “was
going to tell [his wife] something and he and [his wife] had just
gotten back together.”21 Carrier also testified that Tempest
explained that Picard “‘came down the stairs at the wrong time,
saw him hitting [Laferte]’ and that ‘[h]e couldn’t let her get away
and had to do her, too.’”22 Carrier also gave numerous statements
before trial indicating that she lived in the same apartment
complex as Tempest on the day of the murder.23 This was later
proven false, as Tempest lived on Phoebe Street on the day of the
murder, and only moved to Winter Street, where Carrier lived
with her boyfriend, John Guarino (Guarino), the following year.24
After his conviction, Tempest first filed for postconviction
relief on April 8, 2004, with a request to test physical evidence.25
From that time until 2015, Tempest continued his quest for
postconviction relief, to no avail.26 In April of 2015, Tempest filed
a second petition for postconviction relief, which is the subject of

exchange. Id.
19. Id.
20. Tempest III, 141 A.3d 677, 680 (R.I. 2016). The three other
witnesses were: John Guarino, Carrier’s boyfriend; Ronald Vaz, an
acquaintance with whom Tempest snorted cocaine; and Lorette Rivard, a
prostitute that Tempest “part[ied] [with] one night in January, 1989.” Id.
(first alteration in original). The trial justice noted that these four witnesses
were not “a parade of MDs or [s]umma [c]um [l]audes,” but the court “must
take the witnesses as they come.” Id. at 681 (alterations in original) (quoting
Tempest I, 651 A.2d at 1218).
21. Id. at 680 (alterations in original).
22. Id. (alterations in original).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 684.
25.
Id. at 681. The physical evidence Tempest sought included “hair
recovered from both victims of the attack, as well as fingernail clippings from
Picard.” Id.
26.
Id.
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this appeal.27 In response to that petition, Tempest was granted a
postconviction relief hearing (PCR hearing), which took place over
vacated
several weeks.28 The hearing justice ultimately
Tempest’s conviction and granted a new trial, based on three
distinct grounds: two Brady29 violations and one due process
violation.30 The State opposed the hearing justice’s opinion on all
three grounds, and petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the
Rhode Island Supreme Court granted.31
The first Brady violation was based on the prosecution’s
suppression of Carrier’s statements seventeen days before trial.32
Throughout pretrial interviews and hearings,33 Carrier’s
testimony was that Tempest’s brother, Gordon Tempest (Gordon),
a detective in the Woonsocket Police Department, did not know
about Tempest’s involvement in the murder, and Gordon would
not protect Tempest if he found out.34 However, seventeen days
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). Later cases have
expanded the Brady standard to include impeachment material in addition to
exculpatory evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
30.
Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 681. See Tempest v. State (Tempest II), No.
PM20041896, 2015 WL 4389908 (R.I. Super. July 13, 2015) for the hearing
justice’s opinion.
31.
Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 682.
32.
Id. at 682. The second Brady violation was based on John McMann
Jr.’s (“McMann”) statements to the Woonsocket Police Department during
Tempest’s trial. Id. Richards testified that she saw Tempest in McMann’s
maroon car on the day of the murder. Id. at 689 (Suttell, C.J., concurring).
When McMann learned of this testimony as the trial was ongoing, he went to
the Woonsocket Police Department to inform the police that he never lent his
car to anyone on the day of the murder, and, therefore, his car could not have
been present at the murder scene. Id. at 690. Tempest argued, and the
hearing justice agreed, that the prosecution’s failure to inform the defense
that McMann and Kevin had told the Woonsocket Police Department that
they did not lend the car to Monteiro constituted a Brady violation. Id. at
690. The due process violation resulted from improper police practices and
witness coaching during interviews with both Richards and LaDue. Tempest
II, 2015 WL 4389908 at *21–22.
33.
Carrier gave her first statement to Woonsocket police in February,
1987, and subsequently testified in a grand jury hearing on November 30,
1990, at Tempest’s bail hearing in June, 1991, and at trial in April, 1992.
Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 684.
34.
Id.
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before the trial began, Carrier made two novel statements to the
former prosecutor:
(1) that [Gordon] . . . hid the murder weapon (a pipe) in a
closet on the first floor at 409 Providence Street in an
effort to conceal it so as to protect his brother; and (2)
that, on the day of the murder, Tempest’s children were
“excited” about getting a puppy.35
The former prosecutor did not reveal Carrier’s statements to
the defense but instead included a note in the file stating: “more
new info re: GT [Gordon Tempest] putting pipe in closet + dog for
the kids—too late—don’t volunteer new info—will cause big
problems.”36 Tempest argued, and the hearing justice agreed,
that this failure to disclose violated both Brady and Rhode
Island’s Wyche standard, which guarantees a new trial when a
prosecutor deliberately fails to disclose any evidence, even
evidence that would not meet Brady’s material exculpatory
requirement.37
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Court affirmed the hearing justice’s grant of a new trial
based on the Carrier statements Brady violation.38 In reasoning
that any one of the three grounds upon which the hearing justice
granted a new trial would lead the Court to affirm its decision, the
Court did not reach the other two grounds.39 The Court affirmed
the hearing justice’s determination that the Carrier statements
constituted a Brady violation, which was sufficient to affirm the
hearing justice’s ruling granting Tempest’s new trial.40
35.
Id. at 682 (footnote omitted). Carrier had never before indicated that
she had seen Tempest’s children on the day of the murder, or that she knew
about his arrangement to obtain a puppy from Laferte. Id.
36.
Id. (alteration in original).
37. Id. at 683; see also State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986)
(“When the failure to disclose is deliberate, this court will not concern itself
with the degree of harm caused to the defendant by the prosecution’s
misconduct; we shall simply grant the defendant a new trial.”).
38.
Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 683. Justice Indeglia wrote for the Court,
with Chief Justice Suttell concurring in part and dissenting in part, and
Justice Goldberg dissenting. Id. at 679, 687 (Suttell, C.J., concurring), 698
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
39.
Id. at 683 (majority opinion).
40.
Id.
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Under Brady, a new trial must be granted if the prosecution
withheld material exculpatory evidence from the defense.41 If the
evidence was deliberately withheld, Rhode Island’s Wyche
standard provides that the defendant is entitled to a new trial,
regardless of the materiality of the evidence.42 The prosecution’s
suppression is deliberate when “it makes ‘a considered decision to
suppress . . . for the purpose of obstructing’ or where it fails ‘to
disclose evidence whose high value to the defense could not have
escaped . . . [its] attention.’”43
The Court held that the hearing justice applied the proper
test for a Brady violation.44 The hearing justice determined that
the former prosecutor’s rationale for suppressing the Carrier
statements was that “it would lead to a continuance and to
headaches.”45 The hearing justice found that this “considered
decision to suppress” was a deliberate suppression, and under
Wyche, it must result in a new trial.46 The Court held that the
hearing justice made no clear error in determining that the former
prosecutor deliberately withheld the Carrier statements, and thus
it affirmed the ruling granting a new trial.47
The Court then conducted its own analysis of the evidence,
and concluded that the “high value” of the Carrier statements
“could not have escaped the former prosecutor’s attention,”
thereby satisfying the Wyche test.48
A. Carrier’s Pretrial Statements About Gordon’s Involvement
The State argued that the Carrier statements indicating that
Gordon hid the murder weapon were not actually new evidence,
but merely cumulative of other evidence that had already been
given to the defense.49 The Court easily dismissed this argument
because the hearing justice found that the former prosecutor had
41.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963); see also DeCiantis v.
State, 24 A.3d 557, 570 (R.I. 2011).
42. State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986).
43. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 683 (alterations in original) (quoting United
States v. Keough, 391 F.2d 138, 146 (2nd Cir. 1968)).
44. Id. at 683.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 684.
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identified the statements as “new” in his note, and the Court
found no clear error in this finding.50
In Carrier’s first statement to police in 1987, she stated that
Gordon did not know about Tempest’s involvement in the murder,
and Tempest told her that if Gordon ever found out, he would turn
Tempest in to police.51 During her grand jury testimony in 1990,
Carrier indicated that Tempest’s father, the High Sheriff of
Providence, had knowledge and helped cover up Tempest’s
involvement, but Gordon had no knowledge of Tempest’s role in
the murder.52 At Tempest’s bail hearing in April, 1991, Carrier
testified that “if [Tempest] told his brother, Gord[on], Gord[on]
would go to the police and tell them what they knew, and that the
murder weapon was not there, it wasn’t available, and that all
fingerprints were taken care of.”53 During a statement to police in
August, 1991, Carrier stated that “[Tempest] said, ‘I won’t get
caught, my father and brother won’t let me get caught. The
weapon’s been all taken care of, he said.’”54 The Court conceded
that Carrier’s previous statements were “vague” with respect to
Gordon’s involvement, but they never directly implicated Gordon
in covering up Tempest’s crime.55
The Court held that Carrier’s pretrial statement in March,
1992, was a “dramatic” change from her previous statements;
Carrier flip-flopped from denying Gordon’s knowledge or
involvement to directly implicating him in concealing the murder
weapon.56 At the PCR hearing, the former prosecutor recalled
that “Carrier told him in March 1992—mere days before trial—
that ‘Gordon Tempest had put the pipe in the closet’ at 409
Providence Street, where it was ultimately found by police.”57
Given the significant change in her statement, the Court deemed
Carrier’s pretrial statement about Gordon to be a “significant
modification,” and thus, the Court disagreed with the State’s
claim that it was not new information.58
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The State then argued that even if the statements were new
evidence, they were not exculpatory evidence because they only
further implicated Tempest in the crime, and therefore is not a
Brady violation.59 The Court dismissed this argument on the
grounds that Carrier’s inconsistent statements could have been
used by the defense to impeach her credibility.60 The Court held
that “facially inculpatory evidence can be used to impeach a
witness,” and impeachment evidence constitutes Brady
evidence.61 Thus, even absent a finding of deliberate failure to
disclose under the Wyche standard, the State’s suppression of the
Carrier statements about Gordon’s involvement establish a Brady
violation warranting a new trial.62
B. Carrier’s Pretrial Statements About Tempest’s Children
The Court similarly dismissed the State’s argument that
Carrier’s statement about Tempest’s children being excited about
getting a puppy on the morning of the murder was not new
information.63 Carrier’s grand-jury testimony indicated that
Tempest planned to retrieve a puppy from “either Doreen Picard
or Sue Laferte” on February 19, 1982, but she had never indicated
that she had seen Tempest’s children that day, or that they were
excited about the puppy.64 The Court held that this statement
had “impeachment value” because it would further discredit
Carrier’s assertion that she saw Tempest on the day of the
murder.65 Carrier was under the false belief that she lived in the
same apartment complex as Tempest on Winter Street on the day
of the murder.66 Additionally, it was “undisputed that John
Allard, a friend of Tempest, was to be the recipient of the puppy,”
not Tempest’s children.67 Given that Carrier had never before
mentioned seeing Tempest’s children on that morning, this
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 n.21 (1999)); see
also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
62. Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 685.
63. Id. at 686.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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statement was new evidence.68
The State next argued that the statement was not material,
and does not amount to a Brady violation.69 The Court reiterated
its Wyche standard and held that the State’s deliberate
suppression of evidence entitled Tempest to a new trial, regardless
of materiality.70 Furthermore, the Court held that even absent a
finding of deliberate failure to disclose under Wyche, this
statement was material exculpatory evidence sufficient to
establish a Brady violation.71 Much like Carrier’s inconsistent
statements about Gordon’s involvement, this statement could
have been used to “impeach Carrier’s testimony even further.”72
The Court held that because there was no physical evidence in the
case, witness credibility was paramount to the State’s case.73 If
the defense had the opportunity to further impeach Carrier, “there
is, at the very least, a reasonable probability—one ‘sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome’—that the verdict against
Tempest would have been different.”74 Even though the defense
had already impeached Carrier’s testimony by proving that
Tempest did not live on Winter Street until 1983, the Court held
that “whether the defense would have actually used the
statements is not relevant to our analysis—the bottom line is that
it should have been defense counsel’s choice to make.”75
COMMENTARY

Doreen Picard’s murder, which went unsolved for ten years
and was the subject of a botched police investigation and probable
cover-up, serves as a black mark in Rhode Island history.76
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 687 (citing Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016)).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 680 (“[E]ven the state described [the case] as a ‘chao[tic],’
‘disorder[ly],’ and ‘disast[rous]’ nine-year investigation by the Woonsocket
police department[.]”) (alteration in original). “[The case] ranks as one of the
most infamous crimes committed in this state during the last century. The
fact that no arrest was made for several years was a festering sore in the
community, compounded by a cover-up by sworn police officers.” Id. at 698
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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Finding the Rhode Island Supreme Court divided on this decision
is not surprising, given the extreme intricacies of the case, which
have developed over the thirty-four years since Picard was
murdered. While the majority was satisfied that the suppressed
Carrier statements constituted a Brady violation,77 the
concurrence and dissent both disagreed with the standard
employed; the dissent would have reversed the hearing justice’s
ruling altogether,78 and the concurrence would have remanded on
the Carrier issue, but ultimately agreed with the ruling based on
the McMann statements Brady violation.79
The concurrence, not satisfied by the Carrier statements,
moved on to the other Brady violation: the McMann statements
about the maroon car.80 The Chief Justice found that this issue
was indeed a Brady violation, and he would have affirmed the
lower court’s holding on that ground.81 However, Justice
Goldberg held that the hearing justice abused his discretion in
denying the State’s laches defense, and she would have reversed
on the McMann statements as well.82 The dissent then addressed
the due process violation to complete the review of the issues on
appeal.83 While the dissent agreed that the majority need not
consider the McMann evidence, given that it affirmed the decision
below, the dissent believed that the majority should have
considered the due process claim, so that the trial court would
have instructions on that issue on retrial.84 Justice Goldberg
predicted that without the Supreme Court’s instruction on the due
process violation, the issue will likely be back before the Court
when the case goes to trial once again.85 Eschewing the
inefficiency of this likely occurrence, Justice Goldberg addressed
77. Id. at 687 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 717 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 688 (Suttell, C.J., concurring).
80. Id. at 689.
81. Id. at 698.
82. Id. at 717–18 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg believed
that Tempest did not meet his burden of proving that his defense team did
not know that Monteiro did not own or borrow the maroon car on the day of
the murder. Furthermore, it seems that Tempest could have
easily
discovered this information and did not need to wait until 2013, twenty-one
years after his conviction, to bring forth the claim. Id.
83. Id. at 730.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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the due process violation and put forth her own opinion as to how
to treat the testimony of the witnesses coached by the Woonsocket
Police Department.86
A. Wyche Standard
The concurrence and dissent agreed that the hearing justice
and the majority omitted a vital part of the Wyche standard.87
Under the Wyche standard for deliberate nondisclosure, the
prosecution must have either (1) made “a considered decision to
suppress . . . for the [very] purpose of obstructing,” or,
alternatively, (2) “fail[ed] to disclose evidence whose high value to
the defense could not have escaped . . . [its] attention.”88 The
concurrence concluded that the hearing justice made no
determination of fact regarding the former prosecutor’s purpose
for suppressing the evidence, and the case could be remanded for
such a determination on that issue.89 The dissent believed that
the hearing justice made no factual determination as to why the
former prosecutor withheld the Carrier statements and applied
the wrong legal test (omitting “for the very purpose of obstructing”
from the analysis), constituting clear error. Conducting her own
analysis, Justice Goldberg found that the prosecution’s
suppression satisfied neither prong of the Wyche standard, and
thus, Carrier’s statements must be analyzed under the Brady
material exculpatory standard.90
B. Materiality
The striking difference between the Court’s and the dissent’s
recitation of the facts leads one to question the objectivity of
materiality. The Court reasoned that Carrier was “arguably the
most credible” of the four witnesses who testified that Tempest
confessed to killing Picard,91 while the dissent was
86. Id. at 732.
87. Id. at 688 (Suttell, C.J., concurring), 706 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 706 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
89. Id. at 688 (Suttell, C.J., concurring). Although the Chief Justice
disagreed with the Court’s Wyche standard and would have remanded on that
issue, he ultimately concurred in the opinion because he affirmed the hearing
justice’s opinion based on the McMann statement Brady claim. Id.
90. Id. at 707, 710, 714 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 686–87 (majority opinion).
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“convince[d] . . . that Carrier was the least credible witness offered
by the state.”92 The Court compared Carrier to the other three
witnesses, including a drug user and a prostitute, and found her to
be more credible,93 but the dissent reasoned that Carrier was the
only witness “demonstrated to have fabricated prior testimony.”94
Clearly, the Court and dissent viewed Carrier’s testimony very
differently, making it impossible to agree on its materiality.
Whether the Court should make determinations of materiality
was also at issue.95 Justice Goldberg admonished the Court for
making findings of credibility, but also put forth her own opinion
that Carrier was the least credible witness, and asserted that the
withheld statements were merely cumulative impeachment
evidence.96 The dissent pointed out that the trial justice “pressed
Carrier to admit that, contrary to what she told the grand jury,”
she could not have seen Tempest on the day of the murder,
because “she and Tempest were not neighbors on the day of the
murder[.]”97 Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine the additional
value of impeachment evidence for a witness who admitted on the
stand that she was “mistaken” and did not see Tempest on the day
of the murder.98 Had the hearing justice made a determination of
fact with respect to the materiality of Carrier’s statements, the
Court would not have to speculate as it did.
C. Due Process Violation
The due process violation resulted from improper police
practices and witness coaching during interviews with both
Richards and LaDue.99 The hearing justice found that “the police
92. Id. at 714 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 680 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 714 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. (“For one thing, this type of credibility assessment is reserved for
the hearing justice, not the members of this Court. The hearing justice made
no such credibility determination in the relevant two-and-a-half pages of his
decision, and the majority should not have ventured onto this forbidden
terrain. In any event, my reading of the trial transcript convinces me that
Carrier was the least credible witness offered by the state.”).
97. Id. at 703.
98. See id.
99. Tempest II, No. PM20041896, 2015 WL 4389908, at *21–22 (R.I.
Super. July 13, 2015).
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fed witnesses information in an effort to move the case against
Mr. Tempest forward,” and employed a variety of “suggestive
interview techniques.”100 The hearing justice highlighted the
police’s ten interviews with Richards, whose account “shifted in
lockstep with the State’s theory of the case.”101 Throughout her
interviews, and as the State learned more information, Richards
would appear to “develop[] hypermnesia—suddenly remembering
Mr. Tempest’s return and vividly recalling the sight of him
standing by Mr. Monteiro’s car on the day of the murder.”102
Ultimately, the hearing justice determined that “[r]egardless of
whether police intended to interfere with the witnesses’
recollection of events here, the taint of improper police procedure
so poisoned the well that Mr. Tempest’s conviction cannot
stand.”103
“In refusing to address this claim, the majority leaves a
gaping hole rather than a clear mandate on remand.”104 There is
no legal error in the Court’s decision not to address the witness
coaching claim, but there is practical error. When Tempest’s new
trial comes about, he will surely object to the admissibility of
LaDue’s and Richards’s testimonies with respect to the maroon
car, claiming that the police coached the witnesses. The PCR
hearing justice found that “the presentation of this faulty
testimony at trial prejudiced Mr. Tempest,” and resulted in a due
process violation.105 However, the dissent points out that the
hearing justice’s ruling on the evidence has no bearing on the
admissibility of the “faulty” evidence in Tempest’s upcoming new
trial, and thus, the State may present the same evidence against
Tempest once again.106
Without addressing the admissibility of this evidence, the
issue will arise in Tempest’s new trial, and quite possibly return
before the Supreme Court. Unquestionably, there has been a
miscarriage of justice in this case. Doreen Picard was mercilessly
100. Id. at *21, *24.
101. Id. at *26.
102. Id. at *54.
103. Id. at *58 (citing Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 (1956)).
104. Tempest III, 141 A.3d 677, 730 (R.I. 2016) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
105. Tempest II, 2015 WL 4389908, at *59.
106.
Tempest III, 141 A.3d at 731 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (“A PCR
hearing justice has no authority to address the admissibility of evidence in a
retrial[.]”).
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killed at a young age, and her family did not see justice until ten
years later. The Woonsocket Police Department botched the crime
scene investigation and coached witnesses. Tempest was not
given a fair trial because the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence
to the defense. From any angle, this case has lingered too long,
and the Court should have seized any chance that it could to bring
a resolution. Without answering the due process question,
Tempest will either face another unfair trial, or else must wait for
the Court to decide the question of admissibility on appeal.
The Court pointed out that it could affirm the hearing
justice’s opinion based on any one of the three issues on appeal.107
Consequently, one is left to wonder why the Court chose to
analyze the Carrier statements as its “one issue” instead of the
McMann statements or the witness coaching. Given that the
witness coaching claim is the only claim to have significance in the
new trial, the Court could have killed the metaphorical two birds
with one stone by addressing it: affirm the decision and give the
new trial justice direction about the admissibility of the evidence.
The Court missed an opportunity to help put an end to this case,
and all but guaranteed that it would revisit this issue in near the
future.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court
justice’s order to vacate Tempest’s twenty-four-year-old murder
conviction and granted a new trial. The Court held that the State
deliberately suppressed Donna Carrier’s statements, which were
material evidence, violating both Brady and Rhode Island’s more
defendant-friendly Wyche standard.
Jennifer Lisi

107.

Id. at 682 (majority opinion).

Family Law. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717 (R.I. 2016).
Under chapter 14.1 of title 15 of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, before the Family Court may
decline jurisdiction on the grounds that Rhode Island is an
inconvenient forum, the Family Court must engage in a two-step
inquiry. First, the hearing justice must determine whether it
would be appropriate for another state to exercise jurisdiction, and
in making that determination, the court must allow the parties to
submit evidence and weigh eight different factors set out in
section 15-14.1-19. If the court determines that another
appropriate forum exists, they must then consider whether the
current state would be an inconvenient forum under the
circumstances of that particular case.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Valerie M. Hogan (Hogan) and Philip A. McAndrew
(McAndrew) are parents to P., born in 1999, C., born in 2000, and
E., born in 2004.1 Both Hogan and McAndrew are dual citizens of
Ireland and the United States and were granted a divorce in the
Rhode Island Family Court in 2008.2 A property settlement
involving both parties established that Hogan and McAndrew
agreed to share joint custody of their three children, but that
Hogan was to have physical custody.3 The agreement included a
forum-selection clause, consented to by both parties, in which all
future custody disputes would fall under the jurisdiction of the
Rhode Island Family Court and chapter 14.1 of title 15 of the
1. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 719 (R.I. 2016). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court honored McAndrew’s request to keep the children’s
names private and to refer to them only by their first initials. Id. n.2.
2. Id.
3. Id. The property agreement stipulated that Hogan was allowed to
move the children to Ireland in 2009 and that McAndrew was to exercise
visitation with them both in Ireland and the U.S. Id. The agreement was
transformed into a final judgment of divorce entered by consent of both
parties. Id. at 720.
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA).4 In 2009, Hogan relocated the children to Ireland;
McAndrew frequently visited the children in Ireland, and the
children visited him for two weeks every summer in Rhode
Island.5 During their visit to Rhode Island in the summer of 2014,
the two oldest children alleged to McAndrew that Hogan had
subjected them to physical and emotional abuse and that the Irish
Child and Family Agency (TULSA) had become involved with the
family after a report of abuse by P. to his school counselors.6
On July 9, 2014, McAndrew filed in the Rhode Island Family
Court an “ex parte, emergency motion to modify the custody and
placement [agreement][,]” “a motion for an in-camera interview of
the children[,]” and a motion for an order that would require
Hogan “to submit to a mental health evaluation[;]” the ex parte,
emergency motion was granted.7 On July 16, Hogan sought to
vacate the ex parte order8 and dismiss the case, claiming that the
Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction given the fact that
all three children had been living in Ireland for more than five
years.9 At the hearing to vacate the ex parte order on July 17, the
issues of subject matter jurisdiction and forum non conveniens
were postponed for hearing until September 12.10 Prior to the
September 12 Family Court date, Hogan attempted to maintain
jurisdiction in the High Court of Ireland.11 The High Court of
Ireland granted McAndrew’s motion to stay the special summons
on September 9, declaring that Hogan could continue her action
only if Rhode Island rejected jurisdiction.12
At the hearings in the Family Court on September 12 and 15
of 2014, the parties were able to present evidence on the
4. Id. at 719–20.
5. Id. at 720.
6. Id.
7. Id. The motions alleged that P. and C. did not want to return to
Ireland. Id.
8. The ex parte order was vacated on July 17. Id at 720 n.3.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 720–21. At the hearing, the parties reached an agreement in
which P. would stay in Rhode Island with McAndrew and attend school there
in the fall, and C. was to extend her visit, subsequently returning to Ireland
in late August. Id. at 720 n.3.
11. Id. at 721.
12. Id.
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jurisdiction issue.13 Elicited from the testimony were the
following facts: Except for visits to their father, the children
resided in Ireland from January of 2009, until July of 2014 with
their mother;14 McAndrew spent multiple weeks with his children
each year, most of that time being in Ireland; the children
attended Irish schools since their move to Ireland in 2009;15 the
family received services from TULSA; and all of the family’s thencurrent medical doctors, therapists, and social workers were from
Ireland.16 McAndrew asserted in his testimony that he would not
have agreed to allow the children to go to Ireland without the
agreement, asserting that the Rhode Island Family Court would
maintain jurisdiction because he believed that Ireland does not
recognize the joint custody rights of a divorced father.17
Regarding the parties’ financial situations, the court
determined that McAndrew was a physician in a medical practice
and received a biweekly stipend of $5,500 regardless of whether or
not he worked during those weeks.18 Hogan, on the other hand, is
a per diem nurse at a local hospital and received wages eight
times lower than those of McAndrew.19 Hogan receives no paid
vacation time and is not paid unless she works, whereas
McAndrew receives four weeks of vacation time each year and is
paid regardless.20 McAndrew also testified regarding the multiple
witnesses in Rhode Island who could speak to the relationship he
has with his children, that he would pay the travel expenses for
“any witness who would travel to Rhode Island to testify in Family
Court[,]” and that testimony could be provided via
teleconference.21 Hogan asserted that she
had
difficulties
securing childcare when she had to travel to Rhode Island for

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. With the exception of P. being enrolled in school in Rhode Island in
August of 2014. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 721 (majority opinion), 730 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 722. (majority opinion). McAndrew also testified to the fair
market value of his home, the rental income he received every month, as well
as the $400,000 in his 401(k) and the $25,000 in various investment accounts.
Id. at 721 (majority opinion), 730 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 721, 722 (majority opinion).
21. Id. at 721–22.
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court dates.22 The hearing justice decided that the Family Court
had exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA but concluded that
Ireland was a more appropriate forum on the ground of forum non
conveniens.23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, “McAndrew argue[d] that the hearing justice
abused her discretion by not giving proper weight to the mutually
agreed upon forum-selection clause” and other additional factors
that should be considered under the UCCJEA.24 A trial justice
has abused her discretion when ‘“a material factor deserving
significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied
upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but
the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.’”25 To
determine if any factors were ignored, improperly relied upon, or
weighed incorrectly, the Court itself went through the two-part
test laid out in section 15-14.1-19.26 Under the UCCJEA, the
lower court must first determine whether it would be “‘appropriate
for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction,’” and is to
analyze and weigh eight factors laid out in the statute in making
that determination.27 If the lower court concludes that a more
appropriate forum exists, it then must consider whether the
current forum would be inconvenient under the circumstances.28
The Court discussed each of the eight factors and how the
22. Id. at 722.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Indep. Oil and Chem. Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988)).
26. Id. at 724.
27. Id. at 723; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-14.1-19 (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). The eight factors include: (1) whether there
has been domestic violence in the relationship and what state could best
protect the parties from future domestic violence; (2) how long the child has
been residing outside the state; (3) the distance between the current court
and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (4) the financial
circumstances of the two parties; (5) “any agreement of the parties as to
which state should assume jurisdiction”; (6) the nature of the relevant
evidence and the location of that evidence, including the testimony of the
child(ren); (7) each court’s ability to resolve the case quickly and the different
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and (8) how familiar each court
is to the facts and issues in the case. Hogan, 131 A.3d at 723–24.
28. Id. at 724.
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hearing justice applied them before moving on to discuss the
reasons why it believed certain factors should have been weighed
differently.29 The Court took issue with the way in which the fifth
factor was applied and made a point to discuss the high value that
is conferred upon final judgments entered into by consent.30 This,
coupled with the fact that McAndrew would not have reached an
agreement with Hogan absent the forum-selection clause, left the
Court to believe this factor was not weighed heavily enough in the
hearing justice’s analysis.31
The other factor that the Court thought was weighed
incorrectly regarded the ability of the Irish courts to decide the
issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the
evidence in the proposed forum.32 The lack of evidence presented
both to the Family Court and the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
regarding the procedures necessary to present evidence in Irish
courts, as well as the parties’ inability to provide a clear
understanding to the courts about whether the Irish system would
recognize an American, joint-custody agreement, led the Rhode
Island Supreme Court to determine that the Family Court
improperly determined that the seventh factor weighed equally in
favor of Rhode Island and Ireland.33 Finally, the Court also
determined that the hearing justice did not consider the “interplay
among the factors” or other “material evidence” that had bearing
on the weight certain factors should have been given.34
The Court made the determination that several factors were
weighed incorrectly during the first step of the inquiry, but it also
went on to explain that it is a two-part test, and to decline
jurisdiction, the lower court needed to make a separate finding
that Rhode Island was an inconvenient forum.35 To properly have
declined jurisdiction, the hearing justice would have had to make
“an independent finding that Rhode Island was ‘significantly
inconvenient and [that] the ends of justice would be better served
29. Id. at 725, 726.
30. Id. at 726.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 727 (citing Indep. Oil and Chem. Workers of Quincy, Inc. v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.1988)).
34. Id. at 728.
35. Id.
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if the action were brought and tried in another forum.’”36 The
Court did not go on to make the second analysis itself, but rather,
held that the hearing justice abused her discretion in executing
both steps of the two-part analysis.37
COMMENTARY

The Court stated early in its opinion that abuse occurs only
“‘when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored,
when an improper factor is relied upon,’” or when the lower court
makes a serious mistake in weighing the multiple factors.38 While
the Court did a wonderful job in explaining what the eight factors
are and what evidence should be used in evaluating them, the
Court seemed to do their own factor-by-factor analysis in reaching
their decision. While this provided a better understanding of the
factors and what they entail, the Court was not in the position to
do their own factor analysis and make a decision based on that
analysis. Chief Justice Suttell said it best when he stated, “the
issue is not whether I would have reached a different result than
[the trial justice] did; the issue is whether she abused her
discretion in so doing.”39
It seems as though the Court is opening up the floodgates to
allow every parent whose case has been dismissed for forum non
conveniens under the UCCJEA to appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in hopes that the justices will do their own
analysis, and if they decide differently, overturn the lower court’s
decision because they believe the factors should be weighed
differently. For a judge’s decision to be overturned for abuse of
discretion there needs to be a serious mistake in the way in which
the various factors were weighed,40 and although the justices here
may have weighed the various factors differently, the hearing
justice considered all of the statutory factors and weighed them in
a way in which was fair, reasonable, and well within her
discretion.
36. Id. at 728–729 (alteration in original) (quoting Kedy v. A.W.
Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1178 (R.I. 2008)).
37. Id. at 729.
38. Id. at 722 (quoting Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d at 929).
39. Id. at 732 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. Cty. Post & Beam, Inc.,
v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)).
40. Id. at 722 (majority opinion).
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The Court did determine that the seventh factor was weighed
improperly due to a lack of evidence, but this determination is
different than the one required in the reviewing court’s role. The
determination that the factor was weighed incorrectly could have
been a valid one, but that was not one of the determinations
necessary in deciding whether or not there was an abuse of
discretion. The mistake in weighing the seventh factor, while
valid, was not a serious mistake that was “of such a magnitude as
to constitute an abuse of discretion in her ultimate conclusion that
Ireland was the more appropriate forum.”41 Here, the factors
weighed slightly in favor of maintaining jurisdiction in the Rhode
Island Family Court, but that determination was the hearing
justice’s determination to make, not the Rhode Island Supreme
Court justices’. “‘[W]e shall not substitute our view of the
evidence for [that of the hearing justice] even though a contrary
conclusion could have been reached.’”42
Another problem that arises is the lack of direction given to
the second reason for overturning the lower court’s decision. The
Court made the correct decision in enforcing the necessary, second
step of the inquiry that the UCCJEA lays out: the requirement
that the hearing justice determine that Rhode Island is an
inconvenient forum.43 However, in making that determination
and sending the case back down to the Family Court, the Court
failed to lay out what exactly it expected from the analysis and
what they believed was necessary in making that determination.
Chief Justice Suttell shed some light on that topic in his dissent,44
but the Court failed to address that issue. This could seem
unimportant, however, the Court has already done its own
analysis for the first issue, and the gap in law left open in the
Court’s opinion leaves the opportunity for this case to again come
before the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The justices should
review decisions from the lower courts, not re-decide them based
on their own factual opinions.

41. See id. at 731 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting JPL Livery Servs., Inc. v.
R.I. Dept. of Admin., 88 A.3d 1134, 1142 (R.I.2014)).
43. See id. at 728 (majority opinion).
44. Id. at 732 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that in order to
dismiss a case and relinquish jurisdiction based on forum non
conveniens the hearing justice must make two determinations.
First, the lower court must determine whether there is a court in
another jurisdiction that could be appropriate and use the eight
factors laid out in section 15-14.1-19 to make that determination.
If the court concludes that another jurisdiction could be
appropriate, it must then make a second, independent
determination that the current forum would be inconvenient
under the circumstances of that case. Only if both of those
determinations are made in the affirmative may the court choose
to relinquish jurisdiction to that of another.
Kaylin M. Pelletier

Family Law. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court reversed an adjudication of delinquency on
two counts of first-degree child molestation because the
complainants’ testimony that their penises were “in” and “inside”
the respondent’s “butt” was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that sexual penetration of the respondent’s anal
opening took place. An adjudication of delinquency on the lesser
charge of second-degree child molestation was directed to be
entered on remand because the trial justice’s adjudication of
delinquency on the greater offense necessarily included an
adjudication of delinquency on the lesser-included offense.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In August of 2011, B.H., then thirteen years old, sexually
molested two of his friends, twin, eleven year old brothers Kevin
and Henry, during a sleepover at the twins’ grandparents’ house.1
In August of 2012, delinquency papers were filed with the family
court, alleging that B.H. committed first and second-degree child
molestation.2 At trial, Kevin and Henry both testified that during
the sleepover, B.H. asked both of them to put their penises “in
[B.H.’s] butt,” and the twins complied because B.H. had
threatened to tell their grandmother that the twins were doing
“something” or “trying to do something.”3 Neither Kevin nor
Henry could recall the specifics of the incident, but when asked
whether or not their penises went “inside of [B.H.],” the twins
answered in the affirmative.4 Kevin and Henry testified that B.H.
had asked them to put his penis into their “butts” but they both
refused.5 Henry testified that B.H. characterized the incident as
“[a]n experiment to see if we wanted to be gay,”6 and that B.H.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774, 777 (R.I. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 777, 778.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 778.
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had placed his penis on Henry’s body.7
After the State had closed its case, B.H. moved to dismiss the
petitions arguing that, with respect to the first-degree child
molestation charges, an essential element of the charged offense,
sexual penetration, was not established because the testimony of
the twins that they placed their penises “in” and “inside” B.H.’s
“butt” was insufficient evidence that sexual penetration took
place.8 B.H. also argued that if the State found that sexual
penetration did take place, the State was required to prove that
B.H. had “acted with the intent for sexual arousal or sexual
gratification,” and no such finding was made.9 The trial justice
denied the motion, and concluded that the evidence was indeed
sufficient to establish the element of sexual penetration and
explained that, “[i]n or outside the butt is certainly where the anal
opening is located. This Court does not expect a child . . . to
describe a horrific act . . . with such specificity and adult language
that it mirrors the language of the statute.”10 The trial justice
also rejected B.H.’s argument that the State was required to prove
that B.H. had acted with the intent of sexual arousal or sexual
gratification, but explained that even if the State was required to
prove this, it had based on the testimony of the twins, which
revealed that B.H. desired to penetrate the boys.11 The trial
justice concluded that the State had met its burden of proving that
B.H. had committed first-degree child molestation upon the twins,
and B.H. was adjudged delinquent on those charges, which he
timely appealed.12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had to
determine “whether legally competent evidence exist[ed] therein
to support the findings made by the family court trial justice,”13
and also whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 779.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”14
Ultimately, the Court agreed with B.H. that the testimony of both
Kevin and Henry, which revealed that the twins put their penises
“in” and “inside” B.H.’s “butt,” was insufficient evidence to show
sexual penetration.15 In reaching that decision, the Court looked
to the definition of “sexual penetration,” found in the statute,16 to
determine whether or not the twins’ testimony that their penises
were “inside [B.H.’s] butt” was sufficient to establish “anal
intercourse or any other intrusion” under the meaning of the
statute.17 Because the terms “sexual intercourse” and “anal
intercourse” are not defined in the language of the statute, the
court looked to various definitions for these terms.18 The Court
also had to define the term “butt,” since this was the term used by
the twins, and the term “anus” since this is the area subject to
sexual penetration during anal intercourse.19 After considering
those definitions, the Court determined that “[t]he words
[buttocks and anus] are not synonyms as they describe entirely
different parts of the anatomy.”20
The Court explained that the General Assembly, when
enacting the chapter of the general laws relating to sexual assault,

14. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)).
15. Id. at 780.
16. Id.; see also R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 11-37-1(8) (West, Westlaw through
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). The statute reads as follows:
Sexual penetration’” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio,
and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, by any
part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person’s body, or the victim’s own body upon the
accused’s instruction, but emission of semen is not required.
§ 11-37-1(8).
17. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 780.
18.
Id. The Court defined “sexual intercourse” as intercourse that
“involves penetration of the vagina by the penis,” and anal intercourse was
defined as “penetration of the anal opening by a penis.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
19.
Id. The Court defined “butt” as “[t]he prominence formed by the
gluteal muscles of either side,” and “anus” as “[t]he lower opening of the
digestive tract. It is associated with the anal sphincter and lies in the cleft
between the buttocks, through which fecal matter is extruded.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
20.
Id. at 781 (quoting Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000)).
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distinguished the terms “buttocks” and “anus.”21 Under section 1137-1(8), “sexual penetration” includes intrusions into the anal
opening,22 while section 11-37-1(7) defines “sexual contact” as “the
intentional touching of the victim’s or accused’s intimate parts,
clothed or unclothed, if that intentional touching can be
reasonably construed as intended by the accused to be for the
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or assault.”23 After
making that distinction, the Court looked at its decision in State v.
McDonald, where it held that “precise and specific testimony is
necessary to support [an act of sexual penetration] and that to
infer penetration from the complainant’s testimony would be to
draw an inference that could scarcely justify a finding of [sexual]
penetration beyond a reasonable doubt.”24 Based on the holding
in McDonald, the Court held that the twins’ testimony was not
precise and specific enough to support a finding of sexual
penetration.25 The State had the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that sexual penetration had occurred, and the
State failed to do so since it only elicited testimony concerning
B.H.’s “butt.”26 The use of the term “butt” rendered the twins’
testimony too imprecise and vague to determine whether or not
sexual penetration had occurred.27 Therefore, the State failed to
prove the sexual penetration element of first-degree child
molestation beyond a reasonable doubt.28
Next, the Court had to decide whether or not the
adjudications of delinquency should be reversed and the petitions
dismissed.29 In answering this question, the Court looked to a
prior decision, State v. Silvia, where it held that “[a]s a matter of
law, second-degree child molestation is a lesser-included offense of
21.
Id.
22.
Id.; see also R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 11-37-1(8) (West, Westlaw through
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
23. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 781; see also § 11-37-1(7).
24. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 781 (quoting 602 A.2d 923, 925 (R.I. 1992)).
25. Id. at 782.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Court explained, “[a]n intrusion into the space between a
person’s buttocks, while perhaps a necessary step on the path to intrusion of
the anal opening, is not, in itself, an intrusion into the anal opening. Id.
(quoting Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
28. Id. at 783.
29. Id.
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first-degree child molestation.”30 The Court also explained that
this jurisdiction follows the common law rule that once a person
has been charged with an offense that contains a lesser-included
offense, the accused is put on notice that they are being charged
with the lesser-included crime as well.31 Therefore, the Court
reached the conclusion that the first-degree child molestation
charge necessarily carried with it a charge of the lesser-included
offense of second-degree child molestation.32 Since B.H. was
found delinquent on the first-degree child molestation charge, the
Court reasoned that the trial justice found all of the elements of
second-degree child molestation had been met.33 B.H. argued that
the State had failed to prove the elements of second-degree child
molestation because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that B.H. acted with the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification.34 The Court disagreed and held that the evidence
was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that B.H. had acted with the requisite
purpose.35 The matter was then remanded to the family court
with directions to enter an adjudication of delinquency on the
lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation and for
resentencing since the State had already proved the elements of
the lesser-included charge of second-degree child molestation–a
30. Id. (citing 798 A.2d 419, 424–25 (R.I. 2002)).
31. Id. at 784; see also R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 12-17-14 (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.). The statute reads as follows:
[w]henever any person is tried upon an indictment, information or
complaint and the court or jury, as the case may be, shall not be
satisfied that he or she is guilty of the whole offense, but shall be
satisfied that he or she is guilty of so much of the offense as shall
substantially amount to an offense of a lower nature, or that the
defendant did not complete the offense charged, but that he or she
was guilty only of an attempt to commit the offense as the case may
be, and the court shall proceed to sentence the person for the offense
of which he or she shall be so found guilt, notwithstanding that the
court had to otherwise jurisdiction of the offense.
§ 12-17-14.
32. In re B.H., 138 A.3d at 784.
33. Id. at 785.
34. Id.
35. Id. The evidence that the Court relied on was the twins’ testimony
that B.H. had asked them to penetrate his “butt,” B.H.’s desire to switch roles
with the twins, and the fact that B.H. touched the twins’ private parts. Id.
The Court also relied on the testimony of the twins’ mother who said that
B.H. seemed to enjoy the incident. Id.
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charge that B.H. was put on notice of when he was charged with
first-degree child molestation.36
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court departed from its own “wellsettled law,” when it remanded this matter to the family court
with directions to enter an adjudication of delinquency on the
lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation.37 The
Court relied on R.I. Gen. Laws sections 12-17-14 and 11-37-9 in
holding that second-degree child molestation is a lesser- included
offense of fist-degree child molestation of which B.H. was put on
notice.38 The dissent concluded that although it agreed with the
Court, it had no authority to direct an entry of delinquency
charges on the lesser-included offense.39 In drafting the language
of sections 12-17-14 and 11-37-9, the dissent opined that the
General Assembly was referring to the trial court and not this
Court.40
In reaching its decision, the Court also relied on a prior
case, State v. Eiseman.41 There, the Court found that it had the
power to reverse a conviction and order the entry of judgment on a
lesser-included offense, but it had never “availed itself of the
opportunity to adopt this practice.”42 Nevertheless, the Court
determined that it would exercise that power in Eiseman, because
the defendant had conceded that the State had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the lesser-include offense,
and therefore, there was no danger of prejudice to the defendant
in ordering the Superior Court to enter judgment.43 The dissent
36. Id. at 786.
37. Id. at 788–89 (Flaherty, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
38. Id. at 787.
39. Id. at 788.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. State v. Eiseman addressed how the Court was going to resolve a
similar predicament since the defendant had been convicted of the greater
crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine; the Court agreed that
the defendant was actually guilty of the lesser-included crime of possession
consistent with personal use. Id. (citing 461 A.2d 369, 372 (R.I. 1983)),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128
(1990).
42. Id. (citing Eiseman, 461 A.2d at 372).
43. Id.
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pointed out, very persuasively, that the rationale in which the
Court relied on in Eiseman, was limited to the particular facts of
that case.44 Here, B.H. has not admitted culpability and he would
be prejudiced on remand.45 The prejudice stems from the fact that
the sole issue presented at trial was the issue of first-degree child
molestation.46 There were no arguments made during trial that
the trial justice should make a finding of second-degree sexual
assault,47 and there were no arguments made on appeal that B.H.
could be adjudicated as delinquent because he committed an act of
second-degree child molestation.48
The Court’s decision here, as the dissent points out, “greatly
expand[ed] the holding enunciated by this Court in Eiseman.”49
The dissent could not find another case in which this Court
employed the Eiseman analysis, and moreover, none of the cases
cited in Eiseman relied on the Court’s ability to wield the power it
did here, sua sponte.50 There is no harm in remanding the case to
the family court with instructions to dismiss because the State did
not prove the necessary elements of the charge.51 After doing so,
B.H. can then be charged with second-degree child molestation
and the relevant inquiry would be on whether or not the necessary
elements of second-degree child molestation had been satisfied.
Because nothing was ever mentioned during the family court trial
or during appeal about an adjudication of delinquency based on an
act of second-degree child molestation, the Court did not have the
authority to raise this issue sua sponte and order the family court
to enter adjudications of delinquency on this lesser-included
charge.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the State had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that B.H. had
committed acts of first-degree child molestation because the twins’
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 789.
Id.
Id.
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testimony was too vague and imprecise to be considered a
description of sexual penetration–an essential element of the
charge. The Court further held that the first-degree child
molestation charge carried with it the lesser-included charge of
second-degree child molestation and the State presented sufficient
evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that B.H. had acted with the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification–an essential element of the charge. The
case was remanded to the family court with directions to enter
adjudications of delinquency on the lesser-included charge of
second-degree child molestation and for resentencing.
Matthew Gustaitis

Government. Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2015). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held the Mayor and the City Council
of Central Falls were entitled to indemnification and attorneys’
fees because they were acting within the scope of their official
capacities when challenging the constitutionality of the Financial
Stability Act. Though the Act was ultimately found to be
constitutional, at the time of filing their suit, the Mayor and City
Council were acting within the scope of their official duties, which
included an oath to support the constitution and laws of Rhode
Island and the Constitution of the United States.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On May 18, 2010, Mayor Moreau and the City Council of
Central Falls petitioned, under a municipal receivership statute,
for a judicially-appointed receiver to assist with the city’s financial
problems.1 As a result of this petition, Central Falls’s credit
rating was reduced to “junk-bond” status, and state officials were
informed this would adversely impact how financial rating
agencies would view debt financing to other Rhode Island
municipalities.2 Determining that a municipality’s petition for
judicial receivership threatened the financial well-being of other
municipalities statewide, the General Assembly passed “An Act
Relating to Cities and Towns-Providing Financial Stability” to
amend section 45-9 in order to establish a state-controlled
mechanism to address financial adversity in troubled
municipalities.3 Prohibited from filing for a judicially-appointed
receiver under this new legislation, the Mayor and City Council of
Central Falls dismissed their previous motion and filed for the
1. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 570 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id. at 571.
3. Id. at 569, 571. Under the Financial Stability Act, the Director of
Revenue has the authority to appoint a permanent Receiver to a municipality
requesting aide in restoring financial stability. Id. at 569. Signed into law on
June, 11, 2010, the Act was made retroactive to May 15, 2010. Id. at 571.
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Receivership from the State Department of Revenue.4 On July 16,
2010, the Director of the Department of Revenue appointed retired
Superior Court Justice, Mark A. Pfeiffer, as the first Receiver for
the City of Central Falls.5
On July 19, 2010, pursuant to the Act,6 the Receiver wrote to
the Mayor that he had assumed the duties and functions of the
Office of Mayor, limiting the Mayor to serve in an advisory
capacity.7 On August, 4, 2010, the City Council passed a
resolution to authorize the hiring of legal counsel to provide
guidance in addressing the Receiver’s recent assumption of
powers.8 The Receiver rescinded this resolution by letter, citing
his authority to “[a]lter or rescind any action or decision of any
municipal officer” under the Act.9 On September 20, 2010, the
City Council passed a resolution to file a legal action to challenge
the constitutionality of the Act.10 On September 22, 2010, that
resolution was met with another rescission by the Receiver along
with a letter declaring that the City Council was “directed to serve
solely in an ‘advisory’ capacity.”11 The following day, the Receiver
filed a verified complaint with the Providence County Superior
Court, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against the Mayor and City Council.12 The Mayor and City
Council responded by filing their own cause of action
on
September 27, and these cases were consolidated in superior
court.13 Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the
Act as constitutional and remanded this case for adjudication on
the remaining issues that are now on appeal.14 Upon remand, the
superior court held: the Receiver was entitled to reimbursement
4. Id.
5. Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 5 (R.I. 2015).
6. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis.
Sess.) (“Upon the appointment of a receiver, the receiver shall have the right
to exercise the powers of the elected officials under the general laws . . . the
powers of the receiver shall be superior to and supersede the powers of the
elected officials . . . .”).
7. Flanders, 15 A.3d at 572.
8. Id.
9. Id. (alteration in original).
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12. Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 5 (R.I. 2015).
13. Id.
14. Id.

834 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:832
for his attorneys’ fees under the Act;15 the Mayor was not entitled
to indemnification by Central Falls as he was “acting beyond the
narrow scope of his official or public duties” when he engaged in
this litigation;16 and the City Council’s attorney, Attorney
Goldberg, was not entitled to attorneys’ fees from Central Falls
because his “representation of the City Council was in
contravention of the Financial Stability Act.”17 The Mayor and
City Council appealed the Providence Superior Court’s three
holdings.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A. Reimbursement of the Receiver
Upon review of the hearing justice’s ruling to grant the
Receiver’s motion for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees, the Court
reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of the Mayor
and City Council.18 The Mayor and City Council contended that
the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment for the
Receiver under section 45-9-11.19 In the superior court, the
hearing justice ruled “it [was] abundantly clear that the Receiver
ha[d] satisfied the elements of his section 45-9-11 claims against
Mayor Moreau and the City Council.”20 The hearing justice relied
on evidence that the Mayor and City Council brought this suit
after being put on notice by the Receiver that the municipality’s
budget lacked appropriations for the retention of outside
counsel.21 By going forward with this litigation, despite knowing
there were no funds, the hearing justice concluded that the Mayor
and City Council acted “intentional[ly] and in derogation of the
Receiver’s superior and superseding authority,” conduct prohibited
by section 45-9-11.22 Thus, the hearing justice held that the
Receiver was entitled to reimbursement for the unappropriated
funds expended in pursuing the superior court action.23
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6 (first alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Prior to their de novo review of the superior court’s ruling, the
Court observed that in the absence of any statutory provision
expressly providing for an award of attorney’s fees, it would
“adhere to the American Rule that . . . each litigant pay its own
attorney’s fees.”24 Upon a finding that section 45-9-11 was
completely silent with respect to attorneys’ fees, the Court stated
that statutory interpretation precedent leaves “no room for
implication by judicial construction.”25 Because the statute said
nothing about attorneys’ fees, the Court reversed and denied the
Receiver reimbursement of his attorneys’ fees.26 The Court
determined that “the hearing justice focused in error on whether
the requirements of section 45-9-11 were met, rather than
whether that statute actually provided for the payment of
attorneys’ fees.”27
B. Indemnification of the Mayor
Upon review of the hearing justice’s ruling to deny the Mayor
and City Council’s motion seeking indemnification for the Mayor,
the Court reversed because it found the Mayor was acting in his
official capacity when he challenged the constitutionality of the
Act, and therefore was entitled to indemnification.28 The Mayor
and City Council argued that the Mayor was entitled to
indemnification for attorneys’ fees and legal costs pursuant to
Rhode Island General Law section 45-15-16 and Central Falls
Code of Ordinances section 2-109.29 The Receiver argued that he
had the power of the Mayor and City Council when both were
relegated to serve in solely advisory capacities, so the Mayor could
not be entitled to indemnification because he could not have acted
in that official capacity when bringing suit.30 Referring to the
language of Rhode Island General Law section 45-15-16 and
Central Falls Code of Ordinances section 2-109, the Court
determined the only condition upon which the City Council would
24. Id. at 8 (quoting Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 2007)).
25. Id. at 10. (quoting Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal Inc., 576 A.2d 1217,
1221 (R.I. 1990)).
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 16.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id.
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have had the discretion to not indemnify the Mayor would be if
the Mayor were not “acting within the scope of [his] official duties
or employment . . . .”31 By challenging the constitutionality of the
Act and defending himself against the Receiver’s action, the Court
determined the Mayor was acting in his official capacity.32
The Court referred to “a number of reasons” for coming to this
conclusion.33 The most significant of which pertained to the
substance of the suit: a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Act.34 At the time of filing, this newly enacted statute had yet to
be challenged, and it “removed a significant amount of power held
by the elected officials.”35 The Court noted that if “the
constitutionality of the [Act had] already been established, then
any acts by the Mayor which contravened the Act might well have
been beyond the scope of his official duties . . . .”36 The Court
further supported this ruling by explaining the implications had it
ruled that the Mayor was not acting in his official capacity.37
Without indemnification, the Mayor would be left “financially
responsible in his individual capacity for these lawsuits . . . which
were undertaken on behalf of the people of Central Falls to
determine the constitutionality (or lack thereof) of a new, broad,
and far-reaching statutory scheme.”38 Furthermore, the Court
found that the oath taken by the mayor or any city council
member of Central Falls “explicitly requires the person being
sworn in to support the constitutions of Rhode Island and of the
United States.”39 The Court stated this oath arguably creates a
“duty to challenge the constitutionality of the [Act] in his official
capacity.”40 Additionally, the Court referred to Flanders, where
31. Id. at 13 (alteration in original).
32. Id. at 14.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 15 (citing Central Falls Home Rule Charter Art. II, Chap. 1, §
2-105 (“The mayor and members of the city council, before entering upon the
duties of their office, shall first be severally sworn or affirmed to the faithful
discharge of the same, and to the support of the Constitution and laws of the
state, and of the Constitution of the United States, in the form and manner
provided for by law.”)).
40. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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there was “little difficulty in concluding that the mayor and city
council, in their individual and official capacities, ha[d] standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the [Act].”41 The Court
reversed, holding that the Mayor was acting in his official capacity
when challenging the constitutionality of the Act, and was
therefore entitled to indemnification “pursuant to section 45-15-16
and the City Ordinance.”42
C. Attorneys’ Fees for Attorney Goldberg
Upon review of the hearing justice’s ruling that the City
Council’s attorney for these actions was not entitled to attorneys’
fees, the Court reversed because the City Council “had standing,
in its official capacity, to bring a constitutional challenge to the
[Act].”43 The Mayor and City Council argued that the City
Council had acted in its official capacity when it
passed
resolutions to hire outside counsel for guidance and litigation
because the City Council had a “duty to challenge the Receiver
and the [Act] on behalf of its constituents.”44 The Receiver
retained the position that the Act gave him the sole authority to
engage outside counsel, and by acting on their resolution to
engage outside counsel after the Receiver rescinded it, the City
Council “exceeded the scope of its duties.”45 Again, the Court
noted this decision’s unique and unprecedented circumstances.46
Although the Court acknowledged the Act gave the Receiver the
sole authority to rescind actions of the City Council, the Court
stated that the City Council’s purpose in hiring legal counsel was
to challenge the constitutionality of this Act.47 The Court said the
hearing justice’s reliance on the Act was misplaced.48 Just like
the Mayor, the oath the members of the City Council swore
imposed a duty upon them to uphold “the constitution and laws of
the state, and of the Constitution of the United States . . . ,” so the
City Council’s challenge to the Act was consistent with its official
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 574 (R.I. 2011)).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18. (quoting Flanders, 15 A.3d at 574).
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
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duties.49 The Court once again referred to its unanimous decision
in Flanders to find that the Mayor and City Council “had
standing, in [their] official capacit[ies], to bring a constitutional
challenge to the Financial Stability Act.”50 The Court ruled that
the City Council’s decision “to hire outside legal counsel was
entirely consistent with an effort to comply with that oath,” and
therefore reversed the lower court.51
COMMENTARY

In the Chief Justice’s dissent, he agreed with the Court to
deny the Receiver reimbursement for his attorneys’ fees, but found
that neither the Mayor nor the City Council were acting in their
official capacities when filing suit to challenge
the
constitutionality of the Act.52 The Chief Justice reasoned that
when the Receiver took office on July 16, 2010, to assume the
duties and functions of the Mayor, who would only then serve in
an advisory capacity, the Mayor could no longer have filed suit in
an official capacity.53 Additionally, when the Receiver assumed
the functions and duties of the City Council, the decision to
indemnify the Mayor under Central Falls Ordinance section 2-109
would no longer reside with the City Council, but within the
Receiver’s discretion to deny said relief.54 The constitutionality
issue had no effect on the Chief Justice’s analysis, stating that the
Mayor’s suit to challenge the Act was a risk that he should have
bore in his individual capacity.55 The Chief Justice reiterated this
same reasoning for declining to award attorneys’ fees to the City
Council. Like the Mayor, the City Council was stripped of its
duties and functions by the Receiver and merely served in an
advisory capacity.56 In pursuing litigation to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act, the City Council’s two resolutions
were rescinded by the Receiver, yet it chose to move forward

49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565,
574 (R.I. 2011)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 19 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 20.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 21.
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anyway and should bear the costs as a result.57
The Rhode Island Supreme Court made it clear that this
decision turned on the unique circumstances presented by this
constitutional challenge to a newly-enacted statute.58 Where the
dissent found that the Mayor and City Council should not be
entitled to relief because they exceeded the scope of their advisory
capacities by bringing suit,59 the Court saw the challenge as a
good-faith effort to assess the constitutionality of new legislation
that stripped powers from elected officials.60 After upholding the
Act’s constitutionality in giving the Receiver the authority to
assume the duties and functions of officials, the Court still found
the Mayor and City Council’s actions justified because they
exceeded the scope of their capacities only to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act, which stripped them of their original
duties and functions.61 The dissent did not find the constitutional
substance of the suit to justify the Mayor and City Council acting
outside of their advisory capacities because the Act was ultimately
ruled to be constitutional.
The Court ruled in favor of the Mayor and City Council
because their decision took more into account than just the Act.
The dissenting approach appears to only determine whether one
acted in their official capacity as established by the law. However,
the Court does find some form of an exception to exist when
considering the surrounding circumstances and an official’s reason
for exceeding the scope of their official capacity. When they filed
suit, the Mayor and City Council acted inconsistently with the
Act, but they did so under a good-faith belief that the Act was
unconstitutional and challenging it was necessary as part of the
oath to Central Falls to uphold the Rhode Island Constitution and
United States Constitution.62 The Court relies on the fact that
the Mayor and City Council could not have seen the ultimate
outcome of Flanders at the time of filing.63 Flanders held the
57. Id.
58. See id. at 14, 18 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 20 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. See id. at 16, 18 (majority opinion).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565,
574 (R.I. 2011)).
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Mayor and City Council did have standing for this constitutional
challenge,64 but the dissent has them doing so only in their
individual capacities.65 The Court reasoned that officials make
constitutional challenges on behalf of their constituents to
determine the constitutionality of such laws.66 Requiring those
officials to risk bearing the cost of such litigation if they do not
prevail may only prevent laws from ever receiving judicial review.
After Shine, officials of other municipalities challenging the
constitutionality of the Financial Stability Act will not have as
strong of a good-faith argument to recover their legal fees in the
event that the law is upheld, but they may have that good-faith
argument when challenging statutes, in analogous situations, that
have yet to receive judicial review. The Court’s decision advocates
for a tentative exception when dealing with constitutional
challenges made by well-intentioned municipal officials. The
Court’s explanation here relies on statutory interpretation as well
as policy considerations, so the success of such arguments will rely
on the substantive law and the challenging official’s intentions at
the time of filing. By not excusing an official’s good-faith for
pursuing a constitutional challenge, the dissenting position may
have better ensured compliance from officials not willing to make
such a constitutional challenge that could be potentially made out
of pocket. Although the dissent’s position may better prevent
litigious conflicts between government officials because of the
accompanied risk that an official would be responsible for fees in
their individual capacity if a challenge fails, this could chip away
at the tools available to voice constitutional concerns. The Court’s
decision does not endorse officials to challenge every law, but only
in particular situations where a new law enacted has yet to be
deemed constitutional.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the superior court
in all respects. The Court found that although the Financial
Stability Act was held to be constitutional in Flanders, the Mayor
64. Flanders, 15 A.3d at 574.
65. Shine, 119 A.3d at 20 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 17 (majority opinion).
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and the City Council were acting in their official capacities at the
time they challenged this legislation and were therefore entitled to
indemnification and attorneys’ fees from Central Falls. Although
the Mayor and City Council may have violated section 45-9-11 by
requiring Central Falls to expend unappropriated funds on court
proceedings, the statute was silent as to whether attorneys’ fees
could be recovered, and therefore the Court ruled that the
Receiver was not entitled to be reimbursement by Mayor Moreau
or the City Council.
Connor Mills

Labor and Employment Law. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC,
134 A.3d 173 (R.I. 2016). A claim alleging the violation of the
employer drug testing statute (R.I. Gen. Laws section 28-6.5- 1(a))
concerns “injuries to the person.” Subsequently, this determination
invokes the three-year statute of limitations, as opposed to the tenyear statute of limitations for a civil action, which begins to run at
the time the violating drug test was administered.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Melissa Goddard (Plaintiff) was formerly employed by APG
Security-RI, LLC as a security guard until her termination
sometime in January 2010.1 The cause for her termination was her
failure of an employment drug test.2 Plaintiff filed a claim on March
27, 2014 against APG Security-RI, LLC, Scott Hemingway, and
Anna Vidiri (collectively Defendants).3 Plaintiff alleged Defendants
violated R.I. Gen. Laws section 28-6.5-1, the employer drug testing
statute (EDTS), because the Defendants did not have reasonable
grounds to administer the drug test.4 Plaintiff sought damages
under both EDTS and R.I. Gen. Laws section 9-1-2.5 The
Defendants responded to the complaint by moving for a dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
on the grounds that the complaint was not timely filed.6 A hearing
was held on June 9, 2014 in the Superior Court, where each party
argued the appropriate statute of limitations to be applied to the
EDTS violation.7 The Plaintiff cited to the ten-year
1. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, 134 A.3d 173, 174 (R.I. 2016). The
exact date of termination was not in the record, but suggests sometime close to
January 2010.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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statute of limitations under R.I. Gen. Laws section 9-1-13(a).8 The
Defendants, on the other hand, argued that the three-year statute
of limitations under R.I. Gen. Laws section 9-1-14(b) was
applicable.9 The hearing justice ruled for the Defendants and
determined that the complaint was not timely filed by the
Plaintiff.10 The hearing justice granted the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, and thereafter, the Plaintiff appealed the decision.11
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Court first noted the applicable standard of review when
addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure.12 The Court established that its
review was “confined to the four corners” of the complaint, and that
the allegations and facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiff.13 Upon review, the Court must decide whether
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the [P]laintiff would not be entitled
to relief” against the Defendants, even accepting all facts as true.14
The Court simultaneously had to determine the appropriate
statute of limitations to apply to the complaint, which proved
essential to the Court’s decision in the appeal as a whole. The Court
examined the purpose of the EDTS, specifically that it serves to
protect employees from unjustified drug testing.15 The Court then
focused on the effects of a violation of the EDTS, which include
criminal convictions, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.16
However, the Court noted that the statute does not indicate a
statute of limitations to be applied in a civil action.17 When there is
an absence of a statute of limitations clause within
8. Id. at 175.
9. Id. at 174.
10.
Id. at 175. The hearing justice also determined the action accrued at
the time the test was administered, and at that moment the statute of
limitations began to run. Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. (citations omitted).
14.
Id.
15. Id. at 176.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.5-1 (West, Westlaw through
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).

844 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:842
the text of a statute itself, the Court must decide between either a
three-year or ten-year statute of limitations.18 Section 9-1-14(b)
states that when there are “injuries to the person,” the cause of
action must be filed within a three-year window from the time the
event occurred.19 The Court noted that “injuries to the person”
extend to injuries other than physical injuries.20 Subsequently, the
Court examined the purpose of “injuries to the person” under
Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, which identified that the
phrase, “injuries to the person,” must be applied to the statute of
limitations concerning “invasions of rights that inhere in a man as
a rational being.”21
The Court has historically relied on Commerce Oil, in
determining the appropriate statute of limitations for causes of
actions.22 As a result of the Court’s interpretation of Commerce Oil,
as applied to the case at hand, the Court found the Plaintiff’s ability
to utilize the ten-year statute of limitations was based on whether
the Plaintiff’s “claim that her right to recovery for a violation of the
EDTS accrue[d] to her ‘by reason of some peculiar status . . . .’”23
The “peculiar status” arose from the fact that the Plaintiff was an
employee.24 The Court noted it had not yet had the opportunity to
consider the concept of an employee-based peculiar status claim
against the backdrop of Commerce Oil, but also stressed it is more
important to focus on the right violated and not the “elements of
damage.”25 Subsequently, the Court determined “the nature of the
right created by the EDTS is analogous to an invasion of privacy,”
and therefore the Plaintiff’s right is not of a “peculiar status,” but
one “entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law . . .
.”26 The Court then reasoned that violations stemming from the
EDTS are “injuries to
18. Goddard, 134 A.3d at 176 (citation omitted).
19. Id; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14(b) (West, Westlaw through
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
20. Goddard, 134 A.3d at 176 (quoting Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v.
Miner, 199 A.2d 606, 610 (R.I. 1964)).
21. Id. (quoting Commerce Oil, 199 A.2d at 610).
22. Id. at 177.
23. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-13(a) (West, Westlaw through
Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
24. Goddard, 134 A.3d at 177.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Commerce Oil, 199 A.2d at 610).
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the person” and thus subject to the three-year statute of
limitations.27
To further support its position, the Court explained that its
decision was consistent with the statute of limitations applied by
the General Assembly to other employment causes of actions.28 The
Court noted the intent of the General Assembly was to apply a
similar time period to the EDTS.29 Additionally, the Court found
that under section 9-1-2, the correct statute of limitations was the
three-year time frame.30 Therefore, the Court found the Plaintiff
filed her complaint outside of the three-year statute of limitations
and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision to grant the motion to
dismiss.31
COMMENTARY

The Court was faced with a relatively straightforward appeal
on the motion to dismiss. The Court needed to address one question:
Which statute of limitations applied? Although, the Court seemed
to be dealing with a relatively simple issue, it certainly proved more
in-depth than not.
The cause of action stemmed from a violation of the EDTS and
a subsequent termination following the failed drug test. When drug
tests are illegally administered, severe consequences can result.
This is a more important issue as of late with the rise of medicinal
and recreational marijuana laws. Although, this case does not
disclose what caused the failed drug test, one can see the potential
issue arising out of new medical marijuana laws, where qualified
individuals legally use a traditionally illegal substance, and how
employers may react if there is any miscommunication resulting
from a failed drug test induced by medical marijuana usage. Thus,
it was paramount that the Court articulate a clear and precise
decision on which statute of limitations applies in a EDTS violation
context.
The Court certainly made such an effort by analyzing the facts
against Commerce Oil, which is the standard when
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 177–78.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
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determining the appropriate statute of limitations, and did not
depart from its precedent regarding statutes that remain silent as
to the applicable statute of limitations.32 The Court evenly worked
through the Plaintiff’s arguments against the backdrop of
Commerce Oil, until it reached a conclusion. However, the Court did
not stop there, as it wanted to ensure the correct outcome. The
Court additionally considered the legislative intent of which statute
of limitations to apply and examined other similar employment
causes of actions for further support.33 The Court’s observations in
these extra areas led to the same statute of limitations outcome. If
the Court were to find that other similar employment causes of
actions invoked the ten-year statute of limitations, the Court’s
decision here would certainly appear much weaker. It was
important for the Court to maintain the same consistency in
applying which statute of limitations in these specific employment
matters. Lastly, the Court also noted how the Plaintiff sought
damages under section 9-1-2, and how that section applies a threeyear statute of limitations.34 Overall, the Court went through many
steps to ensure the correct statute of limitations was applied.
However, there is one minor point worth noting. In addition to
concluding which statute of limitations applies, the Court also
found that the cause of action accrued at the time the violating drug
test was administered. Therefore, the Plaintiff had three years to
file a complaint starting from the day she took her drug test.
Therein lies a potential problem. It does not seem outside the
realm of possibilities that following a failed drug test, a company
would give an employee a second chance. If the failed drug test
played a role in a subsequent termination, the employee’s potential
cause of action would have already begun running on the drug test
date. This could severely impact a potential plaintiff with a limited,
legal time window. Therefore, the cause of action should begin to
accrue at the time the violation adversely affects the employee.35
32. Id. at 177–78.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 178.
35. The potential plaintiff would of course have to sufficiently establish that
the earlier drug test played a role in his or her subsequent firing. However,
this very well could prove to be difficult depending on the amount
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an action under
section 28-6.5-1(a) invokes the three-year statute of limitations
under section 9-1-14(b) because the right violated consisted of
“injuries to the person.” Additionally, the Court found that the
three-year statute of limitations was consistent with the legislative
intent behind the statute and other employment causes of actions.
Lastly, the Court identified that the cause of action under section
28-6.5-1(a) begins to accrue at the time the drug test is
administered.
John W. Caruolo

of time elapsed between the drug test and termination.

Medical Malpractice. Ribeiro v. R.I. Eye Inst., 138 A.3d 761 (R.I.
2016). An expert’s testimony in a medical malpractice case should
have been admitted because it would have assisted the jury in
establishing that it was more probable that the misdiagnosis and
passage of time led to the patient’s permanent vision loss. Thus, an
expert’s testimony is admitted if its probative value is not
immensely outweighed by the risk of jury confusion. A motion for
judgment as a matter of law must be renewed at the close of all
evidence. The motion is thereby waived and cannot be renewed once
a verdict is returned.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On August 24, 2004, Antonio Ribeiro (Ribeiro) attended an eye
appointment with Dr. Newman, an optometrist at the Rhode Island
Eye Institute, LLC (Eye Institute).1 Ribeiro presented symptoms of
blurred vision in his right eye.2 Dr. Newman diagnosed Ribeiro with
central serous retinopathy (CSR).3 On August 25, 2004, Dr.
Newman confirmed the diagnosis based on an Optical Coherence
Tomography (OCT) scan, and on October 25, 2004, Ribeiro returned
to Dr. Newman because his vision had worsened.4 Dr. Newman
again diagnosed Ribeiro with CSR and referred Ribeiro to a retinal
specialist, Dr. You.5 On November 1, 2004, Dr. You diagnosed
Ribeiro with a retinal detachment, which is a tear in the back of the
eye.6 Despite Dr. You’s efforts to surgically repair the tear, Ribeiro
permanently lost central vision
1. Ribeiro v. R.I. Eye Inst., 138 A.3d 761, 764 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 765. CSR is a “blister” on the back of the eye that causes fluid
to accumulate behind the retina. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 765–66. A detached retina is a tear that develops behind the eye,
and like CFR, it involves fluid accumulation; however, it is more serious than
CFR because when the tear fills with fluid, the retina pulls away from the eye
and loses its blood supply, thus rendering it functionless. Id.
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in his right eye.7
Ribeiro brought a medical malpractice action against Dr.
Newman and the Eye Institute (collectively, Defendants), asserting
a negligence claim against Dr. Newman, and that the Eye
During pretrial
Institute was vicariously liable.8
communications, Ribeiro disclosed that it would call expert witness
Dr. Greenstein, O.D.—an optometrist—to testify that on August 24,
2004, Dr. Newman breached the standard of care by failing to
diagnose a detached retina, as well as expert witness Dr. Bressler,
M.D.—an ophthalmologist—to testify that the untreated fluid
buildup was the proximate cause of Ribeiro’s permanent vision loss
in November 2004.9
On November 1, 2011, there was a motion in limine hearing to
determine whether Dr. Bressler’s testimony could include the
October 2004 OCT.10 On November 10, there was a similar hearing
concerning Dr. Bressler’s testimony about Dr. You’s report.11 The
Defendants contended that the jury would confusedly rely on Dr.
Bressler’s opinion, as an ophthalmologist, to determine if Dr.
Newman, an optometrist, breached the standard of care.12 Ribeiro
submitted an offer of proof that Dr. Bressler’s testimony was limited
to causation and damages.13 As such, the trial justice decided to let
the parties limit Dr. Bressler’s testimony themselves through
“usual means,” questioning and objections.14
On November 10, 2011, another motion in limine was held.15
7. Id. at 766.
8. Id. at 763.
9. Id. at 766.
10. Id. at 766.
11. Id. at 768.
12.
Id. at 766. Ophthalmologists can diagnose and treat all forms of eye
disease and can perform eye surgery; however, optometrists provide vision care
by testing and correcting vision using corrective lenses as well as detecting
certain eye abnormalities. Id. at 766 n.5 (internal citation omitted).
13.
See id. at 766–67. Ribeiro explained that it was necessary for Dr.
Bressler to compare the August 2004 OCT to the October 2004 OCT to show
that in August 2004 Ribeiro’s macula was detached, but could have been
reattached, as compared to the October 2004 OCT, which showed that by this
time, the macula was completely detached, and therefore Ribeiro’s vision was
permanently damaged. Id.
14. Id. at 767.
15. Id.
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The Defendants, still concerned about jury confusion, moved to
limit Dr. Bressler’s testimony about the August and October OCTs
to “hypothetical questions.”16 The trial justice permitted Ribeiro to
question Dr. Bressler about the August OCT, but limited October
OCT questions to hypotheticals.17 Ribeiro asserted that this was
prejudicial because it barred Dr. Bressler’s opinion about Ribeiro’s
worsened vision from August to November, which was the basis of
her causation theory.18
Next, the Defendants argued that Dr. Bressler’s testimony
should be limited exclusively to the August 2004 appointment
because, given that Dr. Newman was allegedly negligent only
during the August 2004 appointment, Dr. Bressler’s testimony
regarding Ribeiro’s eye condition in October was irrelevant.19 In
response, the trial justice “modif[ied] or change[d] its earlier ruling”
and agreed to instruct the jury that Dr. Bressler’s testimony was
limited to causation, but also permitted Ribeiro to question Dr.
Bressler about both the August and October OCT results.20
Thereafter, the Defendants argued that Dr. Bressler could not
testify about the duration of Ribeiro’s detached retina because
neither her deposition nor expert disclosure provided her opinion
on this.21 The trial justice finally called an end to the arguments
and ambiguously held that depending on Dr. Bressler’s crossexamination, “the [c]ourt may permit [Ribeiro]on redirect
examination to further opine as to the chronicity of Mr. Ribeiro’s
eye in her opinion.”22
At trial, Ribeiro attempted to question Dr. Bressler about the
October OCT, to which the Defendants immediately objected.23 At
sidebar, the parties tried to decipher exactly what the trial justice
previously held regarding the scope of Dr. Bressler’s testimony.24
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 768.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 769 (first alteration in original).
23. Id.
24. Id. Ribeiro contended that the trial justice previously granted
permission to ask about both the August and October OCTs, and that Dr.
Bressler needed to discuss the eye’s condition on both dates to support her

2017]

SURVEY SECTION

851

The trial justice, adopting the Defendant’s view, held that unless
the Defendants brought the October OCT scan into evidence,
neither the witness nor Ribeiro’s counsel could refer to it.25
Trial recommenced, and Ribeiro asked Dr. Bressler a question
about Dr. You’s medical notes regarding Ribeiro’s appointment on
November 1, 2004.26 The Defendants objected, and the trial justice
held that unless the Defendants brought Dr. Young’s notes into
evidence on cross-examination, Ribeiro was barred from such
inquiry.27
On cross-examination, Dr. Bressler was neither asked about
the October OCT nor Dr. You’s treatment.28 Thus, Dr. Bressler was
prevented from discussing Ribeiro’s worsening eye condition from
August to November, which precluded her opinion as to how
Ribeiro’s undiagnosed condition eventually caused his permanent
vision loss.29 The Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of
law, which the trial justice reserved ruling on.30 The Defendants
proceeded, calling only Dr. Newman to question him exclusively
about Ribeiro’s eye condition from August to October 2004.31
Accordingly, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Defendants,
finding that although Dr. Newman breached the standard of care,
his deviation was not the proximate cause of Ribeiro’s injury.32
Ribeiro moved for a new trial, contesting that the trial justice
erred when he precluded Dr. Bressler’s causation testimony.33
opinion regarding Ribeiro’s eventual vision loss. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Defendants objected, based on the presupposition that because
Ribeiro was barred from asking Dr. Bressler about the October OCT, Ribeiro
was also barred from questions relating to Dr. You’s notes. Id. Ribeiro asserted
that Dr. Bressler relied on Dr. You’s notes because they formed her conclusion
that, given Ribeiro’s eye condition in October, his retina was incurable. Id.
27. Id. at 770.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law based on the assertion
that Ribeiro failed to prove: that the standard of care was breached, proximate
cause, and damages. Id. at 763–64; see also SUPER. CT.
R. CIV. P. 50.
31. Id. at 770.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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The Defendants sought to renew the Rule 50 motion, and in the
alternative, moved for a new trial on the standard of care.34 The
trial justice denied Ribeiro’s motion, reasoning that because the
negligence claim was limited to August 24, 2004, causation
evidence was appropriately limited to that date.35 The trial justice
also reasoned that the risk that the jury would rely on Dr. Bressler’s
testimony, as an ophthalmologist, to determine the standard of care
of an optometrist outweighed its probative value.36 Lastly, the trial
justice held that any alleged error was harmless because Dr.
Bressler’s testimony was limited “only to the extent that she
intended to talk about Mr. Ribeiro’s condition in October, two
months after anything could have been done to prevent his
permanent vision loss.”37 The Defendants’ motions for judgment as
a matter of law and for a new trial were denied.38
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to
determine whether the trial justice’s decision to preclude Dr.
Bressler’s testimony regarding the October OCT scan was an
“abuse of discretion.”39 The Court explained that within the medical
malpractice context, an expert witness’s opinion is only admitted if
it has met “the requisite degree of positiveness.”40 However, given
that “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it,” the admittance of expert
testimony warrants greater oversight.41 For this reason, the Court
explained that a trial justice must act as a gatekeeper, weighing the
expert testimony’s probative value against the danger of unfair
prejudice.42
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 771 (citing Franco v. Latina, 916 A.2d 1251, 1258 (R.I. 2007)).
40.
Id. (quoting Riley v. Stone, 900 A.2d 1087, 1092 (R.I. 2006)). Expert
opinion must “rise to the level of reasonable medical certainty, that is, some
degree of positiveness or probability and not possibility.” Id. (quoting Riley, 900
A.2d at 1092).
41.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co.,
729 A.2d 677, 688 (R.I. 1999)).
42.
See id. (citing Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 891 (R.I. 2003)); see also
R.I. R. EVID. 403.
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The Court began its analysis by addressing the relevancy of Dr.
Bressler’s testimony regarding the October OCT scan.43 According
to the Court, not only did Ribeiro have to establish that Dr.
Newman breached the standard of care on August 24, 2004, but also
that this deviation was the proximate cause of Ribeiro’s permanent
vision loss.44 The Court simply explained that this required Ribeiro
to “prove what actually did happen as a result of that deviation.”45
As such, Ribeiro had to form “links” showing that the deviation “set
in motion the ‘natural, unbroken and continuous sequence,’” which
led to the outcome.46 Therefore, Dr. Bressler inevitably had to
testify about Ribeiro’s eye condition between August and October to
illustrate the “natural [and] unbroken” deterioration of the retina,
which led to Ribeiro’s permanent vision loss in November 2004.47
The Court then considered whether the probative value of Dr.
Bressler’s testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect.48 In regards
to the “balancing test,” the Court shed light on the notion that
“[h]elpfulness to the trier of fact is the most critical consideration
for the trial justice in determining whether to admit proposed
expert testimony.”49 Taking this into account, the Court found that
the expert’s opinion about the August OCT—unlike the October
OCT—would have benefited the jury because it would have helped
them conceptualize that it was “more probable” that
43.
See Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 771. The Court analyzed the testimony’s
relevancy under Rule 401 and Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.
Id. Under Rule 401, to be “relevant,” the evidence must “hav[e] any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” R.I. R. EVID. 401. Rule 402 provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.” Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 771
(alteration in original) (quoting Boscia v. Sharples, 860 A.2d 674, 678 (R.I.
2004)).
44.
Id. at 772 (citation omitted).
45.
Id.
46.
Id. (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 692).
47.
Id; see also DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 692.
48.
Id. Rule 403 provides that according to a justice’s discretion, evidence
is excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” R.I. R. EVID. 403.
49.
Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 772 (alteration in original) (quoting Owens v.
Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 891 (R.I. 2003)).
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Dr. Newman’s misdiagnosis, along with the passage of time,
caused Ribeiro’s eventual loss of vision in November.50
The Court then analyzed the probative value of Dr. Bressler’s
testimony against a risk of jury confusion, regarding the difference
between the standard of care and causation.51 Another postulate
the Court relied on was that “[u]nless evidence is of limited or
marginal relevance and enormously prejudicial, the trial justice
should not act to exclude it.”52 Accordingly, the Court held that, in
regards to Dr. Bressler’s testimony about the October OCT, the
potential for jury confusion did not outweigh the testimony’s
probative value.53 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that such
concerns would have been eradicated with the justice’s “cautionary
instruction,” which specifically advised the jury that Dr. Bressler’s
testimony could not be used to determine whether Dr. Newman
breached the standard of care.54 Therefore, the Court held that,
Dr. Bressler’s testimony was not “enormously prejudicial, . . . [and]
the trial justice strayed beyond the bounds of his discretion . . . .”55
Moreover, the Court held that Dr. Bressler’s preclusion from
testifying about the October OCT and Dr. You’s notes were not
harmless error.56 As the Court explained, the expert’s credibility
and opinion depended on this evidence because her inability to
compare the August OCT against both the October OCT and Dr.
You’s notes, prevented the jury from theorizing why it would have
been more probable for the eye to be cured in August, but not in
November.57 The Court concluded that the trial justice’s preclusion
was an “unsustainable exercise of his discretion,” and a new trial
on all issues was granted.58
Lastly, the Court addressed the Defendants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law.59
Despite the Defendants’
50.
See id. at 772; see also R.I. R. EVID. 401.
51.
Ribeiro, 138 A.3d at 772.
52.
Id. at 772, 773 (quoting Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d
1188, 1193 (R.I. 1994)).
53. Id. at 772.
54.
Id. at 772–73; State v. Clark, 754 A.2d 73, 80 (R.I. 2000) (noting that
“the members of the jury are presumed to follow the trial justice’s
instructions.”).
55.
Id. at 773 (citing Wells, 635 A.2d at 1193).
56.
Id.
57. Id. at 773–74.
58. Id. at 774.
59. Id.
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contentions, the Court reaffirmed “[its] established rule that if one
party makes a motion for judgment as matter of law at the close of
the opponent’s case and then presents evidence on his . . . own
behalf, the motion must be renewed at the close of all [the]
evidence.”60 As such, because the Defendants did not renew their
motion at the close of their evidence, the Defendants’ earlier motion
was waived and could not be appealed.61 The Court also held that
because Ribeiro was granted a new trial on all issues, the
Defendants’ motion for a new trial was denied.62
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court discussed how a trial justice
abused his or her discretion when admitting expert testimony into
trial.63 The Court brought to light the challenge posed by potential
jury confusion as well as the prejudicial effect that such evidence
may have upon jury members.64 However, consistent with the
adversarial search for the truth, the Court set forth the importance
of precluding expert testimony only when
“enormously”
prejudicial.65 For this reason, the Court provided mechanisms upon
which a trial justice may rely when making this complicated
decision. The Court emphasized the power of “crisp and succinct
cautionary” jury instructions in order to prevent such confusion.66
Moreover, the Court presented fundamental questions for trial
justices to consider, such as how “helpful” the testimony might be
to the jury, as well as, whether admitting the testimony would be
“enormously” prejudicial.67 The Court was also empathetic to the
importance of ensuring that the parties had a fair opportunity to
fully present their case. As for the jury, the Court had a keen eye to
ensure that the jury had sufficient information to reach a fair
determination. Through its opinion, the Court stressed how
imperative it is for the jury to know these
60. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
742 A.2d 282, 287 (R.I. 1999)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 771–74.
64. See id. at 772–74.
65. Id. at 773; see also Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188,
1193 (R.I. 1994).
66. Id.
67. See id.
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relative facts in order to fully understand the case at hand as well
as the legalities involved. For this reason, it is imperative for the
trial justice to heavily weigh the more attenuated implications that
an exclusion may have.
Consistent with the search for the truth, there is also a need to
foster ideals of conflict resolution. For this reason, a trial justice’s
inconsistent decisions pose the risk that this will enable a case to
become more complicated and confrontational than necessary.
When opposing counsel partakes in multiple hearings on the same
issues this may cause the parties to become distracted from the
principle issue of the case as well as their role within the system of
justice. The golden rule is that a client is entitled to a “just, speedy,
and inexpensive” trial. As such, when there are multiple cases
within a case, this inevitably requires additional time, costs, and
court resources. Nonetheless, the greatest concern presented by
this attenuation is the risk of jury confusion as well as a
misconstruction of the law. For this reason, the Court’s decision and
analysis serve as a model for applying fundamental discretionary
tests in order to ensure that the truth is attained, the conflict is
resolved, and the purpose for which the case was brought remains
the priority.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Superior Court
abused its discretion when it excluded a causation expert’s
testimony as to a patient’s scans and medical record because this
information was relevant to the expert’s causation theory.
Furthermore, this testimony would have assisted the jury in
conceptualizing that it was more probable that the misdiagnosis
was the proximate cause of the patient’s irreparable injury, and
thus its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The
Court also held that a motion for judgments as a matter of law must
be renewed at the close of all evidence, and once the verdict is
returned, the motion is thereby waived and cannot be renewed.
Alexandra Rawson

Mortgage Law. Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho, 127 A.3d 897
(R.I. 2015). A prior recorded mortgage on a condominium held by
a bank is extinguished when a super-priority lien is created by
statute and the condominium sold at auction does not generate
enough funds to cover both liens.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In December of 2004, Michael Botelho purchased a
condominium unit in Warwick, RI.1 As part of the process,
Botelho executed a promissory note in favor of First Franklin
Financial Corp. in the amount of $114,400.2 The loan amount was
then secured by a mortgage on the condominium unit.3 After a
period of years, Botelho became delinquent on the associated
monthly condominium association fees.4 This delinquency created
a statutory lien under the Rhode Island Condominium Act (RICA),
and the condominium association (Association) eventually sold the
condominium unit in a lien foreclosure sale to the Plaintiff,
Twenty Eleven, LLC, on July 19, 2011.5 Subsequent to that sale,
the original mortgagee6 tried to foreclose on its mortgage on the
property on January 18, 2013.7 Plaintiff brought an action in the
Rhode Island Superior Court, seeking to quiet title to the
condominium unit in its favor.8 The Superior Court decision
relied heavily on a strict reading of the statute, which does not
include any reference to extinguishment of prior recorded
mortgages.9 Therefore, the hearing justice dismissed the action as
1. Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho, 127 A.3d 897, 898–99 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id. at 899.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The original mortgage holder was PNC Bank, National Association.
Id. at 898.
7. Id. at 899.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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of August 28, 2013.10 The Plaintiff then appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Court began its discussion by stating that the question at
bar required a statutory interpretation, which the Court reviews
de novo.11 The Court immediately turned to RICA, section 3436.1-3.16(b).12 The Court read section 34-36.1-3.16(b)(1)(ii) as
stating that a lien under this section is prior to all other liens
except a first mortgage on the condominium unit recorded prior to
the date on which assessment is sought.13 If that was all the
statute stated, the lender’s original mortgage would be the highest
priority lien with the Association’s lien having a lower priority.14
The Court then moved to section 34-36.1-3.16(b)(2),15 which
created a “super-priority lien,” consisting of all “common expense
assesments.”16
The Court considered section 34-36.1-3.16 in its entirety and
found that it created a bifurcated lien, in which one part had a
higher priority than all other mortgages,17 and a remaining part
of the lien18 would be of a lower priority than previously recorded
mortgages. Here, once the Association foreclosed on the “superpriority lien,” the question became what happened to the interest
of the first mortgage holder? The Court, following section 34–
10. Id.
11. Id. at 900.
12.
Id. at 901; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1-3.16(b) (West,
Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
13.
Botelho, 127 A.3d at 901.
14.
Id.
15.
The operative provision the Court addressed is quite unusual (“[t]he
lien is also prior to any mortgage or deed of trust described in subdivision
(b)(1)(ii) of this section to the extent of the common expense assessments
based on the periodic budget adopted by the [condominium] association . . .
which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the six
(6) months immediately preceding the foreclosure of the interest of the unit
owner including any costs and reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”). § 34-36.13.16(b)(2).
16. Id.; see also § 34-36.1-3.16(b)(1).
17.
Botelho, 127 A.3d at 901 (the first part of the bifurcated lien equates
the “super-priority lien” to the last six months of “common expense
assessments” by the condominium association).
18.
Id. (the second part of the bifurcated lien regards all other liens held
against the condominium unit).
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36.1–1.08 of RICA, looked to “[t]he principles of law and equity” to
“supplement the provisions of this chapter.”19 There, the Court
found a common rule: When a higher priority lien is foreclosed on,
and the property is subject to lower priority liens, the “junior
liens” are extinguished in favor of satisfying the higher priority
lien.20 The Court suggested multiple safeguards lenders could
employ in order to prevent the extinguishment of their security
interest, including simply paying the six months of outstanding
fees to prevent the foreclosure stemming from the “super-priority
lien,” and then adding the amount to the principal balance of the
mortgage.21
The Court then discussed the right of redemption provision,
added to RICA in 2008.22 The right of redemption provision
allows the holder of the first mortgage or deed of trust to redeem
its security interest in the condominium unit by:
[T]endering payment to the association in full of all
assessments due on the unit together with all attorney’s
fees and costs incurred by the association in connection
with the collection and foreclosure process within thirty
(30) days of the date of the post foreclosure sale notice
sent by the association ....... 23
The Court pointed out that this provision evidenced the
Legislature’s intent to have the “super-priority lien” extinguish
the first mortgage because “one cannot redeem what it has not
lost.”24 In its conclusion, the Court pointed out that the bifurcated
lien is indeed a unique scheme.25 However, the Court also gave
heavy weight to the consideration of both the drafters of the
Uniform Condominium Act,26 as well as the Legislature in
19.
Botelho, 127 A.3d at 902; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1-1.08
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
20.
Botelho, 127 A.3d at 902.
21. Id. at 904.
22. Id. at 905; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1-3.21 (West,
Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
23. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 905; see also § 34-36.1-3.21.
24. Botelho, 127 A.3d at 905.
25. Id. at 903.
26. Id. (specifically, the “Commissioners’ Comments to the act describe
the split-lien as ‘[a] significant departure from existing practice’ . . . created
to ‘strike[] an equitable balance between the need to enforce collection of
unpaid assessments and the obvious necessity for protecting the priority of
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adopting and adapting the scheme with notice and redemption
procedures.27
COMMENTARY

The Dissent argued that the statute itself is devoid of any
language regarding extinguishment of the security interest of the
first mortgage holder, which was in accord with the trial justice’s
view.28 Justice Robinson expounded on this point by noting that
the term the Court used to describe the Association’s lien for the
last six months of common assessments, “super-priority,” is also
not found anywhere in the text of the statute.29 The dissent
critiqued what language is in the statute, pointing out that the
Legislature needed to be “clear, precise, and broad” with its use of
language when drafting a provision with such drastic
repercussions.30
The Court’s decision to unsecure a loan through a judicial
interpretation of such an unusual provision in the statute was, by
the Court’s own admission, a hard ruling for mortgage
companies.31 Even though the debt still existed, the mortgagee
here lost its security interest—essentially all it had—because the
mortgagor was most likely judgment proof. The fact that the
Legislature went back to this statute to add in the notice provision
does suggest that it is aware of the “draconian” effects possible
under the statutory scheme as written. However, the law does
create a cap on the amount of money that can exist under the
“super-priority lien,”32 and any additional proceeds from the
foreclosure of the condominium unit can go to the subordinate
priority lenders.33 This strikes an “equitable balance” and
functionally splits the losses among the parties, as the
the security interests of mortgage lenders.’”). Id. (internal citation omitted)
(alterations in original).
27. Id. at 906.
28. Id. at 906–07, 906 n.2 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 906–07.
30.
Id. at 907 (specifically Justice Robinson noted “I do not believe that
any objective speaker of English would be inclined to use those adjectives to
describe the statutory scheme presently before us.”).
31.
See id. at 908.
32.
Id. at 904 (majority opinion).
33.
Id. $13,501.57 was sent to the Defendant as a surplus of the
foreclosure sale, which the Defendant did not accept. Id. at 903 n.7.
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Commissioner’s Comment from the UCA drafters suggested was
their goal.34 It is important to note that the Court based much of
its decision on a similar case decided by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals; however, that case did not include the additional
twist of the right of redemption provision found in RICA.35
Viewing the decision of that case, the conclusion the Court
reached here is not as outlandish as it might otherwise appear.
As a practical matter, it would seem that the Association,
consisting of all the other condominium unit owners, should bear
some cost. The outstanding fees were all for improvements made
to the condominium property as a whole, meaning all of the
condominium owners received some benefit. In the event of an
individual owner not paying the fees associated with that unit, the
security interest in a condominium unit should not be
extinguished to satisfy the outstanding condominium fees. The
value of the foreclosure sale should be proportionately spread to
the secured parties, both the mortgage company and the
condominium association.
From a policy perspective, the decision the Court reached is a
well-reasoned solution to a confusing statute. The Court seems to
suggest that in using the right of redemption, a bank can pay off
the outstanding association fees, thus removing the “superpriority” portion of the condominium association’s lien, returning
the bank mortgage to the highest priority lien.36 At that point,
the bank could foreclose against the property without the
impediment of the Association’s liens. If the bank did not
generate enough proceeds from the foreclosure sale, all other
lower priority liens would be extinguished, just as the first
mortgage was extinguished in this case, and whoever bought the
condominium would own it free of any encumbrances. This is also
a sound policy because it prevents the existence of multiple liens
against the same condominium unit, which would severely impact
the marketability of the unit. Through this process, the
condominium association would have its “super-priority lien” paid
off, and the bank would salvage whatever it could from the
34.
See id. at 903.
35.
See Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
98 A.3d 166 (D.C. 2014).
36.
Botelho, 127 A.3d at 905 (the Court essentially refers to this process
as a “conditional foreclosure”).
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property.
However, the use of the phrase “all assessments due on the
unit” in the right of redemption provision would suggest that in
order to redeem its security interest, a holder of a first mortgage
would be required to pay not just the “super-priority” portion of
outstanding fees but also the junior priority lien of any fees owed
to the association that fall outside of the “super-priority” section.37
If the intention of the Legislature was to give some protection
against the harshness of the “super-priority lien,” it would be
prudent to insert a specific, right-of-redemption provision in which
only that section of the outstanding fees, which constitute the
“super-priority,” should be paid by the holder of the first
mortgage, in order to redeem its security interest. The Court
seemed to send a message to lenders and the Legislature—that
this is the practical effect of the law as written, and lenders should
learn it and adapt to it. The dissent shined a spotlight on the
ambiguous and confusing language of the statute, presumably in
an effort to drive the Legislature to clarify certain aspects. Either
way, the Legislature should scrutinize the RICA series of statutes
after this ruling, as other parties have noted.38
CONCLUSION

The Court ruled that the mortgage holder’s security interest
in a condominium unit was extinguished when the valid
foreclosure by the condominium association on its statutorily
created “super-priority lien” failed to yield enough proceeds to
satisfy the association’s lien. In doing so, the Court navigated a
confusing section of the RICA to a well-reasoned and practical
ruling.
James Caleb Bass

37.
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1-3.21 (West, Westlaw through Jan.
2016 Legis. Sess.).
38.
See Cale P. Keable and Santiago H. Posas, Rhode Island Supreme
Court Rules That Condominium Assessment Liens Could Extinguish FirstPriority Mortgages, Partridge Snow & Hahn LLP (Jan. 2016),
http://www.psh.com/?t=40&an=52377&anc=742&format=xml.

Premise Liability. Roy v. State, 139 A.3d 480 (R.I. 2016). The
Rhode Island Recreational Use Statute provides limited liability
protection to landowners who either “directly or indirectly invite[]
or permit[] without charge any person to use that property for
recreational purposes.” In addition, the danger of diving is an
“open and obvious” danger.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On July 10, 2008, Brett A. Roy (Roy) walked from his car to a
pond at the World War II Veterans Memorial Park in Woonsocket,
Rhode Island, and dove into the water.1 Due to the shallowness of
the pond, Roy became paralyzed from the neck down; the injuries
sustained by Roy were damaging to Roy, his wife, Dawn K. Roy
(collectively, Plaintiffs), and the Plaintiffs’ two children.2 The
Plaintiffs filed an action alleging several counts of negligence and
premise liability against the Department of Environmental
Management (DEM) and two individuals in their official
capacities as DEM employees (collectively, State).3 During the
trial, the director of DEM at the time of the incident, W. Michael
Sullivan (Sullivan), testified that he made the decision to have the
pond filled in June 2008, and that DEM operated the facility with
the “expect[ation] that there would be people . . . using the [pond]”
even when DEM prohibited swimming-at-your-own-risk.4 The
Associate Director of Natural Resources for DEM, Larry
Mouradjian (Mouradjian), testified that the pond has a
“designated lap pool, a swim area, and a diving platform.”5
Mouradjian also described that “diving near the wall into the lap

1. Roy v. State, 139 A.3d 480, 482, 485 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id. at 482.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 483. DEM operated the pond with the assumption that when
there were “no[] lifeguards present at [the] swimming facility, that the
swimming facility was closed.” Id.
5. Id.
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pool would be dangerous because it was too shallow”6 and believed
that the pond should be drained or left empty due to lack of
preparation needed for the pond.7 The DEM Deputy Chief of the
Rhode Island Division of Parks and Recreation, John Faltus
(Faltus), also testified at trial.8 Faltus stated that diving is
generally not allowed; however, “[p]eople [were] allowed to
possibly do some shallow entry dives.”9
Seasonal laborer for DEM Kenneth Henderson testified that
on the day of July 10, 2008, he “saw ‘about half a dozen’ people
swimming in the pond.”10 Some of the people present on the day
of the incident testified differently as to what took place that day.
One witness described Roy’s dive into the pond as that of a “belly
flop kind of dive; not a complete dive.”11 Another witness
described Roy’s movement before the incident as if he was
“r[unning], like you run when you bowl,” followed by a shallow
dive.12 The witness who accompanied Roy to the pond on that day
testified that Roy jogged from the car to the pond and as Roy was
diving “t[old] him not to dive over there . . . because it was shallow
water.”13 Roy stated in a deposition that he “never saw a sign
that said ‘[n]o [s]wimming.’”14 Prior to jumping in, Roy stated
that he checked the depth of the water by looking at the water,
which he described as being “murky,” and that he “definitely
couldn’t see the bottom.”15 Roy also described his dive to be a
shallow dive and that no one said anything to him when he
conducted a dive in the same spot the previous year.16 Roy
admitted that “the way that [he] check[ed] the depth of the
water . . . was probably irresponsible . . . .”17
The trial justice denied both parties’ motions for judgment as

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (alterations in original).
10. Id. at 484.
11. Id. at 485.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (alterations in original).
15. Id. Roy believed that if the water were too shallow he would be able
to see the bottom. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (alterations in original).
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a matter of law after all evidence was presented.18 After an
extensive trial, a jury returned a verdict for the State on question
one, finding “that the [S]tate had not ‘willfully or maliciously
failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure or activity’ or against a ‘non-obvious, latent dangerous
condition’ at the pond.’”19 As a result, both parties made renewed
motions for judgment as a matter of law.20 The State supported
it’s motion by arguing that the Plaintiffs did not meet their
standards to find that the State was liable under the Recreational
Use Statute and that, as a matter of law, Roy’s conduct was
“‘highly dangerous’ and ‘no duty was owed to him.’”21 The
Plaintiffs argued that the “[S]tate’s witnesses admitted sufficient
facts at trial to establish the [S]tate’s liability as a matter of law
under the Recreational Use Statute.”22 However, the Plaintiffs
also moved for a “new trial on damages, or, in the alternative, a
new trial on all the issues.”23 The trial justice denied both parties’
motions for judgment as a matter of law and granted the
Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial on all the issues, but the State
timely appealed this decision, and Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal.24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In reviewing the appeals, The Rhode Island Supreme Court
limited its review to the State’s renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law because the Court concluded that the State owed no
duty to Roy.25 Furthermore, in order for the Court to review the
trial justice’s decision on the motion, the Court was bound to
follow “the same rules and legal standards [that] govern the trial
justice.”26 Essentially, the Court “must examine ‘the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing
the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and draw[]
from the record all reasonable inferences that support the position
18. Id.
19. Id. at 486, 487.
20. Id. at 487.
21.
Id. The State also argued that Roy assumed the risk of injury by
failing to check the pond’s depth before diving into the murky water. See id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25. Id. at 488.
26. Id. (quoting Hough v. McKiernan, 108 A.3d 1030, 1035 (R.I. 2015)).
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of the nonmoving party.’”27 After the Court reviewed
the
evidence, it should enter a judgment as a matter of law “when the
evidence permits only one legitimate conclusion in regard to the
outcome.”28
Upon review, the Court initially sought to determine whether
the State was liable under the Recreational Use Statute.29 The
Court recounted that the purpose of the statute was to provide
limited liability to owners of land and water areas made available
to the public for recreational use.30 The Court noted that the 1996
Amendment to the statute clearly showed that the “[L]egislature
intended to include the state and municipalities among owners
entitled to immunity under the statute.”31 The Court determined
that the statute only provides limited liability and not that of
absolute.32 The statute does not extend its liability limitations
towards willful or malicious conduct.33 The State further argued
that the Plaintiffs’ evidence did not establish that the State
“willfully and/or maliciously failed to warn against a dangerous
condition.”34 The Plaintiffs cited Berman v. Sitrin;35 there the
defendants were found to have specific knowledge regarding
“multiple incidents of death and grievous injury” that could occur
with any individual that uses their property, such as the
plaintiff.36 The Plaintiffs argued that the case at hand is
comparable to Berman because the “shallow water and dangers of
diving [into the pond] at this particular facility were not obvious to
users . . . yet were in fact known to [the State].”37 However, in the
case at hand, when it comes to the pond, only “relatively minor
injur[ies] [had been] reported several days before Roy’s
catastrophic injuries.”38 The Court concluded that this case is
27. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Perry v. Alessi, 890 A.2d 463, 467
(R.I. 2006)).
28. Id. (quoting Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 252 (R.I.
1996)).
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 488–89.
34. Id. at 489.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1051 (R.I. 2010)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 490.
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distinguishable from Berman, and found that the Plaintiffs did not
show the State to have “willful[ly] or malicious[ly] fail[ed] to guard
or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity
after discovering [a] user’s peril.”39 Thus, the Court concluded
that the State’s motion for judgment as a matter of law should
have been granted.40
However, even if the Recreational Use Statute did not apply,
the Court found that it is of common knowledge that the “danger
of diving in and of itself is an ‘open and obvious’ danger,” as to
preclude liability.41 Lastly, to support its finding, the Court
recounted the evidence that Roy “admit[ted] he was aware of” the
dangers of diving into shallow water.42 The Court concluded that
Roy must have had knowledge and an appreciation of the risk
because “[u]ltimately, it was [Roy’s] own behavior that caused his
injuries.”43
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court definitively analyzed the
purpose of the Recreational Use Statute and its authority to limit
the liability of landowners with land or water areas for public
recreational usage, ultimately concluding that the State was
protected by the statute and owed no duty to Roy.44 The Court
correctly bound themselves to the same standard as those of the
trial justice because the Court explained that in reviewing a trial
justice’s decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is
bound to follow the “same rules and legal standards as govern the
trial justice.”45 The Court’s ruling continues to make the
immunity granted by the Recreational Use Statute possible for
landowners of property used for recreational purposes, but that
immunity should not be mistaken as absolute immunity. If the
Recreational Use Statute were to be read as an absolute
limitation, it would render any injury sustained by the public to be
unrecoverable, even if such injuries were caused willfully or
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (quoting Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491, 496 (R.I. 2007)).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. (first alteration in original).
Id. at 488.
Id.
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maliciously by the State. This standard not only protects the
rights of the public to still have standing, but also still allows
owners such as the State to provide its land for recreation
purposes to the public.
The Court’s ruling also upheld the requirements that need to
be taken by the nonmoving parties to make a reasonable effort
during its presentation of evidence in order to readdress their
injuries as a matter of law. It would be unreasonable for the
Court to redress an injury just because a party has such daunting
injuries and to exclude the rights granted by the Legislature for
owners of land. The Court correctly noted that the State did
“admit knowledge of the unique features of the pond,” but that
Roy also admitted knowledge of the dangers and continued to dive
in to the pond.46
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld that landowners
have limited liability protection under Recreational Use Statute
with regards to their property used for recreational purposes.
Furthermore, the Court held that the dangers of diving are an
open and obvious danger.
Jonathan L. Pierre

46.

Id. at 489.

Property Law. Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., v. Mardo, 140 A.3d 106
(R.I. 2016). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in a case
that presents exceptional and unique circumstances, a balancing
of the equities can justify a deviation, in the exercise of sound
discretion, from their general rule regarding the remedy for a
continuing trespass if it can be shown that undue hardship will
burden one of the parties.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Goat Island South Condominium (GIS) is a 154-unit residency
that consists of Harbor Houses Condominium (Harbor House),
America Condominium (America), and Capella Condominium
(Capella)—three residential sub-condominium areas.1 GIS is
comprised of nineteen, stand-alone, townhouse, residence units
located in Harbor House; forty-six, single-residence units located
in America; and eighty-nine residence units in Capella.2 Each subcondominium within GIS is subject to separate association
governance and declarations; however, residents must also adhere
to the provisions of GIS’s master declaration.3
On April 19, 2011, Plaintiffs, America and Capella, initiated
the instant action against Defendants, Stefania M. Mardo, as
Trustee of the Constellation Trust–2011 (the Trust), and Harbor
House, seeking injunctive relief to prevent the expansion of Unit
18 located in Harbor House.4 Plaintiffs’ original complaint alleged
that Defendants breached the GIS Second Amended and Restated
Declaration of Condominium (SAR), violated restrictive covenants,
committed a common law trespass, and violated Rhode Island’s
Condominium Act (the Act).5
1. Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mardo, 140 A.3d 106, 109 (R.I. 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id. All four of these associations and declarations must adhere to
Rhode Island’s Condominium Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36.1. Id.
4. Id. at 110. Bernie Sisto, the father of trustee Stefania Mardo, was
entered into the suit as “an additional trustee.” Id.
5. Id.
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A bench trial was held on various days between May and
September of 2011.6 During the trial, Bernie Sisto testified
regarding the expansion of Unit 18.7 During his testimony, Mr.
Sisto stated that although the Trust had expanded the walls of
Unit 18; the walls were built on an existing foundation that the
previous owners had constructed as a part of their expansion
project on the property in 2000 and 2001.8 Mr. Sisto testified that
when he purchased Unit 18, he had built on the foundation that
the previous owners had laid out, which they had used as a patio
and back deck.9 Mr. Sisto further testified that the foundation
had not been intended as a patio or back deck, but was in fact
intended to be a part of a “proposed building expansion” by the
prior owners.10 Mr. Sisto testified that it was his belief that a
prior court had ordered the foundation to be put into the ground,
but that the parties agreed not to continue construction until that
case was entirely resolved.11 Mr. Sisto further testified that “ten
(10) of the nineteen (19) Harbor House unit owners ha[d]
expanded over the years, including most recently in 2008.”12
Finally, Mr. Sisto testified that he had communicated via e-mail
with the President of the GIS Board, Natalie Volpe, in which she
requested that he not take further action in his expansion without
the unanimous consent of all 154 unit owners.13 Mr. Sisto
believed this email to be the “personal opinion of Ms. Volpe, not
the opinion of the GIS Board, since [t]hey did not vote on [it].”14
The president and the owner of America testified that they had
not provided consent for the expansion of Harbor House Unit 18,
although the president testified that she knew of at least one
Harbor House expansion in the past.15
On August 22, 2012, the trial justice rendered her decision,
finding that the Defendants had acted in violation of the Act,
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The “expansion was confined to the existing foundation, which
was on the property when he purchased it.” Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 111.
13. Id.
14. Id. (alterations in original).
15. Id.
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whose statutory provisions require a unanimous vote from all unit
owners.16 Moreover, the trial justice found that since the GIS
SAR was subject to the Act, Defendants had also violated its
requirements.17 The trial justice further granted Plaintiffs’
request for injunctive relief to preclude Unit 18 from further
expansion but did not grant Plaintiffs’ request that she issue a
mandatory injunction requiring the Trust to remove all
construction beyond its “pre-expansion footprint.”18 Plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees and further costs were not awarded.19
The trial justice entered final judgment on February 25, 2014,
and held that: (1) the expansion provisions as provided in the GIS
SAR violated the Act and were unenforceable; (2) defendants had
breached sections 2.3(a)(i)(A)&(M) and 11.1(b) of the GIS SAR; (3)
count three of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleging a violation of
restrictive covenants was moot; and (4) that the Trust had
committed a common law trespass.20
The Plaintiffs appealed three issues: (1) that the trial justice
had erroneously “failed to issue a mandatory permanent
injunction” to remove the trespass despite properly finding that
there had been one; (2) the trial justice erred in ruling Plaintiffs’
count three as moot; and (3) that the trial justice had committed
an error of law when she failed to recognize a contractual basis for
awarding attorneys’ fees as was provided by GIS SAR.21 The
Trust brought a cross-appeal arguing that: (1) the trial justice
erred as a matter of law in her ruling that the Trust breached the
GIS SAR; and (2) the trial justice committed error when she ruled
that the Trust committed a trespass.22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court conducted a de novo review, applying the laws of
contract
construction
in
evaluating
the condominium

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 111, 112.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 113.
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declaration.23 The Court stated that it would read all clear and
unambiguous terms as they are written.24 Further,
when
examining a judgment in a non-jury trial, the Court will reverse
the judgment only if it can be shown that “the trial justice
misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material
evidence[,] or made factual findings that were clearly wrong.”25
The Court held that the trial justice did not commit error when
she determined that the Trust had breached the GIS SAR or when
she ruled that the Plaintiffs’ count three alleging restrictive
covenants violation was moot.26 However, the Court did find error
in the trial justice’s failure to award attorneys’ fees and other
costs to the Plaintiffs based on the Trust’s violation of the GIS
SAR.27 Further, the Court held that the trial justice had not
abused her discretion in issuing an injunctive order to halt further
expansion of Unit 18 despite not issuing an injunctive order
requiring the removal of the expanded part of Unit 18 (“the
trespass”).28
A. The GIS SAR
The Court first addressed the Trust’s cross-appeal contention
that the trial court erred in ruling that they had violated the GIS
SAR by expanding Unit 18.29 The Trust argued that since the
trial justice had ruled that section 2.3 of the GIS SAR, which
prohibits the expansion, violated the Act, its provisions are
therefore “unenforceable and cannot form the basis of a breach of
contract.”30 The Court stated that the Act required unanimous
23.
Id. “The contract must be viewed in its entirety, and the contract
terms must be assigned their plain and ordinary language.” Id. (quoting
Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I. 2004)).
24.
Id. “The Court will refrain from engaging in mental gymnastics or
from stretching the imagination to read ambiguity into a [contract] where
none is present.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Bliss Mine Road
Condo. Ass’n v. Nationwide Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 11 A.3d 1078, 1083 (R.I.
2010)).
25.
Id. at 117 (alteration in original) (quoting Rose Nulman Park Found.
ex rel. Nulman v. Four Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 28 (R.I. 2014)).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28. Id. at 120.
29. Id. at 113.
30.
Id. The Trust further argued that §11.1(b) of the GIS SAR was not
applicable. The language in §11.1(b) is as follows: “Consistent with
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consent of all 154 unit owners before any expansion or changes in
boundaries of any unit could be made, and section 11.1(b) of the
GIS
SAR
“clearly
and
unambiguously
echoes
that
requirement . . . .”31 Relying on Mr. Sisto’s testimony at trial
where he conceded to lacking unanimous consent from all 154 unit
owners, the Court held that the Trust had violated section 11.1(b)
of the GIS SAR.32
The Court then addressed the Plaintiffs’ appeal regarding the
mootness of count three in their complaint.33 In count three of
their complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Trust had violated
the “restrictive covenants that lie with the land” when it expanded
Unit 18 and changed the boundaries of the Unit without obtaining
the required amendment.34 The Court stated that since the trial
justice had found that there was a breach of contract and a
common law trespass, she had awarded what she considered to be
appropriate damages based on Plaintiffs’ complaint and their
relief sought.35 The Court further acknowledged that the
Plaintiffs requested the same relief in count two (breach of GIS
SAR) and in count three.36 As it follows, the Court stated that
deciding the breach of contract claim and awarding damages was
within the discretion of the trial justice, and that she did not
commit an error in declining to “contend with the restrictive
covenants claim since it was not necessary for her to do so.”37
The third issue the Court addressed was Plaintiffs’ contention
that the trial justice had committed an error of law when she
subsection 34-36.1-2.17(d) of the Act, except to the extent expressly permitted
or required by the Act, no amendment may . . . change the boundaries of any
Unit . . . in the absence of unanimous consent of the Unit Owners.” Id. at 114
(emphasis added).
31.
Id.
32.
Id. The Trust then argued that it could not have breached §11.1(b)
of the GIS SAR because that section specifically applies to amendment of the
GIS SAR, and in this case the Trust had not sought an amendment to the
GIS SAR. Id. The Court held that the fact that the Trust did not seek an
amendment “does not change the fact that the Act requires the Trust to seek
such an amendment before expanding boundaries of the unit and that the
GIS SAR incorporates that requirement in §11.1(b).” Id. Accordingly, the
court held that §11.1(b) clearly applies to this case. Id.
33. Id. at 114–15.
34. Id. at 115.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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failed to award them attorneys’ fees and costs.38 The Court
indicated that it has long adhered to the “American rule”39 in
determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and other costs.40
The Court looked at section 11.3 of the GIS SAR, which it believed
to be relevant pertaining to Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys’ fees
and other costs.41 The Court found that the plain language of
section11.3 of the GIS SAR clearly did provide a basis for an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the present case.42 Having
found a valid basis for awarding attorneys’ fees and other costs,
the Court then turned to the issue of whether the trial justice had
abused her discretion in not awarding such damages.43 The Court
read section 11.3 of the GIS SAR to specifically focus on the word
“shall” in the sentence that dictates the mandatory award of
attorneys’ fees and other costs stemming from a breach of the GIS
SAR.44 Reading the terms of the contract and applying them as
they are written, the Court held that there was a valid basis for an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs to exist, and that the trial
justice had abused her discretion in not awarding them to
Plaintiffs.45
B. Trespass
In its cross-appeal, the Trust argued that the trial justice had
committed an error as a matter of law when she ruled that the
expansion of Unit 18 created a common law trespass because “the
area over which the expansion was made is property that the
Trust owns [as a tenant in common] and had the exclusive right to
use” and because the “the Trust had the consent of GIS and
Harbor Houses.”46 The Trust relied on the established fact that
38. Id. The Trust argued that because the expansion provisions of §2.3
in the GIS SAR were found to be unenforceable, a breach of that section
would not be a valid basis for awarding attorney’s fees and other costs under
the GIS SAR. Id.
39. The American rule requires that each litigant pays his or her own
attorneys’ fees absent a statutory authority or finding of contractual liability.
Id.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 115–16.
42. Id. at 116.
43. Id. (citing Dauray v. Mee, 109 A.3d 832, 845 (R.I. 2015)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 117.
46. Id. (alteration in original).
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the original expansion of Harbor House Unit 18 had begun back in
2000–2001 by the previous owners, and that his construction of
the expanded walls on Unit 18 merely completed what the
previous owners had started.47 The Trust further relied on the
fact that the previous owners had been given express
authorization by the Superior Court to expand Unit 18.48 The
Court reviewed the trial justice’s finding that the expansion of
Unit 18 created an encroachment upon a common area, which
caused “a de facto alteration of the percentage of the undivided
interest which each owner has in the common areas . . . .”49 The
Court ruled that despite the Trust building on the previous
owner’s foundation, it had still committed a trespass by
appropriating the limited common area for their own use, and
therefore the trial justice had not committed error in finding that
a trespass had occurred.50
The final issue the Court addressed was the Plaintiffs’
contention that because the trial justice had found a “continuing
trespass” she had committed error when she failed to mandate an
injunction to remove the trespass.51 The Plaintiffs argued that
the removal of a trespass is required by law unless an “exceptional
circumstance” is present, which they argued was not applicable.52
Plaintiffs further contended that the injunction they sought to
remove the trespass would not “operate oppressively or
inequitably.”53 In addressing these arguments, the Court cited
Rose Nulman Park Foundation ex rel. Nulman v. Four Twenty
Corp. in which it stated a general rule for injunctions as they
relate to a continuing trespass.54 The rule states that a
47. Id. at 110.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 117 (quoting Strauss v. Oyster River Condo. Trust, No.
114843, 1992 WL 12153337, at *23 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 27, 1992)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 117–18. The Plaintiffs pointed to the record and argued that
the trial justice did not cite to any exceptional circumstances in this case,
therefore removal of the trespass is required by law. Id. at 118. The
Plaintiffs also argued that the Trust had notice and a warning from Ms.
Volpe that their expansion violated the GIS SAR and the Act, so no
exceptional circumstances existed here and balancing of the equities should
not be considered in this case. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In another notable case, the Court stated:
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continuing trespass “wrongfully interferes with the legal rights of
the owner, and in the usual case those rights cannot be adequately
protected except by an injunction which will eliminate the
trespass.”55 However, exceptional circumstances exist when a
substantial right of the landowner may be properly protected
without ordering an injunction, which would otherwise operate
oppressively and inequitably.56 If, after balancing the equities, a
court finds that there would be an undue hardship to one of the
parties, then an exceptional circumstance exists.57
However, this Court noted that when an intentional trespass
occurs where the defendant continues to proceed with the trespass
despite notice or warning, it will not consider exceptional
circumstances.58 Plaintiffs argue that the Trust was put on notice
and given warning by the e-mail from Mr. Sisto.59 However, the
Court agreed with the Trust that the e-mail merely reflected Ms.
Volpe’s own opinion and that it was not an official notice or
warning after a vote was taken by the GIS.60 The Court agreed
that the Trust, through Mr. Sisto, could not be certain that when
Unit 18 was being expanded that they had to do any more than
comply with the terms of the GIS SAR as they understood them.61
The Superior Court decisions at issue here were still pending on
appeal to the Supreme Court, and the issue as to whether or not
unanimous approval of the other condominium owners was
required for expansion had not been concretely decided when Ms.
[T]he owner of land is entitled to a mandatory injunction to require
the removal of a structure that has been unlawfully placed upon his
land, and the fact that such owner has suffered little or no damage
because of the offending structure, or that it was erected in good
faith, or that the cost of its removal would be greatly
disproportionate to the benefit accruing to the plaintiff form its
removal, is not a bar to the granting of [injunctive] relief. However,
the existence of such circumstances may in exceptional cases move
the court to withhold the [injunctive] relief contemplated by the
general rule.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Santilli v. Morelli, 230 A.2d 860, 863
(R.I. 1967).
55. Id. at 118.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. See id.
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 119.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Volpe e-mailed Mr. Sisto.62 The Court considered this to be an
exceptional circumstance, which justified balancing the equities.63
In addition to the exceptional circumstance mentioned above,
the Court emphasized the important fact then when the Trust
bought Unit 18, the previous owners had already constructed a
foundation in anticipation of an approved expansion.64 The Trust
was made aware that the Superior Court had specifically ordered
that the previous owners be allowed to proceed with their
construction and that the GIS Board had approved the expansion
as no resident had objected to it.65 The Court stated that the
Trust had acted in good faith when it had reasonably believed that
it was able to expand on the existing foundation laid out by the
previous owners.66 Further, the Court reminded itself that the
Plaintiffs had originally sought a preliminary injunction against
the Trust but had “failed to litigate vigorously in pursuit of such
an injunction,” and had allowed their motion to be advanced to
trial on the merits.67 During that time, the expansion on Unit 18
was completed. The Court concluded that requiring the removal
of the now-completed expansion on Unit 18, thus removing the
trespass, would be “enormously oppressive, both logistically and
financially.”68
The Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse her
discretion in issuing an injunctive order against the expansion of
Unit 18 while not issuing an injunctive order to remove the
trespass.69
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly stated that when a
62. Id.
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Court also considered the important facts that the Trust’s
expansion was actually smaller than the intended expansion by the previous
owners, and that other Harbor Houses units had expanded in the past. Id.
67. Id. at 120.
68. Id. at 119. The Plaintiffs are not affected by the Court’s decision not
to remove the expansion. Id. “The expansion is on land designated for the
exclusive use of Unit 18, and there is no allegation that the expansion is
affecting the water views of any resident or is otherwise a material
inconvenience for the other residents.” Id.
69. Id. at 120.
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trespass occurs an injunction mandating the removal of that
trespass is required by law; however, exceptional circumstances
may exist where it must balance the equities before issuing the
injunction.70 Where a substantial right of a landowner may be
safeguarded without resorting to an injunction, to order that
injunction would be oppressive and inequitable.71 However, when
adequate notice and warning are given to a potential trespasser
and are not heeded, the Court will not balance the equities to
consider a hardship to the wrongful party.72
As such, the Court correctly took into account that not all
trespasses are the same, and therefore application of remedies will
also differ. Clearly, requiring the Defendants in this case to
remove the trespass would qualify as an immense hardship on
their behalf. Although not specifically mentioned by the Court,
the Defendants would be faced with both economic and
environmental hardship had they been required to remove the
expansion from Unit 18. In recognizing this hardship, the Court
properly decided that removing the trespass was a justified
deviation to their general rule.
However, despite the Court’s exception to their general rule,
they correctly held that the trial judge did err in not awarding
attorney’s fees to the Plaintiffs. In his concurrence, Justice
Flaherty agreed with the Court’s opinion that the trial justice’s
discretion did not permit her to decline to award attorney’s fees by
stating that “the parties have a right to the benefit of their
bargain.”73 When parties enter into a contractual agreement part
of that bargain is agreeing to certain terms, such as awarding of
attorney’s fees should litigation result from any breach of the
contract. Both parties are free to agree or disagree to those terms.
The trial justice erred when she disregarded that agreement
between the parties and declined to award attorney’s fees. Had
she been correct in that decision, bargaining between parties
when coming to an agreement would essentially be counterproductive.

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 118 (citation omitted).
Id. at 118 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 121 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice
did not abuse her discretion in finding that the Trust had
committed a trespass.74 However, conflictingly, the Court found
that the trial justice did not err in failing to issue a mandatory
injunction required by the law to remove the continuing trespass
that is Unit 18.75 Further, the Court held that the trial justice did
not err in ruling Plaintiffs’ count three as moot and did not err in
determining that the Trust breached the GIS SAR.76 However,
the Court held that the trial justice did abuse her discretion in
failing to award attorneys’ fees and other costs to Plaintiffs based
on the terms of the GIS SAR.77
Sophie Bellacosa

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Public Records. Providence Journal Co. v. R.I. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 136 A.3d 1168 (R.I. 2016). Records that could reasonably
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy do not have to be disclosed by a governmental agency
under the Access to Public Records Act (APRA) if the records
would otherwise be in the public interest. A citizen seeking to
compel disclosure of records for the public interest, over the
privacy interest, to uncover government negligence or impropriety
must provide evidence of government negligence or impropriety,
not just mere speculation or suspicion.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On May 28, 2012, Caleb Chafee (Caleb), the son of thenGovernor Lincoln Chafee, hosted a party on property owned by the
then-Governor where alcohol was consumed by some underage
attendees, resulting in an underage, female attendee being taken
to the hospital for an alcohol-related illness after leaving the
party.1 Following this, the Rhode Island State Police2 went to the
property to conduct an investigation, which yielded 186 pages of
investigative documents.3 Caleb was charged with furnishing or
procurement of alcoholic beverages for underage persons.4 On
August 22, 2012, Caleb pled nolo contendere in Rhode Island
District Court, receiving a $500 civil penalty, and on March 13,
2013, Caleb’s motion to expunge his record was granted by the
District Court judge.5
1. Providence Journal Co. v. R.I. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 136 A.3d 1168,
1170 (R.I. 2016).
2. The property is located in the town of Exeter, which does not have a
local police force, so the State Police responded to the incident. Id. n.1.
3. Id. at 1170–71.
4. Id. at 1171. The 186-page report included witness lists, witness
statements, land evidence records, and narrative reports written by various
officers. Id. The investigation led to Caleb being charged under R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 3-8-11.1 (2010), the Social Host Law. Id.
5. Id.
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Seeking information, on June 21, 2012, a Providence Journal
Company (Journal) reporter requested by email for the state
police to provide copies of the reports of Caleb’s incident.6 The
reason given for the request was that it would be “in the public
interest to know how the situation was handled regarding the
governor’s son—especially since the state police answer directly to
the governor.”7 The Rhode Island Department of Public Safety
denied the request because the records were part of an ongoing
criminal investigation, and the records could reasonably be
expected to be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.8 The
reporter sent another request on August 21, 2012, which was
denied for similar privacy concerns.9 The Journal made a similar
request on September 5, 2012, which was denied for the same
reason.10
Unable to get the information by request, the Journal filed a
complaint in Providence County Superior Court, alleging violation
of the APRA, the United States Constitution, and the Rhode
Island Constitution.11 Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment, and after the hearing justice reviewed the documents
and the parties’ memoranda and heard oral arguments, summary
judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.12 The hearing
justice determined that the Journal had failed to demonstrate “a
belief by a reasonable person that alleged government impropriety
might have occurred,” that “disclosure would not advance the
public interest,” and that even if the documents were to be
redacted, it would be clear that it would be Caleb’s event that was
being investigated.13 The Journal appealed the decision.14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered the
grant of summary judgment and the interpretation of APRA de
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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novo.15 Furthermore, when public interests and privacy interests
are balanced for disclosure purposes by a trial justice, the Court
gives the same amount of deference as it would to a trial justice’s
finding of fact, overturning the decision only if the trial justice
“overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise
clearly wrong.”16
The Court then turned to the function of the APRA and found
that its purpose is to provide the public access to public records,
but to also protect against an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.17 To effectuate this purpose, APRA was drafted with a
general rule of disclosure that provides that all records kept by a
public body are public records, which every person has the right
to, subject to exception.18 “Public records” include
all documents, paper, letters, maps, books, tapes,
photographs, films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes,
electronic data processing records, computer stored data . . . or
other material . . . made or received pursuant to law or ordinance
or in connection with the transaction of official business by any
agency.19
Furthermore, the APRA categorizes certain records as nonpublic records that include those “maintained by law enforcement
agencies for criminal law enforcement and all records relating to
the detection and investigation of crime, including those
maintained on any individual or compiled in the course of a
criminal investigation by any law enforcement agency.”20
However, these records are considered to be non-public only “to
15. Id. When conducting a de novo review of a grant of a motion for
summary judgment, the Court applies the “same standards and rules as did
the motion justice,” and the Court views the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1172–73. Likewise, when
conducting a de novo review of a trial justice’s ruling concerning the
interpretation of a statute, the Court strives to “to give effect to the purpose
of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Id. at 1173 (citation omitted).
Furthermore, the statute “may not be construed in a way that would . . .
defeat the underlying purpose of the enactment.” Id. (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 1173 (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 1173; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 38-2-1 (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
18. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1173–74; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 38-2-3(a) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
19. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1174.
20. Id. at 1174; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 38-2-2(4)(D)(c) (West,
Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
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the extent that disclosure of the records or information . . . could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.”21
Because the APRA is similar to the Freedom of Information
Act and contains a similar privacy exemption for law enforcement
records,22 the Court looked to federal case law to aid in its
interpretation of APRA and found the United States Supreme
Court’s framework in National Archives and Records
Administration v. Favish23 worthy of adoption.24 The U.S.
Supreme Court found that the term “unwarranted” requires a
balancing of the privacy interest against the public interest in
disclosure, and the method of balancing requires a two-step test
that the citizen must use to prove that he or she is entitled to the
records at issue.25 The test requires that the citizen first show
that “the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one,
an interest more specific than having the information for its own
sake,” and secondly, that the citizen show that “the information is
likely to advance that interest.”26 Before proceeding with the
Favish test, the Court first dispensed with the APRA rule that the
requesting citizen has no duty to provide a reason for desiring the
requested records because the Favish test requires that such a
rule be inapplicable in order to balance the competing interests.27
Taking up the Favish test, the Court concluded that the
Journal’s reason for seeking the records, i.e., to potentially
uncover government negligence or impropriety, lacked an
evidentiary basis that showed any government negligence or
impropriety.28 The Court held that the Journal sought the records
under a suspicion or speculation that responsible government
21. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1174; see also § 38-2-2(4)(D)(c).
It is this exemption that is the basis of the appeal.
22. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1174; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552
(West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).
23. 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (considering the applicability of this exemption
to certain photographs of a decedent’s body at the scene of death).
24. Providence Journal Co., 136 A.3d at 1175.
25. Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 171).
26. Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172). Normally, only the public body
has to provide a reason for withholding a requested record, and this APRA
rule is similar to a rule in the Freedom of Information Act. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172).
28. Id. at 1175, 1177.
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officials acted improperly in the performance of their duties, but
that this is not enough, and that the requester “must produce
evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that
the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.”29 The
Court determined that the Favish standard may be inapplicable in
cases where a party has another reason, other than government
impropriety, for requesting the records, but that the Journal had
not offered such an additional reason.30 The Court afforded a
“presumption of legitimacy accorded to the Government’s official
conduct . . . and where the presumption is applicable, clear
evidence is needed to displace it.”31 The Court found that the
State Police had performed a comprehensive investigation of
Caleb’s violation of the Social Host Law, given by its compilation
of 186 pages of documents, which resulted in Caleb being charged,
and that the Journal provided no evidence that any government
official acted negligently or improperly in doing so.32 The
Journal’s mere speculation that there was some impropriety due
to the then-Governor’s position was not enough, and thus the
Journal failed the Favish test.33
While the Journal had failed the Favish test, the Court
continued its analysis in order to evaluate the privacy interests at
stake.34 The Court held that Caleb’s privacy interest was not
diminished because the incident received media attention, as the
media coverage revealed none of the intimate details of the
incident, except the charge against Caleb.35 The Court further
held that Caleb’s privacy interest was not diminished by his nolo
contendere plea because that only applies to the fact that he was
convicted, not to the facts underlying such a conviction.36
The Court ultimately concluded that Caleb’s privacy interest
29. Id. at 1175 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174).
30. Id. at 1176.
31. Id. at 1176 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 174).
32. Id. at 1176–77.
33. Id. at 1177.
34.
Id. The Court did so for completeness and future guidance. Id.
However, the Court did not consider the privacy interests of third parties. Id.
at 1177 n.7.
35.
Id. “The privacy interest at stake flows not from the widespread
knowledge of the fact that Caleb was charged, but, instead, from the
information and personal details that may have been discovered in the police
investigation.” Id.
36. Id. at 1178.
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was significant,37 the Journal’s unsubstantiated assertion of
possible government impropriety due to the then-Governor’s
position did not permit disclosure, the trial justice did not err or
overlook evidence, and under the APRA records need not be
disclosed where such disclosure could create an unwarranted
invasion of privacy.38
COMMENTARY

With regards to both public and private interests, the Court
struck a sensible balance between the competing interests, and
interpreted the APRA to give it its intended purpose. Naturally,
citizens have an interest in public institutions, and that interest
requires citizens be granted access to information contained in
those institutions; however, those institutions contain sensitive,
personal information that should sometimes be prohibited from
members of the general public. If all information given to public
institutions were available to every member of the public, then no
information would remain private. The Court and the APRA
appropriately address this concern by protecting against
unwarranted invasions of privacy in the disclosure of records.
Law enforcement agencies are but one of these public
institutions that acquire personal information for its own function.
If law enforcement agencies could not investigate personal,
intimate details, then its investigative abilities would be so
diminished as to render the enforcement of crime immensely
difficult. As the Court notes, for “documents developed by law
enforcement in the investigation of a private individual, the
privacy interest is considerable and should not be easily displaced
absent a particularly noteworthy public interest.”39 Furthermore,
this information is not likely made available to the public by the
suspect without the investigation, and it should not automatically
become public information by virtue of its inclusion in an
investigative police report. The information in the report is likely
to include personal information that was not voluntarily given by
the suspect, or was voluntarily given under the notion that it will
37. The Court considered only Caleb’s privacy interest, not that of the
then-Governor. Id. at 1178 n.9.
38. Id. at 1178, 1179.
39. Id. at 1178.
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be used for an investigation and be kept private.
While the Court does provide a framework for one’s privacy
interests to be overcome by the public interest, it is perhaps
difficult for a member of the public to overcome that privacy
interest. The evidence needed to meet the standard is not easily
uncovered and is likely to be closely guarded. Therefore, there
likely would never be more than suspicion or speculation for
situations where the evidence to meet the standard is difficult to
obtain. Here, a suspicion is perhaps justly warranted by the
public when the law enforcement agency, accountable to the
Governor, is investigating a member of the Governor’s family to
ensure that the investigation is conducted fairly. The Court says
that the investigative report was comprehensive, but stays silent
on what constitutes a comprehensive report. While it might be
impossible to have a standard for a comprehensive report given
the varying nature of every investigation, the lack thereof leaves
little direction for assessing a report and possibly leaves the door
open for impropriety to be concealed this way. Moreover, the
Court pointed to Caleb’s charge as a reason for lack of
impropriety. This seemingly suggests that not being charged
might be evidence of impropriety, but the Court leaves unclear
whether this is so. This also suggests that charging a suspect may
be enough per se to always protect information in police reports
from becoming public, which leaves open the possibility of subjects
of a police investigation simply being charged in order to protect
the information in investigative police reports from being made
available to the public. Therefore, the Court might have left open
possibilities that could allow law enforcement records that could
show government impropriety from ever being accessed by the
public.
Yet, it is unlikely that these possible routes around the
standard to always protect information from the public will be
successful. The person requesting the records could always bring
a suit to compel the disclosure of records, at which point a trial
judge would assess those records and make a determination
whether or not they should be disclosed. It is extremely unlikely
that government impropriety would reach the reviewing trial
judge.
Furthermore, the privacy interests are likely to be strong
enough to outweigh the public interest. As mentioned,
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investigative reports are likely to be highly detailed and rife with
personal information, which would normally not be disclosed to
the public. This normally undisclosed information should not
automatically be disclosed because it happens to be in the records
of a public institution, or else the exceptions to the disclosure law
and general notions of personal privacy would be defeated. The
privacy concerns are exactly why the need to provide evidence of
impropriety to access records is necessary, so that private
information is not easily discoverable on mere speculation or
suspicion of some wrongdoing. Therefore, the Court’s holding
enforces the safeguards against the disclosure of private
information while keeping with the spirit of making records
accessible to the public for the public interest.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a citizen seeking
to compel a public institution to disclose records for the public
interest, under the APRA, to uncover government negligence or
impropriety must provide evidence of such negligence or
impropriety, not just speculation. The Court determined that this
standard is necessary in order to protect individual privacy
interests and give the statute its proper effect of limiting
disclosure of public records in order to prevent an unwarranted
invasion of privacy.
Andrew D. Senerchia

Tort Law. Hyde v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d
452 (R.I. 2016). Repressed recollection, on its own, does not qualify
as an “unsound mind” disability, and therefore does not toll the
statute of limitations in cases of childhood, sexual abuse against
non-perpetrator defendants.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Helen Hyde and Jeffrey Thomas (Plaintiffs), former students of
Our Lady of Mercy in East Greenwich, Rhode Island, filed suit in
Providence County Superior Court, seeking damages from the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence (Defendant) for the sexual
abuse they experienced while under Defendant’s supervision.1 The
sexual perpetrator, Father Brendan Smyth (Smyth), an agent and
employee of Defendant, passed away prior to the commencement of
this suit.2
Ms. Hyde’s abuse began in 1967, when she was six years old
and a student at Our Lady of Mercy.3 Ms. Hyde states that the
abuse took place in a classroom, schoolyard, church, her home, and
in the woods outside of her house.4 Mr. Thomas claimed that not
long after Smyth began to abuse Ms. Hyde, Smyth raped and
molested him in the church’s rectory and in Hyde’s backyard.5
In their complaints, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant and
his predecessors knew about Smyth’s sexual abuse of children by
the 1940s, yet continued to allow him to serve as priest under his
supervision.6 The Plaintiffs also claimed that due to the amount of
sexual abuse inflicted, Smyth was sent away for treatment before
he was allowed to return to Our Lady of Mercy.7 The Plaintiffs
1. Hyde v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 452, 454–55
(R.I. 2016).
2. Id. at 455.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

888

2017]

SURVEY SECTION

889

alleged “numerous counts of negligence, negligent supervision,
vicarious liability, fraud, intentional nondisclosure, and intentional
failure to supervise,” against the Defendant.8 The Plaintiffs also
asserted that each of them had repressed recollection of the abuse
that was committed against them and did not recover these
memories until within three years of the filing of the lawsuit.9
In response to the Plaintiffs’ complaints, the Defendant filed
motions to dismiss the complaints on the grounds that repressed
memory only applied in cases where the perpetrator is the
defendant, so the action was barred by the statute of limitations,
and the Plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient to support the
tolling of the statute under the “unsound mind” provision of Rhode
Island General Laws section 9-1-19.10 The Plaintiffs opposed,
arguing that repressed memory by itself can be a tolling mechanism
under the “unsound mind” provision, an evidentiary hearing was in
order pursuant to precedent, and their fraud claims were timely
because they could not have known about the Defendant’s
fraudulent conduct until they remembered the sexual abuse.11
At the motion to dismiss hearing, the Defendant argued that
the Rhode Island Supreme Court had never held that repressed
memories alone could constitute an unsound mind.12 The
Defendant also argued that the statute did not apply to nonperpetrator defendants, so there was no need for an evidentiary
hearing.13 The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, without prejudice, pending an evidentiary hearing to be
held to determine if the Plaintiffs could demonstrate that repressed

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-19 provides:
If any person at the time any such abuse of action shall accrue to him
or her shall be under the age of eighteen years, or of unsound mind,
or beyond the limits of the United States, the person may bring the
cause of action, within the time limited under this chapter, after the
impediment is removed.
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
11. Id. Plaintiffs’ claimed that according to the Court’s decision in Kelly
v. Marcantanio, 678 A.2d 873, 879 (R.I. 1996), they deserved an evidentiary
hearing on repressed memory. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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memories would qualify as an unsound mind.14 However, the trial
court did agree that prior decisions definitively held that nonperpetrator defendants could not be tolled under the statute.15
More than a year later, the Defendant filed a motion for entry
of a scheduling order and attached a proposed schedule.16 Plaintiffs
objected to the proposed order because they asserted their right to
conduct discovery on an intentional concealment toll pursuant to
section 9-1-20.17 The Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs had
waived their right to present a fraudulent concealment theory.18
The trial justice held that she would not allow discovery on
fraudulent concealment, but she would allow the Plaintiffs to file a
motion to reargue the motion to dismiss and raise this issue.19
Following the justice’s suggestion, the Plaintiffs moved to
reargue their opposition to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.20 A
hearing was held, and the trial justice determined that none of Ms.
Hyde’s allegations constituted fraudulent concealment.21 The trial
judge also held that she would not allow Plaintiffs to combine the
claims of fraudulent concealment and repressed memory to extend
the statute of limitations.22 At a later continuation of the hearing,
the trial court found that there was no evidence of actual
misrepresentations by the Defendant, and any misrepresentations
that were made to Ms. Hyde’s mother were only applicable until
Ms. Hyde reached eighteen.23 The trial court also denied the
Plaintiffs’
motion
for
discovery
regarding
fraudulent
concealment.24
Finally, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs did not meet the
14. Id. at 456.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. R.I GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-20 provides that
If any person, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently, by actual
misrepresentation, conceal from him or her the existence of the cause of action,
the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the
time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first discover its existence.
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 457.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 457–58.
23. Id. at 458.
24. Id.
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definition of “unsound mind,” and therefore the statute of
limitations began at the time of the offense, not when the Plaintiffs
became aware through a recovered memory.25 Accordingly, the
trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
and Plaintiffs timely appealed.26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to
interpret Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-19 to address the
dispute between the parties.27 The Court first looked to see if
Plaintiffs’ repressed recollection, by itself, satisfied the “unsound
mind” requirement necessary for the statute of limitations to toll
under Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-19.28 The Court
relied on its prior holding in Kelly v. Marcantanio and Roe v.
Gelineau, which held that an “unsound mind” meant the inability
to manage one’s day-to-day affairs; however, there was ambiguity
as to whether this applied to repressed recollection.29 Looking to
resolve whether not being able to manage one’s day to day activities
was required under repressed recollections, the Court looked at the
General Assembly’s enactment of section 9-1-51.30 The Court
focused on the Assembly’s decision to phrase the statute as limiting
the provision to actual abusers.31 The Assembly stated that this
25. Id. at 459.
26. Id. at 460.
27.
Id. The Court conducted a de novo review to see whether the trial
court should have granted summary judgment. Id. at 460 (citing Woodruff v.
Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805, 809 (R.I. 2014)). Whether a statute of limitations has run
against a plaintiff’s claim is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo.
Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 942–43 (R.I. 2015)).
28.
Id.
29. Id. at 463 (quoting Roe, 794 A.2d 476, 486 (R.I. 2002).
30. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §9-1-51 provides that:
(a) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought
by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result
of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within seven years of
the act alleged to have abused the injury or condition, or seven years
of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered
that the injury or condition was caused by the act, whichever period
expires later.
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 2016 Legis. Sess.).
31. Id. at 465 (quoting Kelly v. Marcantanio, 678 A.2d. 873, 878 (R.I.
1996).
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was because of the causal connection between the abuser, who is
responsible for the “. . .[victim’s] psychological defense mechanism
leading to repression,” and the victim.32 Accordingly, the Court
held that under section 9-1-19, repressed recollection, standing
alone, does not toll the statute of limitations when dealing with nonperpetrator defendants.33
The Court then went on to discuss the Plaintiffs’ contention
that the trial court erred in denying them the opportunity to seek
discovery on fraudulent concealment claims.34 On this issue, the
Court was required to give considerable deference to the trial
court’s decision concerning discovery, reversing only for abuse of
discretion.35 Relying on their decision in Ryan v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Providence, the Court stated that the Plaintiffs, to prove
fraudulent concealment, must show: “(1) that the defendant made
an actual misrepresentation of fact; and (2) that, in making that
misrepresentation, the defendant fraudulently concealed the
existence of plaintiff’s causes of action.”36
Here, the Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant made many
misrepresentations, such that the Defendant knew of Smyth’s
abuse and failed to report it; the parish held Smyth out in good
standing to the community; that when Ms. Hyde’s mother went to
the church to complain about the abuse, they threatened to
excommunicate her; that a prior Providence bishop, in an unrelated
case, made a sworn statement that it was his job to protect priests
accused of abuse; and finally, when Ms. Hyde recovered her
memories in 2005 and confronted the Defendant, the Defendant
attempted to conceal and deflect Smyth’s abuse.37 However true or
false these allegations were, the Court held that none of the conduct
could have led the Plaintiffs to believe that the abuse did not occur,
therefore leaving the statute of limitations intact.38 Hence, the
32. Id. (quoting Kelly, 678 A.2d. at 878.)
33. Id. The Court said that reading §§ 9-1-19 and 9-1-51 together made it
clear that § 9-1-51 set the exclusive means with which repressed recollection
could toll the statute of limitations. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 460 (citing Shelter Harbor Conservation Soc’y, Inc. v. Rogers, 21
A.3d 337, 343 (R.I. 2011)).
36. Id. at 465–66 (quoting 941 A.2d 174, 182 (R.I. 2008)).
37. Id. at 466.
38.
Id. The Court stated that mere silence is not enough to be actual
misrepresentation; just because the Defendant may have known about Smyth
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Court stated that the trial justice did not err when denying the
Plaintiffs’ request to seek discovery on the fraudulent concealment
claim.39
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied mainly on the Rhode
Island General Assembly’s enactment of section 9-1-51 after the
Court chose not to integrate a discovery rule into that provision in
their holding in Kelly.40 However, if you read into what the General
Assembly enacted after the Court refused to include a discovery
rule in that statute, it could be reasonably argued that there does
not have to be a discovery rule for section 9-1-19, since they are both
dealing with the type of sexual abuse that happened to the
Plaintiffs here. Also, in section 9-1-51, the General Assembly
completely left out unsound mind and let the discovery rule apply
by itself.41 If the Court read the sections together under this light,
it would seem that repressed recollections, by themselves, could toll
the statute of limitations.
However, it seems the Plaintiffs could not sue under section 91-51 because the Court previously held that it did not apply to nonperpetrator defendants, and the Plaintiffs were suing the Bishop,
who was a non-perpetrator defendant.42 Alternatively, the Court
left open just what evidence a plaintiff is required to show, other
than just repressed recollections, to toll the statute of limitations
under section 9-1-19. This seems to be an important aspect that
the Court left out, which makes it almost an unattainable standard
to meet when trying to sue non-perpetrator defendants.
When dealing with the fraudulent concealment argument, the
Court stated the elements that the Plaintiffs had to show to
abusing children, does not mean it was specific to these plaintiffs; just because
the Defendant threated excommunication does not establish that he misled the
Plaintiffs to believe that no cause of action existed; and Plaintiff was actively
investigating Smyth as an abuser, so the fact that the Defendant tried to
deflect could not have led her to believe the abuse did not occur; finally, holding
Smyth out in good standing to the community is not a misrepresentation to the
Plaintiffs themselves required to toll the statute of limitations. Id.
39.
Id.
40. Id. at 464.
41.
Id. at 465 (quoting Kelly v. Marcantanio, 678 A.2d. 873, 878 (R.I.
1996).
42.
Id. (quoting Kelly, 678 A. 2d at 878–79.)
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demonstrate that there was fraudulent concealment as stated
above, and held that the Plaintiffs’ allegations failed to meet this
demonstration. However, the Plaintiffs were asking for discovery
on this claim to uncover what other misrepresentations were made
so that they could satisfy the rule. When the Court denied them
this opportunity, it cut off their only other alternative to hold the
Defendant accountable for the abuse that they endured under his
supervision.
While under these facts, the Court was completely justified in
its holding under the repressed recollections, it left no standard to
decide what evidence, combined with repressed recollections, could
toll the statute of limitations. The Court also could have
interpreted the General Assembly’s action or inaction in a different
light that would have been more favorable to the Plaintiffs in this
case. Finally, the Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim should
have been allowed discovery before the Court decided whether or
not they had enough proof of actual misrepresentation to permit
denying or granting summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment. The Court held that the statute of
limitations under the “unsound mind” provision is not tolled by
repressed recollections in and of themselves against a nonperpetrator defendant because of the causal connection reasoning
behind the General Assembly’s enactment of section 9-1-19. Finally,
the Court held that the Plaintiffs did not meet the burden of
showing actual misrepresentation of the Defendant to toll the
statute of limitations under the theory of fraudulent concealment.
Tara Gunn

2016 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 007, 008. An Act Relating to
Elections—Registration of Voters. This Act allows Rhode Island
citizens the ability to complete voter registration through an
online portal, so long as their information is verifiable. The
Secretary of State shall maintain the electronic voter registration
system, and may request any state agency, quasi-public agency, or
municipality to furnish information that the Secretary of State
deems necessary to cross-reference and verify information that
registrants submit. Any information collected by the Secretary of
State or submitted by a registrant can be shared or disclosed with
any governmental or non-governmental entity for any reason
except for voter registration purposes or pursuant to a court order.
However, the secretary of state may enter into an agreement and
exchange registrant data with any other state for the purposes of
updating the statewide central voter register, provided that the
Secretary of State enters into an agreement to protect the
confidentiality of such registrants’ data.
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 039, 041. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses—Electronic Tracking of Motor Vehicles. This
Act makes illegal the act of knowingly installing, concealing, or
placing an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle
without the consent of the operator and all occupants of the
vehicle for the purpose of monitoring or following the operator, or
any of the occupants of the vehicle. However, such installing,
placing, or concealing of an electronic tracking device on a motor
vehicle is not an offense if done by a law enforcement officer in
furtherance of an investigation and carried out in accordance with
applicable state and federal law. Similarly, if an electronic
tracking device is placed on a motor vehicle by a parent or legal
guardian who owns or leases a car for the purpose of monitoring a
minor child when the child is an occupant in the vehicle, then the
parent or legal guardian need not obtain consent. Furthermore,
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this Act does not apply to electronic tracking devices installed in
or on goods located within a motor vehicle for the purpose of
tracking such goods; electronic tracking devices used remotely to
disable the starter of a motor vehicle if used by a motor vehicle
dealer with the express written consent of the vehicle’s purchaser,
lessor, or lessee; if a electronic tracking device is used by a
business for the purpose of tracking vehicles that are owned by
the business, its affiliates, or contractors. A violation of this Act is
a misdemeanor and carries with it a penalty of up to one year in
prison, a $1,000 fine, or both.
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 092, 104. An Act Relating to
Education—Holocaust and Genocide Education. This Act
specifically defined “Holocaust” to mean the “systematic,
bureaucratic, state-sponsored, persecution and murder of
approximately six million (6,000,000) Jews and five million
(5,000,000) other individuals by the Nazi regime and its
collaborators. Under this Act, the state is required to collect and
disseminate to every school district, private school, mayoral
academy, and charter school materials on holocaust and genocide
awareness and education. Furthermore, every school district is
required to include in its curriculum a unit on holocaust and
genocide, not limited to the materials furnished by the state. The
required unit on holocaust and genocide education must be
utilized during appropriate times in middle school and/or high
school curricula, as determined by the local authority, and all
students should have received instruction on holocaust and
genocide awareness materials by the time they have graduated
from high school.
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 131, 135. An Act Relating to
Criminal Procedure—Domestic Violence Prevention Act. This Act
established the Domestic Violence Prevention Fund used to
support and promote evidence-based programs aimed at
preventing domestic violence and dating violence throughout the
state, and the fund shall be administered by the Rhode Island
Coalition Against Domestic Violence. The Coalition shall create a
committee, which will be responsible for the implementation of
programs to prevent domestic violence by developing a plan for
the distribution of funds, develop criteria for awarding for funds,
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issue requests for proposals to organizations that will provide
services to the committee, review proposals for funds, and monitor
and account for funds. The Coalition shall submit an annual
report detailing the expenditure of funds to the senate and house
finance committee on or before February 28 of each year.
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 202, 204. An Act Relating to
Criminal Procedure—Identification and Apprehension of
Criminals. This Act allows a person to file a motion for the
expungement of records relating to a deferred sentence ten (10)
years after the completion of the sentence. After filing such a
motion, the court will hold a hearing on the motion. In order for
said motion to be granted, the individual must: comply with all
terms of the deferred sentencing agreement, have paid any and all
court-ordered fines, fees, costs, assessments, and restitution, have
no criminal proceedings pending against them, and establish that
he or she has good moral character.
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 352, 373. An Act Relating to
Human Services—Abused and Neglected Children. This Act
establishes the duty of individuals to report the sexual abuse of
children in an educational program. The Act requires that anyone
who has reason to know or suspect that any child has been
subjected to sexual abuse by an employee, agent, contractor, or
volunteer of an educational program, as defined in R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 40-11-2, to notify, within twenty-four hours, the Department of
Children Youth and Families (DCYF). The Act then mandates
that DCYF forward the report to state police or local authorities to
initiate an investigation.
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 377, 499. An Act Relating to
Human Services—Public Assistance Act. This Act limits the use
of an electronic-benefit-transfer card. Under this Act, holders of
an electronic-benefit-transfer card may not use said card at any
liquor store, casino or other gambling facility, retail establishment
that provides adult-oriented entertainment. An individual that
receives direct-cash assistance on said card and uses such cash
assistance for any prohibited use shall, for the first offense, have
their cash assistance reduced for one month by the portion of the
family’s benefit attributable to one parent. For a second offense,
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the individual’s cash assistance shall be reduced by three months
by the portion of the family’s benefit attributable to one parent.
For a third offense, an individual who receives cash assistance
shall be disqualified from the direct-cash assistance program.
Reciprocally, an establishment listed in this Act that accepts
payment from an individual using funds from the direct-cash
assistance program. Any establishment that violates this
prohibition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
no more than five hundred dollars ($500); for a second offense, no
less than five hundred dollars ($500) and no more than two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500); and for a third, or
subsequent offense a fine of not less than two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500). In addition to these fines, an
establishment’s license to conduct business may be revoked.
2016 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 411, 412. An Act Relating to
Criminal Procedure—Cell Phone Tracking. This Act forbids any
agent of the state to obtain location information without a warrant
unless a warrant requirement exception applies. The Act has
specific notice requirements that an agent of the state must
complete when he or she wishes to obtain location information.
The agent or political subdivision of the state shall notify the
customer no later than five (5) days after the agent or political
subdivision of the state receives location information. By
registered, first-class, or electronic mail, the agent or political
subdivision of the state must provide the customer notice, which
includes: a copy of the warrant, if applicable, a statement of the
law enforcement inquiry, a statement that location information
maintained by a service provider was supplied to a law
enforcement, a number associated with the electronic device, and
the dates for which the location information was obtained. Under
the Act, an agent or a political subdivision of the state may obtain
location information without a warrant under the following
circumstances: in order to respond to a call for emergency services;
if an agent of the state believes that an emergency involving
immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any
person requires the obtaining of information relating to the
emergency without delay; if the location information was
generated by electronic device used as a condition of release from
a penal institution or other sentencing order; with the express
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consent of the owner or user of the electronic device concerned;
with the express, informed consent of a parent or foster parent of
a minor who is the owner or user of the electronic device; if the
electronic device is lost or stolen; or if the electronic device is a
government-owned device issued to an employee. An acquisition
of location information shall immediately terminate when the
location information sought is obtained. An agent or political
subdivision may obtain, without court order, location information
when that information, including metadata attached to images
and videos, is otherwise publicly available on social media. By
January 31 of each year, each law enforcement agency that
collects location information must submit a report for the previous
year, identifying the number of warrants issued for location
information for an electronic device that were approved and
denied. Said report must include: the agency making the
application; the offense specified in the warrant are application
thereof; the number of warrants granted, in full or in part, and the
number denied; and the number and duration of any extensions of
the warrant.

